

THE ANDOVER REVIEW

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THE
ANDOVER REVIEW:
A RELIGIOUS AND THEOLOGICAL MONTHLY.

VOL. XI. — APRIL, 1889. — No. LXIV.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HILL GREEN.

It is no secret that the Professor Grey of Mrs. Ward's "Robert Elsmere" is the *umbra*, if not the *nomen*, of the late Professor Green of Oxford. Professor Green is known in this country, where he is known at all, as the author of certain philosophical treatises and criticisms which the uninitiated, if not the expert, would class as decidedly hard reading. Indeed, it suggests the irony of fate that one whose writings are anything but popular, in the ordinary sense of the term, should become part of the intellectual background — Grey is hardly a living character — of the most popular novel of the day. For Green's writings lack popularity both of style and of aim. Clear they are, but only because they are the adequate expression of thought which is remarkably exact and painstaking, as well as conscientious to a degree that will allow no possible qualification to go unmade, no possible objection to remain unanswered, no possible limitations to be passed over. And they were not written *ad populum*, but for philosophical students, one might say for philosophical specialists. Green's intellectual conscience was so sensitive that he very obviously refrains from any attempt to win assent by any adventitious appeals. He is scrupulous to a fault, it sometimes seems, in refusing any alliance with outside movements or parties that might make for his advantage. In form and in substance he will have his thoughts gain the influence that the truth embodied in them can command, and only that influence.

While Green's influence has been growing year by year, and while those whom it has touched, it has touched profoundly, even

radically, I do not think that it can be said to have extended beyond the circle of his personal pupils and of philosophical teachers and students. In this country, at least, hundreds must know Professor Grey to whom the "Introduction to Hume," the "Prolegomena to Ethics," and the lectures upon "Political Obligations" of Professor Green are unknown.

But the remoteness of his philosophy from life is, after all, more apparent than real. There is even a more specific connection of his thought with a novel that pretends to touch life seriously than the general tendency of our times to get the imagination and the understanding upon common ground. The connection is in the character and philosophy of Green; for his character was practical in the highest degree, and it is impossible to hold his philosophy as a mere speculative theory apart from its applications to life. It would be profitless, it might seem impertinent, had not Mrs. Ward set an example, to compare the living Green and the fictitious Grey. But common report, brief sketches by some of his contemporaries, and by some of his pupils, the brief but authoritative biographical account, all speak for the intensely practical bent of his nature, and his philosophy is there to speak for itself. Both theoretically and personally, the deepest interests of his times were the deepest interests of Professor Green. The most abstruse and critical of his writings are, after all, only attempts to solve the problems of his times — the problems which meet us in current magazine discussions, in social and political theory, in poetry, in religion, and in the interpretation of the higher results of science. Professor Caird gives us the clue to the connection of Professor Green's philosophy with the actual life of his times, in saying that one of the main features of Green's character was the distinctness with which he lived by conviction, not by impulse. It was the belief, the profound belief, that all action should spring from conviction, not any love of abstract and abstruse speculations, that made him a philosopher. He saw in what is called philosophy only a systematic search for and justification of the conviction by which man should live. We are not surprised, therefore, when Professor Caird goes on to say that the other main trait of Green's character was the intensity of his intellectual and political interests. His philosophic theory was in the service of these interests, and his political thought and activity was the application of his philosophic conviction. He was (to quote Caird again) "a democrat of the democrats. From a somewhat exclusive interest in the essentials of humanity — in

the spiritual experiences in which all men are alike — his sympathies were always with the many rather than with the few."

Upon both sides, the side of philosophic conviction, and the side of political and social life, Green is in closest contact with the deepest interests of his times. In the true sense, his philosophy, however strictly logical and impersonal in form, is vital and concrete. The theoretic difficulties and the practical aspirations of this last half century are voiced by Green. He is in a more real and, I cannot but think, more lasting way the prophet of our times than many hailed as prophets who have addressed themselves to the public in more direct and popular ways. In this article I wish, so far as I may, considering the technical character of the subject-matter and the limits of space, to give an account of the burden of this prophecy. I wish to point out the theoretic conviction by which he met the doubts and questionings of the intellectual life of these times, and the practical conviction in which he articulated the best political desire and conduct of to-day.

Beginning with the speculative side, I may say that Green's object was to reconcile science and religion. But this phrase needs to be carefully interpreted. If it means a forced exegesis of Scripture on the one hand, and a somewhat questionable use of somewhat doubtful facts on the other, nothing was more remote from the intention of Green. Nor did he work in the more legitimate field of showing that the main doctrines of theology find no contradiction in the general theories of science. Indeed, he carefully refrains from the introduction of specifically religious ideas, — almost of the word religion. By the reconciliation of science and religion, I mean the attempt to show that science, as the fundamental, theoretical interest of man, and religion as his fundamental, emotional, and practical interest have a common source and a common guaranty. It was the main work of Green's speculative philosophy to show that there is a spiritual principle at the root of ordinary experience and science, as well as at the basis of ethics and religion; to show, negatively, that whatever weakens the supremacy and primacy of the spiritual principle makes science impossible, and, positively, to show that any fair analysis of the conditions of science will show certain ideas, principles, or categories — call them what you will — that are not physical and sensible, but intellectual and metaphysical.

Professor Green has himself given a statement of his general intention at the beginning of his "*Prolegomena to Ethics*." He

there points out that there is a certain conflict between poetry and natural science. The ideas contained in the best poetry of our times, the ideas that recommend it to select and serious spirits, are not verifiable by sense. These ideas, if outside the domain of dogmatic theology, are as surely outside the domain of natural science. And yet the most intelligent critics are not willing, says Professor Green, that any justification should be sought for the ideas of poetry. While they cherish these ideas as their own deepest personal convictions, yet they are not willing that their systematic analysis should be attempted. Natural science alone gives certainty and truth; compared with science these ideas are illusions. Yet they are illusions which interest the imagination, and which have power over the heart. Better leave them as they are, these critics say, than attempt a philosophy of them which would be equally an illusion, and which, dull and pretentious, would not touch even the feelings. And yet Professor Green says, in substance, he must insist that fundamental ideas of life and conduct cannot be left to the domain of individual feeling, of poetry, but have an independent justification in the shape of philosophy. This justification he finds to be the more necessary, because, unless the validity of the deeper ideas of poetry and religion can be shown, the conception of a man as a moral being must also vanish. If the underlying ideas of poetry are incompatible with natural science, ethics must also be eliminated. Yet we cannot deny physical science. What shall we do? Analyze the conditions of science, or connected knowledge of matters of fact, and see if it does not presuppose a principle which is not scientific, that is, a principle which is not a matter of fact. If we find embedded in the heart of knowledge of nature a principle not natural, we may then ask whether this same principle is not active in moral experience, if it does not have an expression in the consciousness of a moral ideal and in action in accordance with this ideal.

Professor Green begins accordingly with the complete acceptance of physical science, — not merely of its details, but of its methods and principles. Not in spite of, but through these principles he expects to justify the reality of spiritual and moral ideas. A right examination of science will show it to be not an enemy of poetry and religion, but a most helpful ally. But these phrases should not be misunderstood. It is not science as a body of knowledge of matters of sensible facts, nor science in its characteristic physical methods, that points to an ideal principle which

morals may employ. On the contrary, there is an antithesis between the natural and the moral. But a *metaphysical* analysis of science will reveal, as the basis of natural science, a principle which transcends nature, a principle which is spiritual.

If this is true, one may well ask why the belief should be almost universally current that there is something hostile to religion in the principles of science. Green found the reason for this seeming contradiction in the current interpretation of the characteristic empirical philosophy of Great Britain. This interpretation seemed to make spiritual ideas an outlaw, while it amply justified the methods and categories of "experience" and of the science of nature. If this interpretation were correct, if it were possible for a philosophy at once to guarantee a knowledge of the sensible, and render invalid any knowledge of that which lies beyond the sensible, the position that from the fortress of science turns its guns upon religion would be impregnable. Green's first efforts were directed, naturally, to an investigation of this empirical philosophy. He wished to show that it was no more compatible with science than it was with religion; that a consistent interpretation of Empiricism sapped the roots of knowledge as well as of faith. Empiricism cannot be worked in two opposite directions at once. It cannot bless science and curse religion. Green believed that Hume was the historic proof of this statement, — that his skepticism was the legitimate outcome of Locke's empiricism. It was because contemporary thought failed to recognize this that it trusted science as natural and positive, while rejecting philosophy and religion as fanciful and arbitrary. It retained Hume's negation as to theology, but not as to knowledge. It adopted just enough of his skepticism to cling to science and to reject philosophy. Green's first work was, therefore, in a sense, negative and polemic; it was to go over the movement from Locke to Hume, and to show how completely and inevitably it led to a skepticism which meted out to science the same measure that the anachronistic empiricism of to-day would mete out only to religion. This once accomplished, a truly constructive movement might occur. Modern consciousness might be trusted not to deny science, and having once realized that an empirical philosophy made it impossible, would turn to a spiritual philosophy which would justify it. This done, the application of the spiritual principle to ethics and theology would follow as matter of course. This represents fairly, I think, the underlying motive and the general character of Green's first important philosophic work, — the "Introductions to Hume's Treatise of Human Nature."

To give a synopsis of almost four hundred closely printed octavo pages in a magazine article would be neither possible nor edifying. The mode in which the examination is carried on is, however, highly characteristic of Green. The criticism is exhaustive and laborious to the last degree. It contains a minute and thorough analysis of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, which does not content itself with general views and theories, but takes up every detail of doctrine that in any way bears upon their underlying principles. Nor is it an external criticism. The examination is of Locke himself, and not of Locke as tested by some other thinker. The criticism is directed towards discovering his own self-consistency, and the reasons which made it practically impossible for him to be self-consistent.

The general result may be stated apart from all detail. The contention of Green is that while empiricism must either make intelligence a mere product or deny to it all constructive function, as matter of fact it cannot get along without ascribing certain powers to intelligence. Stated in another way, empiricism must always base its explanations upon the reality of certain relations, but these relations, according to its own theory, must be products. The *basis* of empiricism is the reality of some relation, whether with Locke that of substance, or with Hume that of succession. But the result of empiricism is that every relation is a mere product of sensations. This contradiction is essential to the very method of empiricism. It is, to use illustrations of Professor Green, as if a geologist were to teach that the first formation of rocks was the product of all layers built upon it, or as if a physiologist were to teach that a certain digestive act, exercised by some organism, was the cause of that organism. If the minimum of relation due to intelligence and not to external causes be allowed, constructive function is allowed to intelligence, and we have a spiritual principle at the basis of experience, a principle which may be the source of morals and of religion as well as of experience and science. But if all relation is eliminated, then experience as well as science must be eliminated. "A consistent sensationalism would be speechless."

Three years afterward, in 1877, Green returned to the charge, — but this time it was the philosophy of Herbert Spencer and of G. H. Lewes that received his criticism. His object was the same as in his earlier work: to show the incompatibility of an empirical philosophy with science, and to show the necessity for English-speaking people of a new departure in philosophy. Professor

Green had learned, he tells us in the introductory paragraph of his new work, that "each generation requires the questions of philosophy to be put to it in its own language, and, unless they are so put, will not be at the pains to understand them." As Spencer and Lewes were the typical representatives of the same kind of thought as that of Locke and Hume, the philosophy that separated reality from intelligence, Professor Green thought he could best justify a philosophy which made reality depend upon intelligence, by an examination of these writers. It was characteristic of Spencer's philosophy that using the same empirical method as the earlier empiricists, framing the same theory of knowledge, as built up of impressions forced upon the mind from without, it had tried to unite with this theory of knowledge a positive, constructive philosophy which should rest upon the certainty of particular scientific facts and laws, and upon the certainty of the fundamental conceptions of science, such as the relation of cause and effect, the principle of the persistence of force, etc. Spencer, like Hume, regards knowledge as built up out of sensations; he moves a more extensive, a more cumbrous machinery, but, after all, his encyclopædic marshalling of facts, his broad deploying of scientific forces, comes to the sensational theory of knowledge that possessed the earlier empiricists. And yet Spencer frames a theory of the development of the universe, of life, of mind, and of society. Here, without going into details, is where Green finds the vulnerable point of Spencer. He unites a theory of knowledge which makes science impossible with a theory of the construction of the universe built up at every point upon science. Spencer denies all constructive, all synthetic function to intelligence; he makes intelligence a product of events and forces which are not intelligent. All knowledge is thus a product, an effect of something wholly unrelated to intelligence, hence unknowable. Between knowledge and reality there is thus a great gap fixed. And yet Spencer tells what the laws and forces of the universe are, and how they have produced life and mind. Science, as a body of facts, is to be implicitly relied upon; science, as the process and product of human intelligence, has no objective value. On this contradiction the philosophy of Spencer is based.

Spencer, in a word, only tells us, taking a longer, more round-about road than the earlier empiricists followed, using the life of the race instead of that of an individual, that experience is the source of knowledge, while he has a theory of experience which would not allow it to be the source of anything. The question,

the real question of philosophy, is thus left unanswered: What is experience? How is it constituted? In his "Prolegomena to Ethics" Green takes up this question at first hand. It is impossible even to give the successive steps of the argument, much less the reasonings upon which the conclusions depend. We may, however, summarize some of the leading results. If we ask what is implied in saying that any experience is real instead of illusory, or if we ask how it is that we can distinguish between being and seeming, between fact and fancy, the answer is, because there is a connected whole of experience, "a nature of things." What is mere seeming or unreal is not capable of becoming a member of this unified world. In this unity of the world there is further implied the existence of a single, permanent, and all-inclusive system of relations. But even now we have not found an ultimate fact in which intelligence may rest. We have to ask what is implied in the existence of this system of relations. And the answer is, that its existence has meaning only upon the supposition of a permanent single consciousness which forms the bond of relations, — "an eternal intelligence realized in the related facts of the world."

If it seems to be a far cry from our ability to distinguish fact from fancy to the proof of an eternal self-consciousness, the reader must attribute the gaps to our summary, and not to the argument of Professor Green. The reader must also avoid confusing the argument of Green with the so-called causal proof of the existence of God. The argument does not attempt to show that God is necessary as a cause of the world, but that in the existence of knowable fact, in the existence of that which we call reality, there is necessarily implied an intelligence which is one, self-distinguishing and not subject to conditions of space and time. This intelligence cannot be identified with *our* intelligence, that is, with an intelligence which has a succession of experiences in time, because *our* intelligence is only "a part of the partial world"; it is part of that experience which is to be accounted for. What, then, is the relation of our intelligence to this eternal divine intelligence? Just this, according to Green: the eternal intelligence reproduces itself in us, partially and gradually; it communicates to us piecemeal, but in inseparable correlation, experience, and the world of which we have experience, understanding, and the facts understood.

These are the two fundamental positions of Green's constructive work: on one side an eternal self-consciousness, as involved

in the reality of experience; on the other side, human consciousness as a progressive reproduction of this divine consciousness. Since there is a tendency in some minds to call every philosophic theory pantheistic which does not offer itself as the baldest deism, it may be well to call attention to the two traits which distinguish Green's philosophy from pantheism. One of these traits is found in the relation of God to the world. God may, indeed, be thought as the unity of the world, but only as its *spiritual* unity. God and the world are not facts of the same order, as they must be according to pantheism. God is *self-consciousness*; that is, a consciousness which distinguishes itself from every fact of nature, and from the sum total of such facts, although *apart* from nature this consciousness would not be what it is. In the second place, while pantheism would make the relation of human consciousness to the world and to God one of bare identity and absorption, the relation, according to Green, is one of spiritual, personal unity, and this implies that there be really spirit, personality on *both* sides of the relation.

It may be well to give a statement substantially in Green's own language of what is meant by the human self or man. Our consciousness may mean, he says, either of two things: either a function of the animal organism, which is being made, gradually and with interruptions, a vehicle of the eternal consciousness, or that eternal consciousness itself, as making the animal organism its vehicle. In this process, by which the divine self-consciousness makes the animal operations organic to its own reproduction, it is subject to the limitations and qualifications of the physical conditions to which it subjects itself; and yet, in itself, it retains its essential characteristic, that of being self-consciousness. And so, too, the product, the human consciousness, carries with it under all its limitations and qualifications the characteristic of being an object to itself. Of both the divine and the human consciousness, in other words, it may be said that it is spirit, for each is an object to itself; and of both it may be said that it is person, for each is an end in itself. Of self-consciousness, or spiritual personality, whether in God or in man, it may be said that it is "the only thing that is real in its own right; the only thing of which the reality is not relative and derived."

Experience thus means the continual reproduction in man of an eternal consciousness. This reproduction is limited by physical conditions, by the fact that it takes place in what is otherwise an animal organism, and thus the resulting experience is sensible

and not merely rational. Yet this experience, so far as it has any meaning, retains the marks of its spiritual, its rational source ; experience comes to us in successive moments, but that which is brought by experience neither comes nor goes, — it is the permanent divine intelligence. Science is simply *orderly* experience. It is the working out of the relations, the laws, implied in experience, but not visible upon its surface. It is a more adequate reproduction of the relations by which the eternal self-consciousness constitutes both nature and our understandings. It is clear how such a doctrine prepares the way for a moral theory, — indeed, in his “*Prolegomena*,” Green introduces it simply for the sake of getting a philosophical basis for ethics. Having found that in respect to his knowledge man is not a child of nature, but holds from a spiritual source, there is reason to apprehend that this spiritual principle may find expression in action : in consciousness of a moral ideal, and in the determination of action by it.

In truth, we find that man’s organism makes him not only a being of sensations, but of impulses and of wants. And just as the sensations, by becoming the organs of a divine spirit, are transformed into theoretic experience and science, so the impulses and wants, as *media* of the same divine spirit, are transformed into practical experience, into moral action. The reproduction in man of the consciousness which is an end-in-itself makes man an end in himself, and gives his actions, therefore, both an absolute law and an absolute ideal or good. As the action of the divine consciousness upon passing sensations makes them into an experience of what *is*, so the same consciousness acting upon transitory impulses creates our practical world, our conception of what is not, but *should* be, *ought* to be. The reproduction of the divine intelligence in us is, therefore, as much a condition of moral as of scientific experience. Indeed, it is more than a condition : the reproduction of the divine intelligence through the organism of our needs and our impulses to satisfy them *constitutes* our moral experience. A purely animal intelligence, one whose life was constituted by sensations and impulses alone, has no conception of any ideal world, of anything that ought to be, of any good, or of any duty. The wholly divine intelligence knows no distinction of real and ideal ; the *ought* and the *is* are one to God. But a being like man, in whom the divine has supervened upon the animal, must know that something ought to be, the divine intelligence, the divine will, which for him is not. Hence the constant conflict of the moral life ; hence the necessity of living it by faith,

not by sight; living, that is, by the conception of something which absolutely ought to be, rather than by the perception of what can be sensibly verified as already in existence.

But this general outline of Green's moral views must be made somewhat more specific. We may, perhaps, best accomplish this by analyzing into four stages our moral experience; that is, the relation of our actions arising from animal wants to the divine practical reason or will. (1) The mere presence of the divine consciousness to our wants constitutes an ideal self, which is both an absolute good and an absolute obligation. And if we ask concerning the nature of this absolute good, *what* it is as distinct from the mere fact *that* it is, the answer is (2), that it can be found only in some development of *persons*, and in that relation of persons to one another which we call *society*; and (3), if this answer is still vague, we may know that the consciousness of an ideal of this nature has been the parent of the institutions and usages and of the social judgments and aspirations through which human life has hitherto been bettered. Hence from these institutions and aspirations we may judge more concretely as to the nature of the ideal. (4) Man's *actual* achievements in morality, his virtue, is decided by the degree in which he is habitually responsive to the demands made upon him by the various institutions and customs in which the ideal good has already embodied itself, and to the spirit which is their source.

The first point is, in substance, that the presence of the permanent self-distinguishing consciousness in man determines man's real good. His good cannot be found in the satisfaction of this and that want, in the enjoyment of this and that pleasure, or in any possible series of pleasures. For the satisfaction of such wants does not satisfy the man, the person. His personality *is*, and is *what* it is only through the activity in him of the divine reason, and only that can really satisfy him which satisfies this reason. This can be found only in its own complete reproduction. What man wants is not satisfaction of any given impulse, but satisfaction of self, and this can be found only in God, because God is man's true self. In other words, by virtue of the super-vention of God upon man's animal wants and impulses, man has certain capabilities and aspirations which can be adequately named only by calling them divine. In the realization of these capabilities, human because more than animal, is man's good to be found. This good, the ideal self, is also a law to man. It is absolutely obligatory, that is, obligatory without qualification or exception.

It is obligatory because it is man's own real self. Were it a law or a goodness merely external to him, man might be forced or constrained to it, but he could never be obliged to it. But because it is the reality of his own being, man recognizes it as a law binding upon him. It is man's own duty to strive for perfection, because this striving is the expression of his own nature.

The statement that God is the ideal, or even the true self of man, is liable to interpretation from the wrong side, and, indeed, has often been so interpreted. It is taken to mean that God is only a projection of man; that he is an ideal that man forms of what man would be were he perfect, and that, therefore, God has no reality excepting as a conception of man's ideal, and that God becomes real in the degree in which man realizes his ideal. But this is a complete inversion of Green's thought. The reality of God in himself is a condition of our having the notion of Him as our own ideal self, of our attempts, our striving to make this ideal real, and of our measure of success. Human nature is rather the projection of God, that is, the reproduction of Him, through physical conditions, than God the projection of man's ideal. Man forms the conception of what he may possibly be, only because in itself this possibility is more than possible, because it is forever actual. "God is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming."

It is hardly a satisfactory explanation of moral experience, however, to say *that* there is an absolute good and an absolute duty constituted by the presence in us of a divine intelligence. We want to know *what* this good is; *what* we shall do in order to do our duty. In part, it must be confessed that this question cannot be answered. We cannot say what in fullness the ideal is until we have realized it. What our capabilities are we shall never know until we have manifested them. Yet every manifestation must conform to the nature of the ideal self which it manifests, and must be a partial revelation of its nature. From these two facts we shall be able to define somewhat more adequately the nature of the ideal.

Secondly, then, since the principle which is reproducing itself in us is a self-conscious personality, we may know that its reproduction must also be a self-conscious personality. Of one thing we may be sure: "Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of *personal* worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person." This ideal cannot be found, then, in impersonal humanity, in some national or world consciousness, in some organ-

ization of society, nor in some far-off event, however divine, towards which the world is supposed to be making. "The spiritual progress of mankind is an unmeaning phrase unless it means a progress *of* personal character, and *to* personal character, — a progress of which feeling, thinking, and willing subjects are the agents and substainers." But, on the other hand, this progress can be realized only in society. While its beginning, its process, and its end is in an individual, yet without society, and the conditions afforded by it, there can be no individual, no person. "Society is the condition of development of a personality." "Social life is to personality what language is to thought. Human society presupposes persons in *capacity*, but it is only in the intercourse of men, each recognized by each as an end, not merely a means, and thus as having reciprocal claims, that the capacity is actualized, and that we really live as persons." And not to speak of society at large, from a historical point of view, we know that we now "learn to regard ourselves as persons among other persons, because we are treated as such. It is through the action of society that the individual comes practically to conceive his own personality and to conceive the same personality as belonging to others; it is society, also, that supplies all the higher content to this conception, all those objects of a man's personal interest, in living for which he lives for his own satisfaction, except such as are derived from the merely animal nature." This much at least, then, we know of the end of moral conduct: it is to be found only in the perfection of persons living together as persons, that is, living in society.

But, thirdly, the divine consciousness not only presents itself to man as an ideal in which the capacities of all persons are realized, but it has communicated itself to some degree already in man's experience; man's wants and desires and choices have already, to some degree, become the vehicles or organs of the realization of the divine practical reason or will. This communication, piecemeal, interrupted, has constituted the moral experience of the life of the individual and of society in history. History, indeed, cannot be defined, excepting as the process by which a divine will, determined by reason, has articulated wants, desires, and ideas, by making them organic to its own reproduction. The idea that there is an absolute good, an ideal personality living in ideal relations to other persons, has been the moving spring, the vital source of all history, while the attempts to realize it have been the parent of all that makes history more than a mere

succession of events; of its institutions, of the family, the state, and the church, and of all the customs, laws, and aspirations of society.

The progress thus made in history in giving the inchoate idea of the good, definite articulation may be considered under two aspects. One is the extension of the area of the common good, the practical widening of the range of those who are considered members of society or interested in the same good. The other is the fuller determination of the content of this good. For in either case, it must be noticed that the good can be conceived only as a *common* good. This was implied when it was said that personality could be realized only in a society of persons. It is implied in the fact that the very idea of a divine consciousness reproducing itself in humanity does away with "all respect of persons." Each being in whom God so communicates himself is a person, an end in himself, and has the rights of personality. An ideal so constituted cannot be exclusive, cannot be other than common. If we put it in a more psychological way, the person who is to realize his capacities has interests in persons; not merely interests in them so far as they are *means* to his own gratification, but interest in them as in himself — interest in their good as in his own. Man cannot be thought as man without this fundamental social interest. This social interest cannot by any possibility be developed or evolved from forms of life which do not already in germ possess it. It is an ultimate fact in human history; a fact without which there would not be human history; a fact not deducible from any other history. A unity of interest, a conception of well-being common to a number of persons, however small the number, the idea of community is the necessary presupposition of all human history. Once given this community, this number of persons who conceive themselves and one another as persons, as ends in themselves, and any conceivable development of morality is possible. Without it, morality has no existence.

Progress in knowledge of and realization of the moral ideal has consisted largely just in the widening of the number of persons among whom there is conceived to be a common good, and between whom there is a common duty. So far as we can discover, in what we call the early periods, the area of those conceived to have common ends was limited to the family, or, at most, to the grouping of families of common birth in the tribe. And even in these limited areas, the grasp of the idea of community of

welfare was feeble and incomplete. The woman, the child, were theoretically, and in large manner practically, outside society, — society being defined as the group of persons recognizing themselves and each other as persons. To-day, theoretically at least, it is a belief, almost an axiom, that there is a potential duty of every man to every other man, — a duty which becomes actual so soon as one has dealings with the other. The stoic philosopher, the Roman jurist, the Christian teacher, have all contributed to the development of the idea of human equality; the idea that every man and woman is a sharer in the common good, and hence has the rights and claims of personality.

If we interrupt the exposition a moment, it is worth while to notice the extent to which this idea of the value of personality, of the potentialities contained in the lowest and the worst of mankind, was a governing motive in the life of Green. His conscience was developed to a point in which it became a public and political force as well as a private and "moral" monitor. His political and historical writings, as well as his purely philosophical one, show that he realized the idea of the personality embodied in every individual, not merely as a theoretic proposition, but as a claim, even as a burden upon himself; and his life, as a teacher and as a citizen, is full of evidence that the "enthusiasm of humanity" was not a vague phrase, an abstract formula, nor an emotional indulgence with him, but the ruling motive of his life. To him as to Aristotle the virtues of a good man are identical with those of the good citizen, and citizenship was widened from the Greek *polis* to a kingdom "as wide as the Humanity for which Christ died."

But this extension of the area of the sharers in the common good is not the only sign of growing correctness in the moral ideal. Progress is also marked in the fuller content given to the conception of the common good. In one sense, indeed, there cannot be said to have been any growth in the conception. To the Greek philosophers who first articulated the conception as to the most reflective moralist of to-day, goodness consisted in "purity of heart," that is, in a character controlled by interest in the good for its own sake, in conscious direction of the will to human perfection. But as habits and institutions have arisen in answer to this demand for perfection, our conception of what this perfection is has become richer and fuller, and the demands it makes upon us more comprehensive. "Faculties, dispositions, occupations, persons, of which a Greek citizen would have taken

no account, or taken account only to despise, are now recognized as having their place in the realization of the powers of the human soul." And "where the Greek saw a supply of possibly serviceable labor, having no end or function but to be made really serviceable to the privileged few, the Christian citizen sees a multitude of persons, who in their actual condition may have no advantage over the slaves of an ancient state, but who, in undeveloped possibility, and in the claims which arise out of that possibility, are all that he himself is. Seeing this, he finds a necessity laid upon him." If we apply this principle to virtues like fortitude and temperance, we find that in idea, in underlying motive, these virtues were the same to the Greek as they are to us. Bravery, then as now meant willingness to do and to bear, to any extreme, in the service of the highest public cause that the agent can conceive, — in one case the cause of the state, in the other, of the kingdom of God, — because it is the more excellent way so to do. But because man has realized his possibilities now so much more than in Greece, because he has revealed so much more his possibilities, the application of bravery is so much wider, so much more exacting, that it hardly seems like the same virtue. Aristotle found it only in the citizen-soldier willing to die for the state. Now the will to endure even unto death finds objects worthy to call forth this will where the Greek saw nothing but ugliness and meanness. It finds expression in the obscure laver of love, as well as in the splendid heroism at which a world wonders. So temperance to the Greek meant only control of the appetites of hunger, thirst, and sex, in the interests of the higher life. That was the sole conception of self-denial open to the Greek. But now interest in the problem of social deliverance, in the development of the "mass of men whom we call brethren, and whom we declare to be meant with us for eternal destinies," forbids a surrender to enjoyments, however innocent, however valuable in themselves, which do not aid in this social deliverance. But we should not allow any self-gratulation over the greater fullness of our moral ideal to hide from us the failures in its realizations. In large degree, the ideal is negative. "It makes itself felt in certain prohibitions, as of slavery, but it has no such effect on the ordering of life as to secure for those whom we admit not to be slaves much real opportunity of self-development. So far as negative rights go, — rights to be let alone, — they are admitted to membership in civil society, but the good things to which the pursuits of society are in fact directed turn out to be no good things for them. Civil society is

founded on the idea of there being a common good, but that idea in relation to the less favored members of society is unrealized, and it is unrealized because the good is being sought in objects which admit of being competed for."

And this brings us to the fourth point under discussion. The first point was, the reader will recall, our consciousness of absolute obligation and good; the second, the fact that this good consists in the perfections of persons in society; the third, that the search for this perfection has been the source of the institutions, habits, and aspirations of society, and has found expression and got meaning in them; and the fourth, that the moral character of the individual is based upon the extent to which he is loyal to the good embodied in these institutions, in the family, the realm of social relations, and in the kingdom of God on earth, and upon the degree in which he endeavors to react upon these institutions so as to embody in them more fully the freedom of humanity. It is not enough that man should conform faithfully to the ideals already articulated in the social relations about him; he must remember the infinite nature of this ideal; the infinite capacities yet unrealized. And thus the temper of the individual — so far as he is what he should be — is a spiritual act which may be described either as self-abasement or self-exaltation. "Towards an infinite spirit, which is really the only ideal, the attitude of man, at his highest and completest, could still be only that of self-abasement before an ideal of holiness," and yet this attitude must be "one in which the heart is lifted up to God, in which the whole inner man goes forth after an ideal of personal holiness." Awe and aspiration, the sources of all achievements in history, of all advance in individual life, must be, when all is said and done, the final form of human endeavor, — awe, marking the individual's sense of the petty achievements of himself and of humanity before the realities and requirements of the Infinite Spirit; aspiration, as the realization that this Infinite Spirit is still one in principle with man's spirit, and is, therefore, to be forever aimed at. The most perfect expressions of the moral life may be said to be found in the spirit of the expressions of St. Paul to the Philippians: "I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press towards the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus," — the lowest humility as to self, conjoined with the highest aspiration for self.

This, then, is the sum of the matter. The Spirit of God, of the eternal Reason and Will, which is one with our spirit, because it is one, presents itself to man as the perfect good, and as the source of unconditional duty. As so presenting itself, it has moved man to action, and this action has found expression in history, in the institutions, the laws, the customs, and the expectations, the rights and duties that make our life what it is. The individual introduced into the circle of these complex relations finds this social order, this embodiment of divine reason, confronting him and demanding of him allegiance and loyalty. This social order is thus the source of obligations to the individual; he is bound to loyal service and self-devotion in courage, temperance, wisdom, self-denial, justice. He is bound, not because this order confronts him externally, but because it is the expression of the Spirit that is in him; because it expresses in reality his own being, which is as yet only in capacity. But in fulfilling these duties man learns of other duties and of other goods. He finds that his highest achievements come short of answering even to the demands which actual institutions and laws make upon him, and he finds that these actual institutions are, after all, but feeble and imperfect expressions of the Spirit which makes him and them what they are in possibility as well as in fact. And thus he finds his highest good in what are sometimes called the "religious virtues," in faith, in humility, in awe, in aspiration, in longing for the union of man's will with God's. But these virtues are one in source and principle with the commonest virtues of every-day life. The attitude of will that finds expression in them finds expression in every recognition of duty, in every attempt by which man sets himself to better himself and others, in every service which the father does in the family, which the citizen performs in the state in the interest of the good of the family and of the state.

What has just been said gives an opportunity for a brief statement of Green's religious views. Religious, it is evident, his whole theory is. Science and the moral life — both are based on the communication to us of a divine, perfect Spirit. Science is inexplicable except upon the supposition of an eternal, all-inclusive Intelligence which reproduces itself in us; the life of duty and of the good is this communication in us of the divine Reason and Will. It would be to be false to the memory of Green to attempt to identify his theories with extraneous creeds, or to attempt to win favor for his philosophy by claiming its agreement

with any form of orthodoxy, or by relieving it of any kinship with views that are unpopular. The intellectual sincerity of Green, perfect to human eye, would rebuke any such effort. But since Mrs. Ward so evidently means Grey for Professor Green, and since the two are being popularly identified, it is but historic justice to say that Green's religious teaching goes farther than the position just laid down. Green undoubtedly held that in Jesus Christ this communication of God, which in us, at best, is partial and hindered by seeking of the private self, was perfect and pure. Christ was to Green, in actuality, what every man is in capacity; He was in reality what we are in idea. Undoubtedly he held that Christ was subject to the same physical conditions and possessed of the same physical powers as all men; he would allow neither a miraculous birth nor miraculous, that is, supernatural power; but morally and spiritually, he held Christ to have embodied in his personality perfect union with the Spirit of God. Furthermore, the self-abasement and the self-exaltation which are the highest attainments of the moral life find their adequate expression in language when termed sharing in the death and resurrection of Christ. For it is the death and resurrection of Jesus as eternal facts, as the fundamental expressions of the true life of the Spirit, that are of avail to us. We share in the death of Christ when we share in his spirit of absolute sacrifice of all self-seeking and selfish interest and will; we share in his resurrection when we share in the unity of his Spirit and Will with God's. For the resurrection is the other side of the crucifixion; it is the life of the Spirit, as the crucifixion is the death of the flesh. The desire of St. Paul that he may forget the things that are behind, and reach forth unto the things that are before, also finds expression in his aspiration to know the fellowship of Christ's suffering, to be made conformable unto his death, if by any means he may attain unto the resurrection of the dead. And this is the highest expression of the ethics of Professor Green. We are saved, to use the theological formula, so far as there really is in us interrupted, imperfect, partial though it be, union with that death and resurrection which in Christ was eternal, perfect, and entire.

John Dewey.

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND RELIGION.¹

THE editors of this REVIEW, not being committed to any policy in the discussion of a vital and timely theme, have requested the undersigned to contribute to the symposiac. As an American citizen, a Christian parent, and not without experience either as a teacher and organizer of education in the United States and in Japan, he ventures to offer the following paper.

¹ This article is the second in a series upon Public Instruction in Religion. The first article appeared in the January number from the pen of Professor Arthur Richmond Marsh. Professor Marsh's argument, which began with the restatement and revision of the argument of Dr. A. A. Hodge in the *New Princeton Review*, vol. iii., p. 28, emphasized these points :—

(1) History proves the absolute necessity, in order to national greatness, of the religious instruction of children and youth. Nothing else can make a nation permanently great.

"Education, in the sense of a training of the faculties to suppleness and auteness, or in the sense of placing in the mind a body of information, however accurate, cannot do it."

(2) The theory of a republican government is that the principles deemed by the majority of the people to be necessary to the national welfare shall be adopted in practice and given out as *the* principles of the nation. And this theory does not involve the violation of the rights of conscience.

"No citizen of a republic like ours has any right to insist that his conscience is being violated, if a majority of the people in his community, thinking otherwise than he, decree that he must join with them and help by his contributed tax to support for other children than his own the religious instruction the majority desires."

(3) The practical working of religious instruction must be through the insistence upon that in religion which is common to all sects and all faiths. Stress should be laid upon the qualification of the teacher to teach the law of righteousness.

"I am ready to give up saying of this or that teacher that he is a Roman Catholic, for instance, and that therefore I cannot have him give my children religious instruction. I am willing to substitute for this method of criticism a careful examination of the manner in which the Roman Catholic teaches his faith ; and if he is found mechanical, laying the stress upon the letter of his dogma, upon the forms of his church, then I will say of him that he is not a person of sufficient religious insight and experience, of sufficient personal knowledge of the law of righteousness, to be a suitable religious teacher of youth. . . . But the Roman Catholic faith in its general dealing with righteousness I am willing, nay glad, to have taught to my children. . . . So perhaps the thing for a plain layman is to declare that he will have religious instruction in the public schools, from lowest to highest, if he can ; and that further he will accept and proclaim the assumption without which such instruction is impossible—the assumption that in this matter all churches are at one and in peace." — Eds.

Fifteen years ago, in one of a series of ten articles in "The Japan Mail" upon Education in Japan, the writer thus expressed his convictions:—

"We do believe, however, that the Japanese authorities were fully justified in excluding from their schools the study of foreign text-books on moral science such as were used in their schools, and are still largely used in Western countries. It is anything but a fresh statement to say that a majority of the foreign text-books on morals are mainly compends of theology with an appendix on morals. In other words, the tenets of the orthodox faith of the modern Christian Church are made of greater importance than practical morals founded, or believed to be founded, on them. Belief in a theory is more highly valued than actual exhibition of moral conduct. We hold the teaching of theology, be it Shintō or Christian, to be entirely outside of the province of the government of a state. Further, we believe it to be subversive of genuine religion, which is entirely a matter between the individual conscience and the Creator. We look with unqualified admiration upon the framers of the Constitution of the United States who would have no acknowledgment of religion, or even the name of God, in that purely political instrument, and we deprecate the persistent attempts of some well-meaning but mistaken people to have it inserted in that document which does such honor to the consciences of all men. We hope to see the day when the reading of the Bible ceases to be obligatory in the public schools of the United States. We watch with intense interest the efforts made to secure unsectarian and purely secular education in the schools supported out of the public funds in England. . . . Always provided that a citizen obey the laws of his country, the government should inquire into or interfere with no man's religion."

For this frank expression of opinion the writer was duly castigated in print by a zealous American lady missionary, the editor also—a member of the politico-ecclesiastical "establishment" of England—giving his caveat in a long foot-note; but the essays, in two separate translations, were carefully read by high officers of the Japanese government. Along with other good advice and enlightenment, this particular article had its influence in helping to improve off the face of the land the last relics of Shintō persecution of native Christians, and in creating a sentiment that is daily increasing in Japan, namely, that pure religion thrives best when it is kept out of politics and let alone by government. The violent persecutors of 1868, men who believed that Japan was the Land

of the Gods and the favored country of the Holy Spirits, and that the Mikado was the vicar of God, and who, in the name of religion and the safety of society, sent the Christians to prison and starvation, have learned that to keep their hands off the religion of others is right, and interference with man's conscience none of their business. So grandly have they learned the lesson first taught nationally by the Constitution of the United States, that few countries in "Christian" Europe are so tolerant in religion as Japan, though privately her statesmen give liberally to religious education. They have seen the vital necessity of religious instruction, but they have separated the duties of the state from the functions of teacher, propagandist, or persecutor.

As I write these words, comes the telegram with its fateful burden: "Arinori Mori, Minister of Education, assassinated on the day of the proclamation by the Mikado of the Constitution of 1890. He was stabbed by a religious fanatic." With this leader and pioneer of religious freedom the writer has had many an earnest conversation on the vital themes of religion and education. His autograph copy of his first memorial to the Mikado's government on "Religious Freedom in Japan," which I have re-read with sorrowful interest, is dated, as I am proud as an American to say, Washington, December 5, 1872.

Fifteen years of further experience at home, twelve of which have been spent as a teacher of religion, and in the active pastorate, have but convinced the writer of the substantial soundness of his views expressed in a land where the same logic that sustains either state churches or the public inculcation of the dogmatic forms of religion by taxation might have reërected in Japan at a critical portion of her history a pagan despotism as cruel, if possible, as the state churches of Europe. Japan has done nobly in following the precedents of primitive Christianity and the government of the United States.

That we as American citizens, striving to live in all good conscience towards God and man, may be led to right conclusions, let us inquire:—

I. What was the object of the founders of the government of the United States?

We propound this question because the grave problem before us is not a local but a national one. We are inclined to think that the ultimate solution will be wrought out, not by the states, but by the whole country. Any discussion that appeals chiefly to the local prejudices of Santa Fe or Cotuit, is practically worthless and mili-

tates against the American principle. Of course, if we believe a common and pleasing local superstition that the first settlers of Massachusetts were the exclusive founders of the government of the United States, we shall come to believe that their object was *not* to promote religious liberty. By easy steps, following the average after-dinner orator on Forefathers' Day, and constantly reiterated in that kind of "history" furnished us by too many New England historiographers, we shall be led to believe that only *our* orthodoxy should be the ground of morals, and our particular canon and version of a holy book should be forever read, at every hazard, in the public schools. Such a sentiment is however identical in principle with the claims of the other orthodoxies which have their head in St. Petersburg and Rome. He who insists that "the *government* of the United States is founded on the religion of the Bible" contradicts not only the framers of that government founded in 1789, and the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, but also the decisions of the supreme court, and the whole tenor of national legislation and sentiment. The American government is purely political, and has nothing to do with the maintenance or propagation of supernatural religion in any form. In the treaty made November 4, 1796, with Tripoli — one of the theocracies and religious states so common in the Old World — and signed by Washington, it is said: "As the government of the United States of America *is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion,*" etc., etc. This document, a most exact expression of the American principle as embodied in the Constitution, was framed by an ex-Congregational clergyman, signed by a zealous member of the Episcopal Church, and ratified by a Senate in which were not a few communicant members of Christian churches.

In other words, the purpose of the founders of our government who lived in and were educated in the ideas of Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, and Virginia, as well as of Puritan New England, was to separate religion from politics, to leave out everything pertaining to the settlement of the question of Ultimate Law or Divine Authority from a purely political instrument. They held that religion was not to be used as an engine of government, but was a matter between the individual and his Creator.

They builded even better than they knew. They not only erected a fair commonwealth, but instead of making void pure religion, they established it. In the opinion of the writer they

honored Christianity also, beyond all imperial usurpers, royal blunderers, and political churchmen, who have made use of faith as a governing machine, by freeing religion from alliance with the state. These far-seeing men had learned from history's soiled page what a botch the state had invariably made by attempting to teach religion. They saw clearly that primitive Christianity had no connection with political machinery. They honored religion by setting it where it belongs. There is no land on earth, as foreigners and natives alike confess, in which pure religion flourishes more than in ours where the state has nothing to do with the teaching or propagation of dogma.

The framers of the government of the United States, and the people who even went beyond them in promptly demanding an amendment in favor of free religion, had the courage of their convictions. They had had enough of Asiatic and European systems of state and church, of religious Cæsars, petty vicars of God and Sons of Heaven, with all their unchristian cruelties, costly spectacular tomfooleries, and inhumanities on both sides of the grave. They despised the titles and abominations of Most Christian Majesties, and Holy Alliances, and orthodox Czars, Vicars of God holding temporal authority, and Holy Roman Empires. With sublime faith in both God and man, with a clear vision of the best way to secure pure religion and freedom of conscience, they cut the leading-strings that bound them to European and Asiatic precedents.

In the spirit of "the supreme law of the land," and of the treaty made under it with Tripoli, — a nation that committed piracy in the name of religion, — the highest branch of our government, which is the Supreme Court of the United States, has given concordant interpretation and decision. The rhetoric of Daniel Webster, so un-American in spirit, yet so admired of the clergy, in the Girard will case was set aside, and the testament given force as being in full accord with the laws of Pennsylvania. In that "holy experiment" and "Christian commonwealth," as founded by William Penn, the Roman Catholic and the Mennonite, the Jew and Baptist, Lutheran and Episcopalian, free-thinker and deist, had equal religious and political rights. So, also, in the Maryland of Lord Baltimore, and in New York, founded by the Dutch, — where was the greatest battle-ground, and the longest and hottest fight against political religion and state-churchism, — there was this determination to have religion free, and make the politician and state-priest keep hands off the

conscience. Happily for our country and the future of religion in the United States, the American people responded quickly to the precious opportunity, and in the nascent moment. The spirit of Robert Pike, William Penn, and Roger Williams became the spirit of the Constitution, the first amendment making impossible the union of church and state in any form.

The writer heartily agrees with the ideas of the founder of Pennsylvania and of the framers of the Constitution, and believes that pure religion, and especially that form of it which he accepts and loves, thrives best when it is most like what its Founder made and left, and when its likeness is closer to its apostolic prototype. He is unable to conceive how it could be right in the name of Christianity, or according to law under the Constitution, to make void and inoperative the philanthropy of one who in *act* and *purpose* was so truly a follower of Christ as was Stephen Girard, into whose college for orphans he would have no ecclesiastic ever come.

II. What is the object of the public schools?

The American public-school system, which owes its inspiration to the free republic of Holland, and its introduction on this continent to the English refugees who came from the Dutch republic to Massachusetts, is now a national institution. Being as well grounded as any other of our institutions, its destruction by partisans of special forms of church dogma, or importers of Italian and other European or Asiatic notions, is possible, but not probable.

What is the object for which they were established, and for which the American tax-payers support them? Is it to teach religion? We answer, assuredly not. Rather is it to arm the young mind against the assumptions of those who claim to have the sole knowledge of what religious truth is. As surely as is the church a bulwark against the destroyer of faith and the nihilist of belief, so surely is the American public school a defense, not only against social snobbery and race prejudices, but against bigotry and monopoly in religion. Whatever may have been the exact motive of the founders of public schools in colonial days, the set purpose of American tax-payers of our century is to save the child from the self-styled vicars of God, who manage sectarian churches and cemeteries, and damn all bodies and souls outside of their sect. The state organizes public education for her own defense and preservation. All true Americans, whether of the Greek, Roman, or Reformed phase of the Christian faith,

as well as Israelites, and "free-thinkers," so called, know that for the perpetuity of our political system, the mind as well as the body must not be enslaved, and that the priest and parson, as well as the skeptic, must be moderated by enlightened public sentiment. The American people will never trust any one sect with their liberties, whether that sect be Congregational, Quaker, Methodist, or "Catholic," either of the Greek or Roman sort. Nor will they allow a majority to rule the minority in matters of conscience, or prelates appointed by a foreigner to divide the public funds under pretext of education.

At bottom, the question takes the world-old form of a struggle between the intelligent layman and the ambitious ecclesiastic. It is also the external phase of the literary question discussed by Cicero and Lactantius, and revived in every age, — whether religion means vinculum and bondage, or reflection and enlightenment, whether it should be wholly conservative and reactionary, or stimulating to growth and progress. As to the final answer by the people of these United States of the question, the writer has little doubt, and it will come, he believes, less from priest or parson, or as prompted by them, than from the intelligent tax-payer, from the fathers and mothers who know the value of our public schools, and who compare the quality of religion and morals in a free republic with those in countries where these vital necessities are fostered by the state or monopolized by prelates. By those most closely in sympathy with the American spirit, will the question of the true object of education, and especially public education, be answered. The sound mind in the sound body, the love of honesty, purity, and truth, the ability to obtain a livelihood, to coöperate with his fellow-citizens in whatever tends to the public good, and, above all, to be able to challenge or approve, reject or confirm the claims of skeptic and bigot, will be sought for every citizen. To teach children how to save their souls according to a particular ecclesiastical prescription is no part of public instruction. The state has nothing to do with declaring what is ultimate law and the source of all knowledge and order. "The supreme law of the land" knows no authority but that of "the people of these United States of America." Public education must suffice itself by not usurping the powers of God, or becoming his vicar for the saving of the soul, but only for social order. Let Americans be content to relegate to Czars, Popes, Mikados, Shahs, Chinese Sons of Heaven, and African emperors the functions of vicars of God on earth. The American

state has nothing to do with eternal salvation or eternal damnation. For the teaching of religion public taxes will never be paid.

Let us, especially religious teachers, who are citizens, but not "in politics" either of Rome or America, keep the issue clear. We neither assault nor favor any man's religion, and we mean to maintain *public* schools and the *public* funds undivided. It is incredible that a respectable minority of Americans will ever want their children educated without religion, or only in "godless schools." Almost, without exception, tax-payers do earnestly want their children religiously instructed; but more than the desire to have that form of religion which is acceptable to them taught at the public expense is their desire to maintain *public* schools. *On this ground the overwhelming majority of American citizens, Roman Catholics, Jews, Protestants, and men of other religions, are heartily agreed,* according to our judgment and faith. Despite skeptic and bigot, prelate of a foreign primate, or fanatic, they will, we think, maintain that ground. American citizens know full well the blessed influence of the public schools in ameliorating race distinctions, social differences, and religious hatreds which parochial schools help to foster.

Does any body of believers in a special form of religion wish to establish private or parochial schools? Let them do it. They are, in thus doing, right and in accord with the supreme and subordinate law of the land. But do they, because they educate a considerable number, or even a large proportion of youth, make claim either for the evasion of payment of the school tax or division of the public education fund? Then, they at once introduce a foreign government into the country, and create an *imperium in imperio*. A denominational school can never be a *public* school. A public school is for all. On the same basis as the maintenance of the police system, fire department, and methods of public order and defense, stands the public-school system, and all must pay to maintain it. All may employ and pay for private police, firemen, detectives, school-teachers, and clergymen, but this does not excuse the payment of taxes for the public institutions. All loyal citizens, whatever their religion, will see this, despite parson, priest, or miser.

III. What are the powers of the majority and the rights of the minority?

If there is one thing sacredly guarded in our national Constitution, it is the rights of the minority. Herein the original instru-

ment and the amendments added are in harmony with the great fact made patent and secured forever by the Reformation, that the majority cannot impose their religion on the minority. The domination of the majority over the minority in matters of conscience was one of the basic ideas in Latin civilization which the Germanic races threw off long ago, which mightily influenced the men who fought the winning side in the American revolution, and which is fully embodied in the American Constitution. The contrary view may be Byzantine, Roman, Russian or Asiatic, but not American, even though good men called Protestants may utter it. While, therefore, the views of the eminent theologian who was so fond of boasting that Princeton had never invented a new idea, as expressed in the "New Princeton Review," may seem wise and orthodox, they have to our ears a most ominous sound. He said: "Christians have all power in their own hands. . . . All we have to do is for Catholics and Protestants — disciples of a common Master — to come to a common understanding with respect to a common basis of what is received as general Christianity, a practical quantity of truth belonging equally to both sides, to be recognized in general legislation, and especially in the literature of our public schools."

Such an argument does not sound at all American, nor, indeed, in harmony with primitive Christianity, nor with the spirit of the Reformation. By a Roman Catholic priest and writer it was promptly welcomed as the closest approach yet made by a Protestant to Romish orthodoxy of the Vatican type. In our judgment, its logical issue would bring back the Inquisition, and the Sanhedrin that persecuted the Christ's apostles.

Base the question on the matter of majority, and soon the adherents of Rome would, at least in certain quarters, settle the question. Any one who has ever listened to the pointed exhortations of clerical celibates, given in church and in the name of God, to their flocks, especially the women, to subdue and replenish the earth for the Holy Church, can understand how quickly the faithful expect to do this, especially in New England. Sermons and lectures on the same theme to Protestant people, among whom large families are unpopular, are, besides being as rare as white ravens, as grains of sand sprinkled on a dam that already totters before the incoming flood. Yet were the majority to consist even of those who look on popes and diocesan bishops as parasitic to pure Christianity, wherein is the American Israelite or deist safe from the tyranny of the local majority? The writer

confesses that, as an American citizen who has read history, he has no confidence even in a majority called Christian. Nor, even for the sake of having "orthodox" religion taught at the public expense to his children, would he barter the rights conferred upon him under the letter and spirit of the Constitution of the United States. Nor could he trust a "Protestant" majority with his rights of conscience any more than a "Catholic" superiority in numbers. As a Christian, a lover and follower of Jesus Christ, as well as an American citizen, he insists that "infidels" like Stephen Girard, Jews, Mormons, Turks, Chinese, and Buddhists, who obey the laws of the land, shall have equal rights as worshipers with Christians. In thus insisting, he believes that he acts not only in the spirit of the supreme law of the land, but of Him who left us an example that we should follow in his steps. To divide the public funds, even to please a majority, is to foster social snobbery, keep alive race hatreds, stimulate religious bigotry, put an end to the *public* school system, and endanger our American liberties. The American public schools furnish the one catholic basis on which the children of all races and creeds meet for the making of American citizens. They form our strongest bulwark against the bigot, the skeptic, and the anarchist. The man who with an eye to the tax funds claims that his church or sect alone represents the Almighty is as real an enemy to our liberties as is the anarchist. Against both these products of dis-tempered minds the healthy sense of the American people will ever oppose the public school as the impregnable bulwark of freedom.

IV. Can morals be taught in our public schools apart from Christianity? I answer at once, Yes: not the best morals, but sufficient for the making of good citizens. The state need not, must not, concern itself with the standards of belief or the production of such characters as the church counts acceptable. To secure the highest efficacy of morals in the individual, religion must present its sanctions and inspiration, but this must be done in the church and family. The wisest and best men in all countries and ages are doubtless of one accord in acknowledging the power of religion in the formation of personal character, and of ideals of civilization. Nor need there be any controversy on this point. Indeed, *there is none at all among the best men*, but only on an entirely different point, namely, as to *who* shall be God's vicar, *who* the representative of the ultimate law, *who* dispense and regulate the rewards and punishments; and this question the

American State will never decide. The founders of the government and the people of the United States, Christians by an overwhelming majority, declared a century ago that it was not the business of the state to nominate the Lord of the conscience. Political government, as such, has nothing to do with eternity, or the origin and end of things.

Without reference to Ultimate Law, without the dogmas of Christianity, without the element of Christian theism, the duties of the son, pupil, and citizen may be taught in the public schools, while the relations between man and God are taught in a church and family. The purer and more earnest the teacher, the nobler the exemplar, the better will morals be taught and enforced. Personal habits, self-discipline, and civic duties of youth are and have been nobly taught in China and Japan, apart from the Scriptures of the New Testament, and grandly in Israel before Christ. The duties commanded by the laws of the township, the city, the commonwealth, and the nation can be taught in the public schools without priest or parson, and apart from the dogmas received by Christians of any name. The large field of morals which have for their inciting cause and justifiable ground the greatest good to the greatest number needs no church or Bible for sufficient foundation. As matter of fact, practical morals are taught both formally and efficaciously in our families, schools, government functions and service, in business, in corporations, in the organized activities of great international enterprises without regard to ultimate law or supernatural sanctions, or a previous and accepted solution of the problems of the universe, or a nomination of the vicar of God. The State must be satisfied with teaching practical and necessary morals, leaving education in the mysteries and infinities and ultimates to the churches.

The highest sanctions and motives to moral living cannot be furnished in schools supported by taxation, because there can be no possible agreement, at present at least, as to what is ultimate law, or who is the sole arbiter and interpreter of truth. The propensity in man to make a devil of his neighbor's god, is too strong to be resisted during the years of grace left us in this century. The Protestant who believes the Romanist to be antichrist and idolater cannot, in one generation, learn to agree with his fellow-citizen who sincerely believes him to be a heretic and sure of damnation. The recent local discussion by Protestant clergymen, orators, and editors, of the subject of

indulgences may serve as an awful warning to optimists. The lion cannot yet eat straw like the ox. The average sectarian is not yet a cool-headed lawyer. The writer confesses not only to the cold chills that ran repeatedly down a certain spine that had by mere force of tradition curved reverently to "Boston culture," but also to his amazement at the persistent and consummate ability of Protestants to misunderstand their Roman Catholic brethren — especially when politics were mixed up with religion, and the flame-fanners had an eye to office or "capital."

Under our "godless" Constitution, however, both "disciples of a common Master" and those who know Him not, may live at peace, mutually helping one another. Apart from what they have been taught by their religious advisers and fomenters, they know that the vital and fundamental differences of opinion as to what constitutes morality sufficient to make good citizens is very slight. It is easily discerned, and quite separable from special church doctrines.

Without being too sanguine in our hopes, we think that the children of the Americans who with faith in God, and with sublime courage of their convictions, framed a constitution in which no name of the Deity or his vicar or favored church appears, nor any recognition of sectarian religion emerges, can agree upon what their children shall be publicly taught. The majority of us are Christians, believers in the Holy Trinity and in the divine inspiration of the Holy Bible, as were the fathers who framed the Constitution; but these beliefs of ours will not hinder us from being true Americans, or tolerant citizens, or followers of the Teacher of universal brotherhood. To the sects, whether Romish or Protestant, which declare that *public* teaching sustained by taxation must be based on the dogmas of "the Church," or on the Bible as they translate and understand it, the American tax-payer's answer will not long be doubtful. In the evolution of the idea of the American commonwealth the functions of the state and of religion are to be more and more sharply separated. In a country where religion is most highly appreciated, and the sanctions based on the ideas of God and eternity do most deeply influence all classes, and where all that has been achieved religiously has rested on the principle of free choice and desire, we do not fear for the perpetuity of pure religion, and even for Christianity or for public morals. Not only will the church and family have a deeper responsibility laid upon them, but they will be ready to meet it. Even for those children who are neglected by their parents, or

insufficiently trained by their religious overseers, we believe that the same moral energy that has provided chapel, church, cathedral, and mission school will provide that education in things unseen and eternal which we Americans in overwhelming majority believe essential to the highest good of the nation and the individual.

Wm. Elliot Griffis.

BOSTON, MASS.

WEEK-DAY RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OF CHILDREN — AN EXPERIMENT.

THE parochial school movement among Roman Catholics is not altogether without reason. We may deplore the form which it assumes; we may be apprehensive of the ultimate consequences of withdrawing large numbers of children from the broadening and equalizing influences of the public schools into a special class by themselves, to be subjected to a warped and narrow training; but so far as the Catholic movement is based upon the conviction that there is need of more definite and systematic religious instruction of children, we cannot entirely withhold our sympathy. When a Catholic priest declares that the public schools are "Godless," it does not follow that he means that they are immoral, nor that they are hostile to religion; he may mean simply that the public schools do not, and of necessity cannot, teach that view of God and of religious truth which he believes to be essential to the salvation of the children. If he means this, instead of denouncing him as an "enemy" of the public schools, we must admit that he is right. The problem which presents itself to the Catholic priesthood, especially in our large cities, is a very serious one. A considerable part of the normally Catholic population — children, that is to say, of Catholic parents — are becoming detached from the Catholic Church, under various influences incident to American life, without entering into any new religious relations. They drift off into practical infidelity. They may retain enough of the impression made by early training to be ready to send for the priest when in some great need or in mortal extremity; but they pay no attention to religious duties, have lost all regard for the church and the priest, lead lives of unrestrained vice and crime, and are Catholics, if at all, only in name. It is a short-sighted

Protestant who watches this disintegrating process with approval, simply because it detaches a portion of the Catholic population from the authority of the priests. From this class are recruited the "hoodlums" and "toughs" of our cities, who begin to be a menace to society almost as soon as they are able to walk alone, and carry on a running warfare against law, order, and decency until the State Prison closes upon them or the gallows terminates their career. It is impossible that a faithful Catholic priest, who holds in his heart to the tremendous sanctions and penalties proclaimed by his church, should view these tendencies without concern.

The root of the difficulty is the absence of effective religious training of children. No one who has any knowledge of the succession of services at which Catholic churches are filled on Sunday by congregations which are in the main distinct, each from the other, can say that the church does not fully improve the opportunities which Sunday gives her. But there is a long interval between Sunday and Sunday, which is spent by the average Catholic child either upon the street, or in homes where there is neither disposition nor ability to teach religious truth, or in public schools where the instruction is purely secular. If religion is what Catholics and Protestants alike esteem it, the supreme concern in life, an hour or two on Sunday is scarcely enough time to devote to it. Confronted by this difficulty, the Catholic Church devises the parochial school, in which secular and religious instruction may be imparted together by duly accredited agents of the church, the religious element being always dominant, and the intellectual discipline of the child subordinated to considerations of the welfare of his soul. Here, then, we have the motive and the purpose of the parochial school, — for which there are certainly some things which may be said. We may disapprove of this movement, but we are inexcusable if we do not understand it.

Catholics are not alone in feeling that the secular instruction of the public schools, supplemented by an hour a week in the Sunday-school constitutes, for the great multitude of children who have little or no religious training at home, a very inadequate preparation for life, regarded in its highest and most serious relations. We have not a few schools and academies founded and maintained by Protestants with a distinctly religious purpose. Perhaps, if religious convictions did not sit more easily upon Protestants than upon Catholics, we should have more institutions of this kind. Perhaps, if Protestantism represented a united

host, as Catholicism does, we might yet see a Protestant parochial school movement of large proportions. As it is, the Catholics are able to cite some Protestant authorities of good repute who deplore as much as they do the absence of religion from public-school instruction, and would even be ready for a division of public-school funds, if thereby good denominational schools could be insured.

It is possible to treat this subject broadly, and in a philosophical spirit; or narrowly, within the limits of actual experiment. The latter is the purpose of the present article. The writer has no contribution to make to the discussion of this question in its larger aspects. He seeks simply to describe a single, quiet attempt which has been made in one community to supplement the public school and the Sunday-school with week-day instruction in religious things, — the methods used being so simple and flexible that they could be easily adapted to any community, and the success attained so considerable as to make similar experiments worth the trial. The narrative, it should be added, is not put forward as affording, in any sense, a solution of the very grave problem to which allusion has been made, but rather as a suggestion of an idea which is capable of a wider application than it has yet had. Nothing could have been farther from the thought of the consecrated Christian woman who, in 1883, established the "Monday Class" which is carried on in connection with the work of the North Avenue Congregational Church, Cambridge, than that her simple experiment should attract attention as opening a new avenue of Christian activity. But there are features of this work, as it has grown and shaped itself in her hands during these years, which may furnish a hint to others who share her desire to win boys and girls for Christ. The stranger who, walking along North Avenue some Monday afternoon in winter, should see crowds of boys and girls hurrying in a certain direction, would not be surprised, for he would infer that they were just released from school and were hastening to get to their homes or their play; but if he noticed that most of them turned in at a church-door, and was told that they were hurrying to be in time for a religious meeting, he might wonder what kind of boys and girls they had in Cambridge. His wonder would increase, very likely, if he learned that the meeting was not a part of any revival movement, but that it was more like a great Bible-class for boys and girls which had been drawn together and taught by a woman whose chief qualifications for the work were a love for children and tact in

dealing with them. The Monday Class owes its origin to a feeling on the part of the superintendent of the Primary Department of the North Avenue Sunday-school that the children who went out from her department were not only slipping away from her influence, but that there was a long interval during which little systematic effort was put forth for them. "Somewhere," she said, "between the ages of ten and seventeen, we lose our boys and girls." To bridge this interval, so far as was possible, she formed the plan of a week-day class, to meet at the close of the afternoon session of the day schools. She gave her invitation to the first meeting with a feeling that if twelve or fifteen children came it would be worth while to go on. To her surprise, thirty responded. From that beginning the class has grown steadily, until its present membership is between three hundred and three hundred and fifty. The class carries no "dead wood." A new enrollment is made for each new series of meetings, and former members who, because of removal or for other reasons, do not appear are dropped from the list. The leader has kept a careful record of the attendance, — when the class was small, by a roll-call; and later, by means of attendance-blanks, which are filled out in advance by the boys and girls and dropped into a box at the door as they enter. The birthdays, as well as the names and residences, are recorded, and birthday cards with an affectionate letter are sent to each member. There has never been any recognition of denominational lines. Boys and girls from any church, or from no church, have been equally welcome, and those now on the roll represent Congregational, Baptist, Methodist, Unitarian, Universalist, Episcopal, Catholic, and Jewish families.

Certain principles were clear in the mind of the leader at the outset, and they have been adhered to. The meeting, she felt, could not be made, wisely, a boys' and girls' prayer meeting; the members must have some share in it, but not in the way of attempting voluntary prayer or appeals. The class must be treated, not as children, nor as young men and women, but simply as "boys and girls," and must always be so addressed. The chief effort must be to hold the older members, and therefore it was not wise, unless in exceptional instances, to admit any who were under ten years of age. There should be nothing done in the way of mere entertainment, but the meetings must be as fresh, varied, and interesting as was possible, in harmony with the central idea. The attendance must be entirely voluntary; reluctant boys and girls must not be compelled to go, by parental or other influence.

Finally, the subject taught must be "First, last, and always, Christ"; the meetings must lead up to the Christian life, or they would fail of their purpose. Within these lines and in harmony with these principles, the work has been carried forward. Usually, there have been two series of meetings, each continuing ten or twelve weeks, one beginning in October and running along until the distractions of the holiday season were at hand; and the other opening in February, as the days were perceptibly lengthening, and continuing until the first or middle of May. It was the leader's theory that it was wise to have no break in the meetings while they were in progress, but that if they were carried continuously through the year, they would lose their freshness to the boys and girls. This plan works so well that the members of the class anticipate the meetings eagerly, and make inquiries about them weeks before the time fixed for opening. During the six years, no meeting has ever been omitted on account of the weather. On the "blizzard" Monday of March, 1888, although the public schools held no session on account of the storm, one hundred and twenty-eight boys and girls were present at the Monday Class, and all the exercises were held as usual.

As to the programme at the meetings, it is varied a good deal. There is always plenty of singing, bright and spirited, such as boys and girls enjoy. Always, too, the class repeat together their simple pledge: "Trusting in the Lord Jesus Christ for strength, I purpose to try to do whatever He would like to have me do; I will pray to Him, and I will try to be his disciple." This is repeated often with bowed heads, and the boys and girls have been taught that every time they repeat the pledge, it signifies a renewal of their consecration. Perhaps some of them say the words thoughtlessly, after all, but with most of them the promise means all that it seems to mean. At the close of the Spring meetings in 1888, the leader asked those who thought that they were trying to be Christians to remain, as she had a special word to say to them, and more than two hundred of them did so. Every head is reverently bowed during the leader's prayer, and all join in the Lord's Prayer, with which it closes. The other exercises of a general character include the recitation of a Psalm in concert, or of the Apostles' Creed, or perhaps of the names of the books of the Bible in their order. As for the instruction, the leader has usually carried along in the same series of meetings two kinds of teaching, one relating to Bible history, biography, geography, etc., and the other conveying moral and religious truths in their

practical bearing upon life. Under the first head, the class has been taught the divisions of the books of the Bible, the epochs of Bible history, and the principal events and persons in each, the map of Palestine, the wanderings of the Israelites, the journeys of Paul, and the chief incidents in the life of Christ. Under the second head the leader has given series of talks upon the parables, the miracles, Bible heroes, the boys and girls of the Bible, and other subjects, always with the aim so to illustrate and apply the truth as to make it helpful in Christian living. For example, the talks on the boys and girls of the Bible included these: Samuel, Lent to the Lord; David, the Brave Boy; Absalom, the Headstrong Boy; the Missionary Maiden; the Little Girl Brought Back to Life; Daniel, the Temperance Boy; Josiah, the Boy King; Rhoda, the Gatekeeper, etc. The subjects of the Spring series in 1888 were these: The Story of the Book; the Secret of Happiness; Turning About; Webs; The Parting of the Ways; Little and Wise; "Ye Have Done It Unto Me;" We Will Go Up by the King's Highway; God Everywhere, Can We Find Him? Gideon's Pitchers and Lights; What is Prayer? If a Man Die, Shall He Live Again?

Changes in method have been made as the class has grown in numbers. When the membership was not more than sixty or seventy, slates were used, and the boys and girls learned the map of Palestine and that of Paul's journeys so well that they could draw them, and put in the most important cities, mountains, and rivers, without aid except from memory. As the class has increased in size, the blackboard has been used, also diagrams and drawings, made with black paint upon white cloth or large sheets of white paper. A series of talks on the manners and customs of Bible times was thus illustrated. Sometimes, when it was desired to put certain words or sentences before the class, they were formed by using the large black gummed letters which can be bought for a trifle for such purposes. Thus the talk on Webs was made more clear by a drawing of a web, and by placing before the class in these black letters the particular "webs" which the leader had in mind, namely, the "I-Didn't-Think" Web, the "First-Cousin-to-Swearing" Web, the "Playing for Keeps" Web, the "Nobody-Will-Know-It" Web, and the "Wait-a-Minute, Pretty-Soon, By-and-By" Web.

Perhaps the methods of instruction used cannot be better indicated than by printing this list of examination questions, with which one series of lessons closed, the boys and girls willingly

writing out the answers, and presenting papers which demonstrated the thoroughness of their study :—

EXAMINATION QUESTIONS.

I. *The Books of the Bible.*

1. How many books are there in the Bible ?
2. Between what years was it written ?
3. How is the Old Testament divided ?
4. How is the New Testament divided ?
5. By what name are the first five books called ?
6. Name the books of poetry.
7. Give seven names by which God's Word is known.
8. A period of how many years does it cover ?
9. How many men wrote the Bible ?
10. Why do we call it the " Word of God " ?
11. Name the books written by Paul.

II. *Bible History.*

12. Who lived 4000 years before Christ ?
13. Who was the chief character of the Second Period ?
14. Name the man who walked with God.
15. Name the three sons of the Ark-BUILDER.
16. Name the Temple-BUILDER.
17. What picture for the Fifth Period ?
18. What picture for the Third Period ?

III. *The Land of Palestine.*

19. Name the lakes and sea.
20. Name two mountains on the north.
21. Name a mountain east of the Jordan.
22. Name the divisions in the time of Christ.
23. Name three towns in Judea.
24. Name two towns in Galilee.
25. How far from Boston to Jerusalem ?
26. Where did Elijah offer sacrifice ?
27. Where was Jesus transfigured ?
28. Name some events that happened in Bethlehem.
29. Where was King Saul slain ?
30. What occurred on Mount Olivet ?
31. Name cities visited by Paul : second journey.
32. Who accompanied Paul on first journey ?

33. What does the Bible say of the "Eyes of the Lord"?

34. Where was the "Sermon on the Mount" given?

35. What would *you* be willing to do for Jesus?

Draw a map of Palestine — put in the mountains, rivers, and cities.

The leader of the class, from time to time, usually at fortnightly intervals while the meetings are in progress, has prepared and printed a little four-page paper, "The Children's Hour," which she has given to each member. When the class was small, she printed this paper with the hektograph, but abandoned this instrument for the cyclostyle, as it became necessary to provide more impressions than the hektograph would print. Her purpose was to put in this, relatively speaking, permanent form, outlines of the lessons, and helpful suggestions. A single number may be taken as an example. It is inscribed "Third Series — Number Five," and dated Cambridge, 1886. On the first page, under the title, which is printed in decorative letters, is a beautiful figure of an angel, with uplifted hand pointing heavenward. At the side of this figure are a few lines of verse. The second page has in the upper corner the figures of a boy and girl singing. The page contains this message to the class: —

Dear Girls and Boys: When you receive this paper, we shall have had our last meeting for this spring. I cannot help wondering how much you remember and have learned from the "Girls and Boys of the Bible." If no impulse has come to you to avoid their mistakes, to make the brave and noble things in their lives a part of your life and character; in fact, if you have not felt more and more that you want to make yourself like the Boy Jesus, then our meetings have been in vain, and my labor is in vain. God pity us all if it be true that we are no better for the hours that we have spent together! I pray daily for your salvation. I beg you to give your best love now to the Saviour. Over and over, give your heart to God. When you have done this, — then give yourself to His church, it will help you, it will help others. Every day your influence is going out to some other life. What kind of an influence is it? Are you sowing seeds of kindness?

On the third page is a cross, with Easter lilies twined about it, and at the side, and beneath, this Easter greeting: —

EASTER DAY, 1886.

"O Mighty Lord of Wintertide!

O Loving Lord of Spring!

Come to our hearts this Easter-day,

Melt all the prisoning ice away,

And evermore abide,

Making both good and ill to be
Thy blessed opportunity."

Sweet Easter-tide! Did you remember, dear boys and girls, on Easter Day, that the blessed Jesus Christ arose for you? Soon God will take away your breath and yet you cannot die. Because Christ lives, you will live also. The Bible says He will "change our vile bodies and make them like unto His own glorious body." And in another place, "when He shall appear, we shall be like Him." I suppose we shall look somewhat as we do now, only all imperfections will be removed, and we shall be made glorious. Better than this, in that new life we shall never be tired, we shall never have to endure pain or disappointment or grief. Christ will be there, and it will be our joy to serve Him.

The fourth page has in one corner a little map of Palestine. The rest of the page contains these notes of Bible geography:—

The "Holy Land"—Palestine—Canaan—Promised Land.

Divisions: Galilee, Samaria, Judea, Perea.

Size: 180 miles long, 40 miles wide at the north, and 90 miles wide at the south.

Distance from New York: 6,000 miles.

Principal Waters: Mediterranean Sea, Dead Sea, Sea of Galilee (also called Tiberias and Lake of Gennesaret), and the river Jordan.

Principal Mountains: Hermon and Lebanon; Ebal and Gerizim, the twin mountains; Carmel and Olivet, the mountains of prayer and victory.

Principal Towns and Cities: Bethlehem, where Jesus was born; Nazareth and Capernaum, where He lived; Cana, where He performed His first miracle; Jerusalem, where He was crucified; Nain, where He interrupted a funeral procession; Bethany, where Lazarus lived.

Names of the Twelve Disciples: Peter, James, John, Andrew, Philip, Bartholomew, Matthew, Thomas, James, Thaddeus, Simon, Judas.

An interesting and novel incident of the work of the Monday Class is the maintenance in connection with it of a "Lending Library." This numbers nearly four hundred volumes, the use of which is free to the members of the class, subject only to such simple restrictions as are essential to the proper care of the books. The money needed to establish the library was procured by the well-worn but still practicable device of a lecture course. Those who attended the lectures received the full equivalent for their investment, and the proceeds, after expenses were met, sufficed to buy the books and print a catalogue. It was assumed that most of the boys and girls were supplied with religious books by the various Sunday-schools. The purpose of the Lending Library was to furnish bright, interesting, and healthful week-day reading, and

the theory on which the selections were made was that most boys and girls would as soon read good books as trashy ones, if they were put within their reach. Rather more than half the volumes are of fiction, the remainder represent travels, adventure, history, biography, and a little popular science. The use made of the library justifies the expectation which prompted its establishment. The boys and girls are eager to read the books of Hawthorne, Scott, Mrs. Molesworth, Miss Alcott, Mrs. Ewing, Scudder, Abbot, Jean Ingelow, Susan Coolidge, Hale, and others, and the bound volumes of "Wide-Awake" and "St. Nicholas." In a series of eleven meetings in the spring of 1888, the circulation was over twenty-two hundred volumes. The numbers found upon the library cards of two of the children, chosen at random from the others, but representing as it happens children whose home environment is the reverse of literary or helpful, will show the kind of books these boys and girls ask for. The first card is that of a boy of fourteen, and the following are the books for which he calls:—

Young Folks' Book of American Explorers; The Deerslayer; Travels in Asia; Poor Boys Who Became Famous; Rob Roy; The Pioneers; The Discovery of America; The Pathfinder; Central Africa; Travels in South Africa; Travels in Arabia; Stories of Adventure; Jack and Jill; Wars of the Colonies; Wonderful Escapes; Young Americans in Japan; Zigzag Journeys in Europe; Zigzag Journeys in Classic Lands; Zigzag Journeys in the Orient; The Black Dwarf; Little Country Girl; The Northern Colonies.

The next card is that of a girl of twelve, sister of the boy whose selections have just been indicated. These are the books called for on her card:—

Strange Stories from History; The Black Dwarf; The Bride of Lammermoor; Uncle Tom's Cabin; Two Little Waifs; The Betrothed; Little Women; Miss Toosey's Mission; The Fair Maid of Perth; Little Country Girl; The Monastery; The Surgeon's Daughter; Water Babies; Hawthorne's True Stories; Seven Little People; Story of Rome; Eyebright; What Katy Did; New Year's Bargain; Castle Blair; The Cuckoo Clock; Life and her Children; Adventures of a Brownie; Anne of Geierstein; The Browns; Old-Fashioned Girl; Thunder and Lightning; What Katy Did at School; Wonderful Stories (Andersen); Wonderful Escapes; Wonders of Pompeii; Fortunes of Nigel; Count Robert of Paris; Life of Washington; War of the Revolution; Stories of Discovery; Under the Lilacs; Stories of Adventure; Rosy; Raleigh; Phyllis Brown; Our Little Ann; A Sea Change; Mrs. Overthaway; Tell Me a Story; Grandmother Dear; Boston Town.

It is noticeable that out of the twenty-two numbers on the boy's card, only seven represent fiction. On the girl's card, the proportion of fiction is much larger, but it is not of a very frivolous order, and it includes no less than nine of the Waverley novels, which are pretty substantial reading for a girl of twelve. The books, as a rule, are well cared for, and wear out no faster than would be expected in so constant use. Instances of willful abuse of the books or of dishonesty regarding them are unknown, — which is surprising, as boys and girls of whom nothing whatever is known are freely admitted to the class and its privileges; and the number of books lost and unaccounted for is less than one tenth of one per cent. of the circulation. It illustrates the survival of a good book from one generation of readers to another that "Uncle Tom's Cabin" is the most popular book in the collection, and is called for so constantly that it has been necessary to put in three copies.

Such are some of the methods which have been used in the Monday Class. So simple are they that it may seem superfluous that they should be given with so much detail. But as an experiment made with average boys and girls, and under conditions neither specially difficult nor specially favorable, the class deserves a certain amount of attention. The methods are all such as may easily be adopted elsewhere; indeed, it might not be difficult to improve upon them. Why may we not have many experiments in week-day religious instruction of children, carried on along the same or similar lines? Given a leader, with a warm love for children, tact in dealing with them, and a willingness to do and sacrifice for them, a class of this kind may be anywhere successful, and it will be elsewhere, as in Cambridge, a nursery of Christian discipleship.

Frank Foxcroft.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

THE POETRY OF DANTE GABRIEL ROSSETTI.

THE real importance of those movements in literature or art which have been definite enough in aim to enlist an active membership of gifted persons and to formulate something like a creed is to be found, as a rule, not in the creed but in the fellowship. The formulation of principles, the agreement upon methods, seem

at the moment of the first importance; but time, that patient corrector of inadequate judgments and false perspectives, is indifferent to theories of art and cares only for the work which discovers the inspired touch, and the personality through which the vision of truth or beauty has entered into the common life of men. Such movements are often fruitful of great works and great souls, and mark great expansions of thought; but the specific creeds which they profess, like creeds of every sort, are always partial, inadequate and provisional. That which seemed a finality to the men who were under the spell of its fresh and thrilling influence, in the end falls into line with the continuous process of development of which it was part, and is recognized as a new and fruitful evolution from the past.

To the ardent youths who crowded the Théâtre Français on the evening of February 25, 1830, "Hernani" filled the entire stage of the world and obliterated the drama of the past; in that hour Romanticism was not so much a reaction as a complete and final revolution of the aims and principles of dramatic art. To many of the Transcendentalists of forty years ago the pure and highly intellectual impulse which they shared prophesied the breaking of the last seals, and the imminent disclosure of that open secret which has been in all times both inspiration and anguish to the noblest souls. No student of literature will underestimate the value of those statements of principles, vague and incomplete as they were, which grew out of the Romantic and Transcendental movements; but the real significance of Romanticism and Transcendentalism is to be found in the substantial works which attest to the world the reality of the impulse which inspired them, and in which the main drift of both movements is to be discovered. Much has been written concerning Preraphaelitism, and much doubtless remains to be said touching this very interesting movement which affected English art so strongly forty years ago; but the significance and value of the impulse which strove with only partial success to formulate itself in the "Germ," and, later, in the "Oxford and Cambridge Magazine," is to be found in the works of three or four eminent artists, and of at least one poet of rare quality and unique personality. We are chiefly concerned to know that the Preraphaelite movement, like every other great movement in art and literature, was not so much the outcome of a new doctrine, a novel creed, as a new attitude towards nature and life, a more sincere and earnest mood, a fresh perception of truth and beauty through individual genius, a deep and spontaneous

feeling for things which had come to be treated in a conventional and formal way. The significance of such movements lies always in the fact that they mark fresh contact of open and aspiring minds with nature and life; and when this takes place, ferment, agitation, and brilliant activity inevitably follow. The artists and poets who are associated with Preraphaelitism were moved by a common instinct to forsake the conventional and academic methods of the day and study nature for themselves; this was the wholesome impulse at the heart of their common activity, and its sincerity and power are the more apparent now that the excessive individualism and morbid intensity of much of its expression have become things of the past.

It would be interesting as matter of literary history to indicate the relations of this movement to the larger movement of thought and life which set its impress on the literature of Europe at the close of the last and the beginning of the present century. Herder and the young Goethe; Burns, Byron, Keats, Shelley, Coleridge and Wordsworth; Hugo and Gautier, — are names which seem to suggest differences rather than agreement; but it would not be difficult to discover certain near and close ties between them. More evident and readily discoverable is the relationship of Preraphaelitism with Romanticism; with the Oxford movement which expressed itself from the pulpit of St. Mary's Church in those subtle and searching sermons which made the world aware that in John Henry Newman a man of distinctly religious genius had appeared; and with that notable revival of Gothic forms which a deepened religious feeling substituted for the pseudo-classic architecture of the preceding century. A wonderfully interesting and significant movement of thought and life was that which associated the names of Newman and Keble, Hunt, Millais and Rossetti, Pugin and Ruskin. But this is, after all, mainly matter of historical interest; the real message which these men had to deliver to the world is to be sought not so much in their statements of faith, which were largely polemic, as in the great works which are the only authentic disclosures of their genius and bent. The men themselves had no sooner come to agreement in certain specific matters of principle or method than they began immediately to drift apart; the law of life was upon them, and while they held some things in common, the work and the word of each was to be the utterance of individual insight and experience.

Of the seven young men who formed the Preraphaelite Brotherhood in 1848, William Holman Hunt, John Everett Millais, and

Dante Gabriel Rossetti achieved distinction as painters; Thomas Woolner, William Rossetti and his famous brother, as poets; while James Collinson and Fredrick George Stephens, either in promise or performance, made good their claim to this illustrious companionship. With these names are also associated others which the world will not care to forget: Madox Brown, the painter of the Westminster frescoes, William Bell Scott, and Christina Rossetti. To this little group the Rossetti family furnished three of the most active and original minds; and of these three, one is likely to remain the most memorable exponent of the Preraphaelite movement. Of Gabriel Charles Dante Rossetti, who changed his name to Dante Gabriel at an early period in his career, much might be said by way of emphasizing the influential element of heredity. In blood, as his brother tells us, he was three fourths Italian and one fourth English; "being on the father's side wholly Italian and on the mother's side half Italian and half English." The father was a scholar, a man of letters, and an ardent patriot long before the days of the successful movement for Italian independence and nationality. Exiled after the good old Bourbon fashion, Gabriele Rossetti came to London in 1824, married the daughter of an English mother and an Italian father, — the latter a teacher, translator, and scholar of excellent quality, — became Professor of Italian in King's College, and a commentator on Dante of orthodox depth and obscurity. To this fugitive scholar were born four children: Maria Francesca, who died in 1876; Dante Gabriel; William Michael; and Christina Georgina. A group so variously gifted has rarely gathered round any fireside. To Maria Francesca we are indebted for "A Shadow of Dante," which so eminent a student of the great Florentine as Mr. Lowell has declared to be "by far the best comment that has appeared in English." William Michael is known to all readers of current English criticism; and Christina has won high rank as a writer of lyrical verse of marked individual quality.

Dante Gabriel was born on May 12, 1828, into an atmosphere charged with high and intense intellectual activity. He knew the story of "Hamlet" before most children know the alphabet, and at five years of age he wrote a dramatic poem entitled "The Slave;" seven years later he composed a series of still more ambitious verses which bore the romantic title of "Sir Hugh the Heron," and were probably suggested by some lines in the first canto of "Marmion." These verses have no interest save as they indicate the precocious activity of a mind which began its con-

scious development with the advantages of an exceptional pre-natal education. In 1835 he entered King's College school, where he studied Latin, French, and German; Italian was as familiar to him as English. A strong desire to become a painter led to a change of instruction in his fourteenth year; and leaving King's College school, he devoted himself to the study of art. From the Royal Academy Antique School he entered the studio of Madox Brown, and made the acquaintance of the daring young innovators who formed the Preraphaelite Brotherhood in 1848. In his nineteenth year Dante Gabriel wrote the first verse which gave unmistakable evidence of his possession of poetic genius. In this year he produced the striking lines entitled "My Sister's Sleep," in the metre with which "In Memoriam" was to make the world familiar three years later; and the most widely known of all his poems, "The Blessed Damosel;" both of which appeared for the first time in "The Germ" in 1850. Of Rossetti's art work, begun at this period and carried on to the close of his too brief career, this is not the place to speak, even if it were within the power of the writer to characterize and describe its subtle and varied beauty of expression, its noble substance of thought, its splendor and depth of imaginative force. It is sufficient to say that the two sides of his life endeavor are entirely harmonious; that they are complementary expressions of a genius which saw things as a whole with a glance that pierced to the very soul of beauty in things visible and in a vision as rapt and at times as ecstatic as was ever vouchsafed to mystic or saint.

In the spring of 1860, after a long engagement, Rossetti married Elizabeth Eleanor Siddal, a woman of poetic and artistic faculty, of exquisite sensitiveness of mind and nature, and whose beautiful face will long remain a possession in one of Rossetti's most characteristic works, the "Beata Beatrix." The completeness and happiness of this fellowship can only be inferred from the crushing and life-long grief which her death, early in 1862, brought upon Rossetti. In the darkness of that sudden and awful sorrow, to quote the words of another, the poet literally buried his wand and committed his poems to the grave in which his wife was interred. But neither genius nor its works are private property, and the time came when the persuasions of his friends and his own sense of obligation to his gifts induced Rossetti to consent to the disinterment of the manuscripts, and in 1876 his first volume of "Poems" was published; the second volume, "Ballads and Sonnets," appearing in 1881. But the hand of death was

already upon him. Insomnia, that lurking foe in sensitive and highly imaginative temperaments, had already greatly reduced his working power and had developed a morbid tendency which led to recurring periods of depression and to prolonged seclusion from the society of all save the most intimate friends. On Easter Sunday, April 9, 1882, Rossetti died.

A singularly uneventful life, judged by that shallowest of conventional standards which measures the depth and breadth of man's life by the journeys he makes, and the things which befall his estate! Rossetti's life was intensive rather than extensive; its power and affluence lay in the clearness with which its own aims were discerned, and the quiet persistence with which it was held to the lines of its own development. Probably no modern man has been, in one sense, so detached from the world of his time, and so consistently true to an ideal which was the projection of his own soul. That ideal is clearly disclosed in the two arts which served Rossetti as interpreters with almost equal fidelity and power. No man has left a more distinct record of his temperament and genius, and there are few such records which put one under a spell more potent, or which lead one on to the heart of a more enthralling ideal. A man so sensitive and intense in his imaginative faculty will not fall under the influence of a multitude of antagonistic teachers; he will respond only to those with whom his own nature has some spiritual kinship. One is not surprised to find, therefore, that Rossetti early discovered strongly marked intellectual affinities, which lie so directly along the lines of his own temperament that, after studying his work, one could safely venture to name them. Shakespeare, Byron, Shelley, Coleridge, Keats, and Tennyson are the natural teachers of such a boyhood and youth as Rossetti's; and later one may count with assurance upon the peculiar and potent influence of Blake and Browning. There is one other name with which the name of Rossetti will be associated as long as it carries any power of association with it. Over the household of the exiled Italian scholar the memory of Dante continually hovered like the presence of the genius of a race. The great Florentine was not a tradition, the shadow of a mighty past, to the childhood of the poet; he was a continual and pervasive influence, penetrating his inmost life in its formative period, and leaving in the mind an image as clear and familiar as it was inspiring. Rossetti's personality was too strong and well defined to yield itself even into hands so puissant as those of Dante; but between the two there was a spiritual as

well as a race kinship, and the poet of the *Divine Comedy* has had no truer interpreter than the translator of the "*Vita Nuova*" and the poet of "*The House of Life*."

Rossetti was extremely fond of the old English and Scotch ballad literature. For the Italian poets as a whole he cared little; among modern writers of French verse he was drawn only to Hugo and De Musset; his admiration for Villon one could safely have predicted. He had little in common with the Germans, whose names were on all lips in the time of his early manhood, although one cannot help thinking that if he had carried his study of the language further he would have been strongly moved by many of the German ballads, and that at least one episode in "*Faust*" would have touched him closely. Fitzgerald's masterly version of Calderon interested him greatly during the later years of his life. For Teutonic and Scandinavian myth and poetry he had no affinity, and he was entirely free from that curiosity concerning Oriental thought and belief which of late has taken possession of so many minds both great and small. He had none of that unfruitful and essentially unintellectual curiosity which leads people to ransack all literatures and philosophies, not in the spirit of eager search for principles, but from a desire to discover some new thing; a desire especially to come upon some esoteric knowledge, and thus, by a single brilliant advance, possess themselves of the secret of the universe. Rossetti did not make the mistake of thinking that truth is something which can be found by searching; he understood that knowledge becomes truth only as we grow into it and make it ours by vital assimilation. Deaf to all solicitations of passion or pleasure, unresponsive to the intellectual curiosity of his time, he took his own way through life, made fellowship with those who shared with him the passion for the ideal, and gave his work the impress of a singular and highly individual consistency of conception and mood.

Two volumes of moderate size contain the complete work of Rossetti in poetry, and one of these is made up of translations. It is the quality rather than the quantity of the work which gives it claim to consideration. We could ill afford to lose any of the Shakespearean dramas or of the longer poems of Tennyson or Browning; these poets survey and interpret so wide a field of thought that the complete expression of the genius of either would suffer mutilation by suppression or loss. But Rossetti was not in touch with the wide movement of life; he was absorbed in a single pursuit, and enthralled by a single ideal; within comparatively

narrow limits he has given us a complete picture of the vision that was reflected in the depths of his soul. The volume of translations, "Dante and His Circle," attests not only his great familiarity with the early Italian poets, but also his extraordinary mastery of difficult metrical forms. In his own verse Rossetti used few forms, but they were among the most expressive and exacting; in his translations he showed himself master of the principles of an art to the practice of which the early Italians brought all their characteristic subtlety and refinement. This volume discloses something more than the possession of those gifts which go to the making of a genuine translation; it discloses a genius for poetry of a very high order. No one but a poet worthy of Dante's companionship could have entered so completely into the purpose of the "Vita Nuova," and disposed about the great Florentine in such effective and luminous grouping the company of singers who preceded, accompanied, or immediately followed, the master. The sonnets, canzonets, and lyrics which represent the work of more than forty different writers, are rendered into English with a fidelity of spirit, beauty of form, and melody of phrase which betray Rossetti's double mastery of Italian thought and English speech.

When we turn to his own work we find the subtlety and delicacy of the Italian genius still present, but new and personal qualities appear to attest the possession of original gifts as well as of inherited aptitudes. It was chiefly through the ballad, the lyric, and the sonnet that Rossetti spoke to the world; and although in the use of each of these forms he showed at times a high degree of metrical skill, it will probably appear in the end that his genius had more kinship with the sonnet than with either lyric or ballad, and that among all his contemporaries his mastery of this delicate instrument which the Italians formed was most complete. It is not easy, however, to discriminate between varieties of form in a mass of work so full of deep poetic emotion and thought as Rossetti's. His ballads grow in beauty and power as we penetrate more and more their often obscure meaning. It is not alone their quaint phraseology, their archaic turns of speech, their recurring use of obsolete but picturesque words, that impress us with a sense of something not akin to our thought or time; it is the mediæval spirit which pervades them and gives them a glow and splendor, a deep and moving spell, such as shines through cloister windows when vesper chants are sung. The ballad as a literary form belongs to social and intellectual conditions which have passed away

never to return; but it still offers to a genius like Rossetti's resources of expression not to be found in any other form of verse. It is so nearly akin to the lyric that it brings the rhythmical movement and thrill of the singing note to the narration of objective events and actions; and it is so full of dramatic resources that it adds to directness of expression the varied and contrasted motives of the drama. It combines lyrical music with dramatic intensity and cumulative force. The seven ballads which Rossetti wrote illustrate the power and beauty with which a poet of genius can inspire a form of verse which has ceased in a sense to be a natural note for modern thought. "Stratton Water," "The White Ship," and "The King's Tragedy," approach very nearly the romantic and historic type of the true ballad, and are thoroughly dramatic in spirit, although charged with intense individualism; "Troy Town," "Eden Bower," "Rose Mary," and "Sister Helen," belong to the world of imaginative creation and are essentially lyrical in quality. But it is easy to push analysis too far; and, while certain broad distinctions may be noted, Rossetti's conception of the subject matter of his ballads was so intense, and, in expression, so readily rose to passion, that he is always dramatic, while his sense of melody was so quick that he is always lyrical as well.

These ballads disclose very fully the quality of Rossetti's genius when it deals with objective things. They are charged with imaginative power; one feels not so much the free and beautiful play of the imagination as in "The Tempest," but the passion and force of it. The imagination has not dallied with these themes, has not contrasted, compared, and balanced them with kindred conceptions; it has pierced to their very heart, and the thrill of personal anguish and agitation is in them. There are few poems in any literature so vivid in presentation, so rapid in climax, so deeply and mysteriously tragic in motive as "Sister Helen." It bears one on shuddering and breathless until the wax is consumed, the fire gone out, the "white thing" crossed the threshold, and the story told to its bitter end in the refrain:—

"Lost, lost, all lost, between Hell and Heaven."

In "Rose Mary" Rossetti not only illustrates the depth and passion of love, but still more clearly the awful tragedy which lies locked in its heart, to be unfolded wherever the law of its nature is violated. Those who find him essentially sensuous will do well to study the strange and rare setting which is given the Berylstone in this characteristic ballad. But the most impressive and

probably the most enduring of all Rossetti's ballads is "The King's Tragedy"; a noble work, in which one of the most dramatic episodes in Scottish history is described with wonderful vividness and power. The pictorial distinctness, dramatic movement and interest, the depth of feeling and force of expression which characterize this ballad, place it in the front rank of modern dramatic verse. Rossetti's use of the supernatural element is nowhere more effective; the lines in which the first warning of the haggard old woman is conveyed to the King on the Fife sea-coast ring true to the very spirit of the time and scene:—

"And the woman held his eyes with her eyes:—

'O King, thou art come at last;
But thy wraith has haunted the Scottish sea
To my sight for four years past.

"'Four years it is since first I met
'Twixt the Duchray and the Dhu,
A shape whose feet clung close in a shroud,
And that shape for thine I knew.

"'A year again, and on Inchkeith isle
I saw thee pass in the breeze,
With the cerecloth risen above thy feet,
And wound about thy knees.

"'And yet a year, in the Links of Forth,
As a wanderer without rest,
Thou cam'st with both thine arms i' the shroud
That clung high up thy breast.

"'And in this hour I find thee here,
And well mine eyes may note
That the winding sheet hath passed thy breast
And risen around thy throat.

"'And when I meet thee again, O King,
That of death hast such sore draught,—
Except thou turn again on this shore,—
The winding sheet shall have moved once more,
And covered thine eyes and mouth.'"

Of Rossetti's lyrical verse one poem has had the good or ill fortune to attain something like popularity; a popularity due, it is to be feared, to its picturesque and quaint phraseology rather than to its high and beautiful imaginative quality. "The Blessed Damosel," written at nineteen, remains one of the most captivating and original poems of the century; a lyric full of bold and winning imagery and charged with imaginative fervor and glow;

a vision upon which painter and poet seemed to have wrought with a single hand; a thing of magical beauty, whose spell is no more to be analyzed than the beauty of the night when the earliest stars crown it. In all his lyrical work Rossetti reveals the peculiar and passionate force of his ideas. "The Burden of Nineveh" and "Dante at Verona" are nobly planned and strongly executed. "The Last Confession" reminds one of Browning in its subtle development of motives, its dramatic vigor, its psychologic insight, and its flashes of imaginative beauty. "The Woodspurge" is perhaps as perfect an expression of a poet's mood as any piece of verse extant; it is a masterpiece of exact observation. Of "The Stream's Secret" Mr. Stedman has said that it has more music in it than in any slow lyric he remembers. The depth of Rossetti's poetic feeling, the subtlety of his conception, and the delicacy and precision of his expression are perhaps best illustrated in the poem entitled "The Sea Limits":—

"Consider the sea's listless chime :
Time's self it is, made audible, —
The murmur of the earth's own shell.
Secret continuance sublime
Is the sea's end : our sight may pass
No furlong further. Since time was,
This sound hath told the lapse of time.

"No quiet, which is death's, — it hath
The mournfulness of ancient life,
Enduring always at dull strife.
As the world's heart of rest and wrath,
Its painful pulse is in the sands.
Last utterly, the whole sky stands,
Gray and not known, along its path.

"Listen alone beside the sea,
Listen alone among the woods ;
Those voices of twin solitudes
Shall have one sound alike to thee :
Hark where the murmurs of thronged men
Surge and sink back and surge again, —
Still the one voice of wave and tree.

"Gather a shell from the strown beach
And listen at its lips : they sigh
The same desire and mystery,
The echo of the whole sea's speech.
And all mankind is thus at heart
Not anything but what thou art :
And Earth, Sea, Man, are all in each."

The structure of the sonnet is at once the inspiration and the despair of those who would range themselves beside Shakespeare and Milton, Wordsworth and Mrs. Browning, in the choir of English sonneteers. Within its narrow limits and under its rigid laws the greatest poets have poured their souls at full tide into forms whose perfection predicts immortality. This delicate instrument Rossetti has made his own; and, after the manner of Shakespeare, committed into its keeping the secrets of his inner life. It is in the lines of the one hundred and fifty-two sonnets included in his published work that we come nearest his personal life. He has given us an admirable description of this form of verse:—

“A sonnet is a moment’s monument,—
 Memorial from the Soul’s eternity
 To one dead, deathless hour. Look that it be,
 Whether for lustral rite or dire portent,
 Of its own arduous fullness reverent:
 Carve it in ivory or in ebony,
 As Day or Night may rule; and let Time see
 Its flowering crest impearled and orient.
 A sonnet is a coin: its face reveals
 The Soul,—its converse, to what Power ’t is due:—
 Whether for tribute to the august appeals
 Of Life, or dower in Love’s high retinue,
 It serve; or, ’mid the dark wharf’s cavernous breath
 In Charon’s palm it pay the toll to Death.”

With this narrow frame of fourteen decasyllabic lines, divided into the octave and the sextet, Rossetti has condensed some of his most profoundly poetic conceptions; following the interior law of the sonnet structure, he has carried a single thought on the flood of a single emotion to a swift climax, from which the reflux wave recedes by a movement as normal as that which lifts the tides and sends them back in rhythmic melody to the deep from which they came. Rossetti’s friend, Mr. Theodore Watts, has said that “for the carrying of a single wave of emotion in a single flow and return, nothing has ever been invented comparable to the Petrarchan sonnet, with an octave of two rhymes of a prescribed arrangement, and a sextet which is in some sense free.” This form served Rossetti as his type, although he uses it not imitatively but with the freedom and facility of a master. The dramatic power, the movement and life which he can introduce within the compass of a sonnet are well illustrated by these lines on “Mary Magdalene at the Door of Simon the Pharisee,” suggested by a drawing in which Mary has left a festal procession and by a

sudden impulse seeks Christ within, her lover following and endeavoring to turn her back : —

“ Why wilt thou cast the roses from thine hair ?
 Nay, be thou all a rose, — wreath, lips and cheek.
 Nay, not this house, — that banquet house we seek ;
 See how they kiss and enter ; come thou there.
 This delicate day of love we two will share
 Till at our ear love’s whispering night shall speak.
 What, sweet one, — hold’st thou still the foolish freak ?
 Nay, when I kiss thy feet they ’ll have the stair.
 “ Oh loose me ! See’st thou not my Bridegroom’s face
 That draws me to Him ? For His feet my kiss,
 My hair, my tears He craves to-day : — and oh !
 What words can tell what other day and place
 Shall see me clasp those blood-stained feet of His ?
 He needs me, calls me, loves me : let me go ! ”

“ The House of Life,” described as a sonnet-sequence, is undoubtedly the noblest contribution in this form of verse yet made to our literature. It should be studied with Shakespeare’s sonnets and with Mrs. Browning’s “ Sonnets from the Portuguese ” in order that its wealth of thought, its varied beauty of phrase, and its depth of feeling may be comprehended. It tells the same heart story, but in how different a key ! The hundred and more sonnets which compose it are a revelation of the poet’s nature ; all its ideals, its passions, its hopes and despairs, its changeful moods are reflected there ; and there, too, a man’s heart beats, in one hour with the freedom of a great joy, and in another against the iron bars of fate.

Rossetti is not, like Goethe, Hugo, Browning, and Tennyson, an interpreter of his age ; the key to its wide and confused movement is not to be found in any work of his hand. He heard its turmoil only as Michael Angelo may have heard the noise of the city faintly borne to the scaffolding which concealed the “ Last Judgment.” Intent upon his own work, the uproar of life was only a hushed murmur on the silence in which art always enshrines itself. His was not that spiritual puissance which carries the repose of solitude into the noisy ways of men ; recognizing his own limitations, if limitations they were, he held himself apart and let the world go its way. That way was far from his, and to close most modern books and open upon “ The King’s Tragedy ” or the “ House of Life ” is like passing from the brilliant square electric with stir and change, or the sunny meadow asleep like a child with daisies in its hands, into some depth of forest awful

with the mystery of wraith and vision, or into some secluded retreat where Love hears no sound but the throb of its own passion, and sees no image save that one face whose compelling beauty is the masque of fate. Rossetti was preëminently an artist; one who saw the ultimate things of life not along the lines of intellectual striving and inquiry, nor in the moral disclosures of action; but in those ravishing perfections of form and being which seem to be finalities because the imagination, baffled by their very completeness, cannot pass beyond. He was an artist, not after the manner of Tennyson, whose literary insight matches itself with a melody that presses fast upon music itself; not after the manner of Sophocles, to whose work proportion and harmony and repose gave the impress of a supreme and final achievement; but after the fashion of some of the mystical painters, whose vision included that interior beauty which is the soul of visible things; which cannot be formulated nor analyzed nor dissevered from itself by an intellectual process, but is the pure product of intuition; something never to be demonstrated but always to be revealed. "The Beautiful," said Goethe, "is a primeval phenomenon, which indeed never becomes visible itself, but the reflection of which is seen in a thousand various expressions of the creative mind, as various and manifold, even, as the phenomena of Nature." This quality of perception is so different from the literary faculty as most poets disclose it, that it may almost be said to characterize another order of mind. Beauty is one of the finalities of creation, and is, therefore, unresolvable into its elements; something instantly recognized, but vanishing when we try to press its secret from it. Rossetti did not see beautiful aspects of things chiefly, or we could overtake his mental processes; he saw beauty itself. It was not the attributes but the quality which he perceived. He did not discern beauty as one form through which the soul of things expresses itself; he discerned it as the form, the final and perfect expression which is substantially identical with the soul. To most modern poets life presents itself under a vast variety of aspects; the soul wears as many masques as she has activities; but to Rossetti there is no such multiplicity of expression; there is but a single face and all things are revealed therein. To a man of this temper, philosophy and statescraft, schools and creeds, knowledge and action, the warp and woof out of which the fabrics of thought and art are commonly woven, are of small account; he may not disparage them but he finds no use in them; he passes through all this appearance of things, so rich in revela-

tion to others, to something which he sees behind them all and to which, if they had any form of guidance, they could but lead him in the end. Life is not divided for him into confused activities and disconnected phases; it is simple; reveals itself even in pain; presses back the blackness of the mystery; and conveys the irrefutable evidence of immortality. It is idle to speculate, to press through effect to cause, to interrogate knowledge; the vision of beauty, once discerned, does not forsake the soul, and confirms the hope, alien to no human heart, that happiness and immortality are one and the same: —

“Nay, come up hither. From this wave-washed mound
Unto the furthest flood-brim look with me;
Then reach on with thy thought till it be drown'd.
Miles and miles distant though the last line be,
And though thy soul sail leagues and leagues beyond, —
Still, leagues beyond those leagues, there is more sea.”

The beauty of the universe, which to Rossetti was both law and revelation of life, was not that fair appearance of things which the Greeks loved with a joy born of a sense of kinship with the thing we love; nor was it that pale, unworldly vision which enthralled some of the early mediæval painters. It was a beauty to which nothing is foreign which life contains; it was in the most sensuous and the most spiritual things; it lay open to all eyes on the meanest flower, and it was hidden in the most obscure symbol. It led up from the throb of passion, from eyes and lips wholly of the earth, through all visible things to that great white rose in which the vision of Dante rested in Paradise. It pervades all things and yet is not contained by them: —

“Hers are the eyes which, over and beneath,
The sky and sea bend on thee; which can draw,
By sea or sky or woman, to one law,
The allotted bondman of her palm and wreath.”

Plato discerned this conception of beauty as an ideal which reveals itself under all forms to its worshiper: “He that gazed so earnestly on what things in that holy place were to be seen, he, when he discerns on earth some godlike countenance or fashion of body, that counterfeits Beauty well, first of all he trembles, and then comes over him something of the fear which erst he knew; but then, looking on that earthly beauty, he worships it as divine, and if he did not fear the reproach of utter madness he would sacrifice to his heart's idol as to the image and presence of a God.”

To one who is possessed by this passion, life does not cease to be perplexing, to be a mystery of unfathomable depth; but it ceases to press its questions for instant answer, it ceases to paralyze by its uncertainty; the runner is not oblivious of the shadows that surround and pursue him, but he thinks chiefly of the vision which draws him through works and days with irresistible insistence: —

“Under the arch of life, where love and death,
Terror and mystery guard her shrike, I saw
Beauty enthroned; and though her gaze struck awe,
I drew it in as simply as my breath.”

“This is that Lady Beauty, in whose praise
Thy voice and hand shake still — long known to thee
By flying hair and fluttering hem — the beat,
Following her daily of thy heart and feet,
How passionately and irresistibly,
In what fond flight, how many ways and days.”

It was this passion which made Rossetti's life one long, eager pursuit, which gives his art, whether in painting or in verse, the sense of something just beyond his grasp, a presence hovering forever before him and receding as he advances. This ideal became most clear to him, not through the myriad aspects of nature, but in a woman's face; it was not a mere appearance of beauty, it was a soul revealing itself; it was life removing its masques of shame and indignity and discovering its divine loveliness. Like the Beatrice of Dante's vision, this face looked through and interpreted all his experiences. All the passion of his soul sets like a mighty tide towards this object of mystical adoration; all forms of human expression, the most familiar, the most intimate, the most intense, the most sensuous, are charged with the flow of his emotion and cannot contain it. It ceases to be a pursuit; it becomes a life.

There is one other word yet to be spoken which describes this enthralling passion. One must go back to Plato and study the “*Phædrus*” and the “*Symposium*,” one must steep his mind in the mystical thought of Dante, to understand all that love meant to Rossetti. It meant the consummation and fulfillment of all that life promised and prophesied; it meant that final state of being in which knowledge and experience and action find their eternal fruition: —

“Not I myself know all my love for thee:
How should I reach so far, who cannot weigh
To-morrow's dower by gage of yesterday?”

Shall birth and death, and all dark names that be
 As doors and windows bared to some loud sea,
 Lash deaf my ears and blind my face with spray ;
 And shall my sense pierce love — the last relay
 And ultimate outpost of eternity ? ”

Before time was love was, Rossetti tells us in those deep and tender lines entitled “Sudden Light” ; after time ends it shall be, or else the Blessed Damosel leans in vain from the golden bar of Heaven. Love is “the interpreter and mediator between God and man ;” only through loving do we come to full knowledge, only in loving do we taste eternal life. To this great passion of the soul all knowledge is tributary and instrumental ; to know is not the consummation, but to love. The great process of life, therefore, involves not only knowledge and action, but the soul ; changes one from a spectator or student of its phenomena into a rapt and tireless seeker of the ideal. The senses, the intellect, relations of every sort and kind, reveal the object and develop the intensity of this pursuit. One is possessed by a mighty thirst which nothing can assuage save that supreme surrender of self in which love finds its opportunity and discloses its power. This conception is essentially mystical ; its speech is esoteric, but when one translates it into prose it is true to the deepest facts of life. It formulates no code of morals, but its eternal test is purity and truth ; sacrifice and surrender ; the passion of the soul which counts all things well lost if only it becomes one with the Infinite Love. This is the passion which expands the vast symphony of life out of a single theme, and presses from every note, however sensuous in tone, a pure and lofty music. Of the large element of truth in this conception there can be no question even by those who crave a different and more distinctively spiritual expression. To the sensuous alone can the “House of Life” be sensuous ; it is to be interpreted as akin with the “Vita Nuova” ; the same mood runs through both, although one is the word of an artist and the other the vision of a prophet. Beauty as the finality of expression, love as the finality of being, — these are the truths that give all Rossetti’s works and words a noble unity and consistency of aim and achievement.

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NEW YORK, N. Y.

THE ANTI-SEMITIC AGITATION IN EUROPE.

DATA exist in abundance to show that the anti-Semitic agitation, one of the least understood of the many problems of modern life, is a not unimportant movement of our day and generation. In its present phase it is scarcely a decade of years old, yet it has spread wherever the Jewish population is sufficiently large to make its influence as such felt; among its leaders are found men high in station, in church, state, literature, and education, such as Stöcker, Lagarde, Glagau, and others; in Germany an organization was effected at the congress of Anti-Semites held in Cassel in the spring of 1886, called "The German Anti-Semitic Union," among whose membership are found men who otherwise represent all shades of thought from traditional confessionism to radicalism; a central bureau for publication and agitation was established, with headquarters at Leipzig, and an extensive literature, some of which appeared in eight and ten editions in a single year, has been published, and is still being published, on the burning question; among which is the official organ of the movement, the semi-monthly "Anti-Semitische Correspondenz"; as early as 1881 a monster petition was presented to the Chancellor of the German empire, signed by 267,000 persons from all parts of the realm, asking that special legal measures be taken against the growing power of modern Judaism; — these, and facts like these, are proof conclusive that anti-Semitism is a real and not an imaginary problem, and that it merits attention and examination.

As a rule, the character and animus of the agitation are misinterpreted. It is decidedly *not* a persecution for religion's sake; it is not a religious agitation at all, but purely a social one. Nor is it a revival of mediæval anti-Judaism after the manner of Pfefferkorn *et id genus omne*. In the nature of the case this is impossible, since only the social relations of modern society, as these have been formed in our times, offer the conditions under which the anti-Semitism of our day sprang into being and could develop vitality and vigor. The opposition is directed against the Jews, not as the representatives of a certain religious system, but as the exponents of certain race characteristics, traits, and tendencies. For this reason it is called not Anti-Judaism, but Anti-Semitism. Only in so far as the religious peculiarities of the Jews, in their doctrines and morals, are regarded as expressive of their race peculiarities as members of the Semitic family of

peoples can the movement be said to have a religious character, and then only in a secondary and subordinate sense. Put into a nutshell, the central thought of anti-Semitism is this, that the manners and methods of Jewish thought and work, as expressive of the ethical ideas and ideals of Semitism, are in hopeless antagonism to the principles of the right and the true which control modern life and thought, and which are the product of Aryan and Christian soil; and further, as a consequence, that the growing influence of this Semitism, as this has been developing in the Jewish prominence in those departments of activity which lead and direct the life of the age, such as business, literature, education, politics, etc., is a real menace to the best features of the existing order of things, and therefore should, as a matter of self-defense and in the interests of a healthy civilization, be resisted and suppressed. In the "Anti-Semiten Katechismus," the *vademecum* of these people, the fourth question is this: "What is then the real object of the Anti-Semities?" To this the answer is given: "They aim to have the Jewish influence in the various departments of life curtailed through legal means, because they regard this influence as dangerous. They therefore are working for a revision of the laws in this sense, that the rights of the Jews shall be subjected to certain limitations." In the constitution adopted by the Cassel Congress, Section 1, defining the purpose of the newly formed organization, reads: "This association aims, by legal measures, to curtail the Jewish influence in the economic, social, and political fields, and also the establishment of special alien laws for the Jews." Question 2 of the "Katechismus" explains that this opposition has nothing to do with the Jewish religion as such, and the leading writers on the subject are very careful to make this plain. It is in this way that we can understand why, by the side of Stöcker, the Berlin Court preacher and the opposition of his Christian-Social party to Jewish aggression, we find working in the same direction the radical writer Radenhausen, the author of "Esther, Die Semitische Unmoral im Kampfe wider Staat und Kirche," probably the most complete summary and sober discussion of the vexed question as one of public morals. Indeed, the character and spirit of the publications coming from the Leipzig headquarters are such as to show that the antagonism is anything but religious in kind. The "Katechismus," the "Volkskalender," and other publications issued there, are the writings of men anything but reactionary in religious thought. On the contrary, the attitude of these works, over against the Old

Testament revelation, is not at all satisfactory to a conservative scholar and Christian. The writers, as a rule, are extremely liberal, even in the German sense of the word. They accordingly belong to the general school of thought to which the great majority of German Jews incline, who are nearly all, to a man, "Reformed," that is, more or less — generally more — rationalistic. From neither Jewish nor anti-Semitic side would the religious element as such be pushed into public prominence in the discussion; considering the attitude of the majority of the participants on both sides, the religious convictions of the one or the other can scarcely be regarded as important factors in the fight. This state of affairs only adds weight to the *ex professo* aims of the agitation, namely, its prosecution as a social problem in the widest sense of the word.

It is now plain why the modern opposition to the Jews is different in kind from any that have preceded it. The present is the century of emancipation, also of the Jews. England, at the beginning of the century, began to remove the political disabilities of its Jewish subjects. Other nations followed; but it was not till the revolutions of 1848-49 that the complete emancipation was achieved in Central Europe, including Austria. In eastern Europe, particularly in Russia, this has not been secured even yet. But otherwise, for nearly four decades, the Jews have enjoyed perfect equality before the law, and, for the first time in the history of Europe, have been permitted to engage in the struggle for existence on a perfectly equal footing with his Aryan neighbors. These new liberties and rights, generously granted him by his Japhetic brother, in whose tent he is living, he is charged with having abused. He is crowding himself forward in every department of life; he will, under no conditions, be a producer and earn his bread in the sweat of his brow; he seeks, above all, to gain control of those callings in which he can live on the profits of what others produce; the Jews will not divide up among the various professions, callings, businesses, and trades of men as do the other peoples; he aims to secure the management of those agencies which are the sources of influence and power in moulding the life and thought of the hour, in the world of finance, business, journalism, education, etc., and, accordingly, he is said to be exerting an influence not only altogether out of proportion to the numerical strength of his people, but, on account of his principles and morals, injurious to the interests of society and the public welfare.

That these charges are, at least in part, well founded admits of no doubt. As far as the extraordinary Jewish influence in the modern social fabric is concerned, statistical data exist in abundance. This is particularly the case in Germany, where the most attention has been paid to this problem by scholars. According to the "Bulletin" of the Marseilles Geographical Society for 1885, the total number of Jews on the globe is 6,377,600. Of these, 5,407,600 are in Europe, 245,000 in Asia, 413,000 in Africa, 300,000 in America, 12,000 in Oceanica. Of the European Jews 2,552,200 are in Russia, 1,643,700 in Austro-Hungary, 561,000 in Germany, 60,000 in England, 70,000 in France, 36,290 in Italy, 260,000 in Roumania, 116,000 in European Turkey, Holland, 81,690, Belgium, 3,000, Denmark, 3,946, Spain, 1,900, Greece, 2,650, Switzerland, 7,373, Luxemburg, 600, Portugal, 200, Servia, 3,490, Sweden and Norway, 3,000. The statistics given by the Jews themselves of their *Diaspora* differ little from this, the most important variant being Russia, to which 2,798,000 are assigned. This, together with other changes, would make the grand total for Europe 5,713,700, or 1 in every 55 inhabitants.

Complete statistics of the proportion of Jews in the leading professions and callings have of course not been collected. But those lines in which such data are at hand may fairly be regarded as typical and representative. In Germany the Jews constitute a little more than one per cent. of the inhabitants. Yet among the non-theological university teachers they constitute nearly ten per cent. Of the 1,326 non-theological professors in the 22 universities of the Fatherland 96 are Jews or of Jewish descent, that is, about 7½ per cent. Of the 529 *privatdocenten*, that is, those who are candidates for appointment to professorships and impart instruction without remuneration, 84 are Jewish, that is, about 17½ per cent. Notably at Berlin and Breslau is this element strongly represented. Of 42 medical professors in Berlin 13 are Jewish; of 15 law professors 3 are Jewish; of 88 members of the philosophical faculty, 13 are of this people. Among the *privatdocenten* the percentage is greater, namely, 45 out of 124. At Breslau, of 79 professors 15 are Jewish; and of the 27 *privatdocenten*, 12 are of this people. Even when we remember the fact that in these figures are included also a number who are baptized Jews, the excess of Jewish representatives over and beyond the relative Jewish population is certainly remarkable. That this disproportion is increasing rather than decreasing is evident from the fact that the ranks of the *privatdocenten* is so crowded by

young Jewish teachers. And that the future has still more in store in this direction is clear from the statistics of those schools which lead to the university and the professions. The data from Berlin, taken from the statistics of 1887, are instructive in this direction. Of the 1,400,000 inhabitants of Berlin, 67,000 are Jews. According to this, of the 23,481 pupils in the gymnasia, technical and other high schools of the German metropolis, 22,357 should be non-Jewish and 1,124 Jews. But in reality the respective figures are 18,666 and 4,815. In other words, the Jewish element is represented four or five times as strongly as it is fairly entitled to. Among the university students, all of whom are preparing themselves for the one or the other of the professions, about the same relative disproportion shows itself. In Austria, for example, the Jews constitute less than five per cent. of the population. Yet of the 5,721 students in attendance at the university at Vienna in the winter semester of 1885-86 there were 2,085 Jews, a percentage seven times as great as the relative Jewish population would lead us to expect. In the same term the ten gymnasia of Vienna had an attendance of 2,247 Christian pupils, but of 1,174 Jewish. In many of the high schools of the Austrian capital the Jews outnumber the Christians. In all the 24 so-called middle schools, that is, those preparing for the university, there were 7,708 pupils. Of these 4,888 were Catholic, 474 were Protestant, and 2,262 were Jews. In the 146 public schools of the city there was an attendance of 76,844 pupils, of whom 10,110 were Jews. In the year 1884 there were born 25,600 children in Vienna of Christian parents and 2,068 of Jewish, or twelve times as many Christian children as Jewish, and yet in the higher schools of every five pupils two are Jewish.

The inevitable result of this has been, and evidently will be to a greater extent in coming years, the crowding of the professions other than the theological by Jews. In Germany, matters in this regard are bad enough in themselves, so that the overcrowding of the professions and the rapid growth of a "learned proletariat" has become a distinct social problem within the past ten years. The struggle of the Jews for places and positions of influence has made bad worse. Berlin has no less than 187 Jewish lawyers. Of the 660 lawyers in Vienna, 350, or more than fifty per cent., are Jewish. Of the 2,140 lawyers in the province of lower Austria, 1,024, or 47 per cent., are Jews; and of the 370 persons of that province who registered as "literary men," only 45 were not Jews.

This draws attention to the further fact, that in other fields too the same state of affairs exists. Notably is this the case in journalism. The great majority of the papers of Berlin, Vienna, Frankfort, Hamburg, and other cities are managed by Jewish capital and Jewish editors. In Berlin this is true of at least four dailies, while two others are very friendly to the Jews; several, like Bismarck's organ, the "North German Gazette," are neutral, and several, such as the "Kreuzzeitung," the "Reichsbote," the Catholic "Germania," are decidedly anti-Semitic. In Vienna all the dailies but two are edited by Jews. In France it is claimed that 1,746 papers have Jewish editors, and in Italy 692. Many of the leading literary monthlies, bi-monthlies, and quarterlies are in Jewish hands, among them being the "Rundschau," in which the extracts from the diary of the late Emperor of Germany first made their appearance.

In France, matters would if anything be worse than in Germany and Austria were the Jewish population greater. Relatively their influence there is greater than in any other state in Europe. They themselves frequently call Paris "the new Jerusalem," and the French Jews are the only section of that people that is organized. They have a consistory of their own with a *Grand Rabbin de France* at its head. The Jewish rabbis are paid by the state. France is also the headquarters of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle*, an organization of more than 30,000 members and an annual income of 400,000 francs, which in the twenty-five years of its existence has proved a most effective agency in maintaining an *esprit de corps* among the Jews and encourages aggressive movements among the nations. Full statistics, although seemingly not in all cases perfectly reliable, on the Jewish influence in France were published by Drumont in 1886, in his remarkable work "La France Juive" (The Judaized France).

Of course it is in the world of business and finance that the Jewish power is chiefly felt. And in this regard the complaints from all over Europe of the methods and manners of the Jewish business men are loud and long. In many districts, such as Posen, in Prussia, where the Jews constitute one eighth of the inhabitants, and in Hungary, in Austria, where they are one fourteenth, and in Galicia, where they are one ninth, it is impossible for a non-Jew to maintain himself in any of the non-producing callings. The Jews monopolize them all. If in the United States, with its sparse Jewish population of only perhaps one fifth

of one per cent. of the whole, mutterings are already heard on this score, it can easily be understood why these cries should be proportionally larger in the sections of Europe so thickly settled by Jews. Indeed, it was the financial measures of the Jews in Germany that caused the cloud of anti-Semitism to rise above the social horizon of Europe. When the tremendous financial crash of 1873 came in Germany, in which literally hundreds of millions of marks were lost in wild speculations, it was soon learned that the chief of sinners in this nefarious work had been the Jewish bankers and brokers. Otto Glagau, the noted publicist of Berlin, thereupon published in the "Gartenlaube" of Leipzig, the great German illustrated weekly that has a subscription list of nearly half a million, a series of articles in which this tremendous financial swindle was exposed in its whole length, breadth, and depth. This was followed by Marr's first work on the question, which in a single year reached twelve editions. The line of attack in these and similar works was against the dishonest principles and methods of Jewish business and trade. In the further course of the argument, then, the deeper underlying principles received some attention.

Naturally this prominence of Jewish influence in public life *in itself* can be no ground for any charges against them. If it meant merely the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence, it would be rather a matter of congratulation. But this, the anti-Semites say, is not the case. On the contrary, they regard this influence as highly detrimental to the welfare of society. This they claim to be the case, because the principles which form the source and fountain-head of Jewish activity can be brought into no harmony with the principles of honesty and public morals that have emanated from Aryan and Christian sources. It is charged that the Jews regulate themselves by a special code of morals which permits them to violate that accepted by the peoples in whose midst they dwell. The argument on this point has been bitter, and has centered around the contents and the spirit of the "Shulchan Aruch," the official, legal, and ritualistic codex of Judaism. This compilation and compendium was prepared in the fifteenth century by the learned Jewish Rabbis Joseph Caro and Moses Ysseles. It embodies the quintessence of the whole religious literature of Israel from the time of the Old Testament to that of the casuists of the Middle Ages, although in practice it is not claimed to be such. The book is the official religious symbol of Judaism. No reliable edition in any modern tongue

had been published of this unique work until such a version was undertaken by Dr. Johannes A. F. E. L. V. von Pavly, the result of whose ten years of patient labor is being published by Marugg, of Basel, in Switzerland. Only five of the proposed twenty-five parts of 160 octavo pages each have been issued as yet. Consequently it is only for the first half of the first of the four grand divisions of this work that we have reliable information. The extracts published by Radenhausen and others in each case must be verified, as they are sometimes based upon unsatisfactory renditions. But be this as it may, the principles enunciated by this work are such as are not compatible with the recognized Christian and philosophical ethics of modern civilization. Privileges and rights are granted the Jew over against the non-Jew which, to say the least, are not consistent with the principles of the golden rule. The whole "Shulchan Aruch" is the expression of a spirit that cannot be reconciled with our ideals of right and wrong; and if this is the real and not only the traditional and official religious guide of modern Judaism, anti-Semitism has a right of existence. But just here is a great debatable ground, and just here the controversies *pro* and *con* have been the least satisfactory. The angry wrangle which took place in Austria about five years ago, and during which the Vienna courts secured the affidavits of leading Semitic specialists on the subject, did not concern itself with the contents of the "Shulchan Aruch" as a whole and as a system of ethics and morals. The *punctum saliens* was the teachings of the book only on one particular point, namely, whether it allowed the Jews to use Christian blood for sacrificial purposes. The sudden disappearance of a Christian girl in a prominent city of Hungary brought forth the charge against the Jewish officials of that place, that she had been murdered by the authorities of the synagogue and her blood used ritualistically. After several years of legal contentions the case ended with an acquittal, but not until this particular question had called forth scores of learned discussions, the most prominent participant denying the allegation being the venerable Professor Delitzsch of Leipzig, the never-failing friend of the Jews, the leading writer maintaining the charge being the Roman Catholic Professor of Prague, Dr. August Rohling, who was followed by an anonymous styling himself Dr. Justus.

More satisfactory for the understanding of the problem than these discussions have been the data taken from criminal statistics as to the relation of Aryans and Jews in crime. The attempt is

made, and with some show of success, that in those crimes in which the moral principles and faculty of the culprit are the decisive factor, the proportional preponderance of Jews over others is a tangible practical proof of the dangerous character of the influence of this strange people. In the annals of crimes like murder, robbery, etc., that require also a large measure of physical courage, the names of Jews are rather seldom found. But in perjury, forgery, criminal bankruptcy, etc., the ratio of Jews is extremely large. According to the official statistics of Prussia for the years 1870-78, during these years there were 6,430 convictions for perjury. The Jews numbering only one in eighty of the inhabitants should have been represented by 85 of these criminals. But in reality there were 219 Jews among them, or $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. above what could normally be expected. Of the 6,378 convictions for forgery only 82 ought to have been of Jews; yet there were 289 of this nation. Of the 1,129 convictions for illegal bankruptcy, there ought to have been only 15 Jews; yet there were 268, or eighteen times more than their quota. In 1873, the year of the great financial crash in Germany, of 104 illegal bankruptcies, 36, or one third, were of Jews.

Data like these are advanced to show that the Jews of our day and date are actuated by the same principles that controls the Semitic of the East. Not seldom are the Jews called the "Beduins" of modern civilization. From these facts it is also seen why in Russia, Roumania, and other states, where the political disabilities of the Jews have not yet been removed, and where he cannot make his power felt in the higher walks and stations of public life, practically the same charges are urged against them in the stations of business and trade with their neighbors, as being controlled by the same dishonest and selfish principles. Indeed, in Germany and Austria, too, the strongest opposition to them arises from their influence in the business and mercantile worlds, from the results of their crowding their Aryan neighbors. The argument is as yet chiefly an economic one, the underlying ethical problem being used only as a means to an end. This explains why so much of bitter antagonism and contention has found its way into the course of the debate. The interests involved concern too much the practical ups and downs of daily life and the every-day struggle for existence to have as yet reached the higher plane of pure ethics and morals.

In accordance with this state of affairs are also the remedies proposed. The sum and substance of these is the legal limitation

of the Jewish sphere of labors and rights. No suggestion of better instruction or conviction of false moral views is proposed, except by the positive Christian men among the anti-Semites. In the words of the "Katechismus": "The Emancipation of the Jews is to be abrogated; they are to be placed under special alien laws."

From this bird's-eye view of one of the strangest of modern social problems it can readily be seen that it is a real and permanent one, and cannot be banished until the conditions that give rise to it have been changed. It is of course superficial to say that its whole existence is based upon a great mistake. The indications are that the controversy will grow intensively and extensively in the near future. The various phases of its ups and downs merit the closest attention and study.

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COLUMBUS, OHIO.

EDITORIAL.

THE CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

THE last number of the REVIEW contained an editorial describing the "Australian Ballot System" soon to go into operation in this State, and expressing the opinion that this measure, although a desirable one, was not likely to meet the expectations of its advocates in the way of preventing the bribery of voters. One of the facts presented in support of this opinion was the passage by Parliament of a Bill aimed at uprooting electoral corruption, ten years after the adoption of the Australian ballot. We wish now to give an account of the latter measure.

It is the most carefully devised, and probably the most effective law ever framed in the interest of electoral purity, and therefore may be presumed to contain valuable suggestions to Americans who are seeking legislative safeguards against the bribery of voters. The suggestive value of the law is the sole object of our present examination of it, and we shall therefore only attempt to describe its leading features, and shall only allude to such even of these as are not especially characteristic and novel.

It was passed in 1883, and is styled the "Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act." It aims to prevent corrupt voting by certain prohibitions laid upon the voter, and by others laid upon the candidate. The voter is deterred from receiving bribes by a penalty more stringent than previous legislation had attached to this offense. The punishment for "personation," or voting under an assumed name, is also increased. This part of the work undertaken by the Act need not detain us. Its original and effective features are the prohibitions laid upon the candidate. In these its value as a preventive measure plainly lies.

Certain acts which he may commit in trying to secure votes are styled "corrupt practices," and made felonious and punishable. These are "bribery, treating, and undue influence." A candidate for Parliament proved guilty of one of these offenses is liable "to imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine not exceeding 500*l.*, to a ten years' incapacity of voting in a parliamentary or other public election, and incapacity for ten years from being elected to Parliament, and from holding any public or judicial office within the meaning of the Act."

The Act puts further restraint upon candidates by forbidding certain election practices which are unnecessary, and easily degenerate into instruments for corrupting voters. These are the employment of an undue number of assistants in canvassing, etc., providing conveyances to or from the polls, engaging more committee-rooms than are needed, engaging public houses for committee-rooms. All these practices are declared "illegal," and a candidate found guilty of any of them is deprived of

his seat (should he have been declared elected), and subjected to additional penalty.

Here we find the law not only forbidding evil acts, but limiting proper ones, on the ground that in their excess they are presumably perverted to corrupt ends; for example, it declares that only a specified number of employees are likely to be used for the legitimate purposes of a canvass, and that therefore no more than these may be employed. A candidate is allowed to employ only one general election agent, "one polling agent for each polling station, and one clerk, one messenger, and one committee-room for each 500 electors." So the Act tries to prevent bribery not only by threatening both the giver and the receiver of a bribe with punishment, but by taking from the candidate certain effective instruments of indirect bribery.

It goes further in the endeavor to restrain the candidate. It tries to deprive him not only of certain instruments of corruption, but of the power which can create others, once these are wrested from him, that is, money. It would let him have as a candidate only so much as he can use for proper expenses. Accordingly, it forbids his spending for the various objects connected with his candidature, exclusive of his own necessary personal expenses and those of his election agent, more than 350%. "where the number of registered voters does not exceed 2,000. If that number is exceeded, 380% is allowed, with an addition of 30% for each 1,000 electors above 2,000. Where there are two or more joint candidates the maximum amount of expenses other than personal or returning officers' expenses shall for each of such candidates, if there are two, be reduced by one fourth, and if more than two joint candidates by one third."

To prevent the candidate from expending more than the specified sum, it is required "that a statement of accounts shall be made to the returning officer within thirty-five days after the poll has been taken, specifying the moneys, securities, etc., which have been provided for the purposes of the election, and the persons by whom they have been provided, giving also full particulars as to the manner in which the money has been spent, with receipts and bills for every item over forty shillings, and the name and description of every individual who has been paid for his services. The return must be accompanied by a declaration from both the candidate and his agent certifying the correctness of the statement of accounts, the candidate also solemnly declaring that he will not provide any further moneys for the expense of the election. This document must be signed by a justice of the peace, and the penalty for making a false declaration is seven years' penal servitude, or fine and imprisonment at discretion."

This is the most characteristic feature of the Act, and that which chiefly makes it a really preventive measure. It is of comparatively little use to point out and prohibit specific ways of corrupting voters, so

long as the power to corrupt them remains, for this will be likely to find others. But if the power is taken away, the evil work ceases. And that the legislation in question has taken that power from candidates seems to be generally admitted by English writers.

Indeed, the provisions of the Act regarding election expenses are so stringent that they cannot be easily evaded, and its penalties so severe that they certainly will not be disregarded. The praise given to it by an Englishman of experience in politics does not seem exaggerated. "The conception of this device to outwit bribery was an inspiration of genius which ought to immortalize its author. Politicians, sick of electoral corruption, and hopeless of reform, cried 'Eureka,' when they saw the draft of the new bill. Other remedies attack the branches, this goes to the root of the evil. Other remedies make corrupt practices dangerous, this makes them impossible. Other remedies seek to cure; this seeks to prevent, which is a more excellent object, besides being more feasible."

Such suggestive value as the Corrupt Practices Act has for our politics plainly lies in this section of it. We cannot hope to check electoral corruption merely by passing laws which reproduce its severity in punishing the giver and receiver of bribes. These offenses are, from their nature, difficult of proof. And the personal motives which impel men to bring other immoralities to justice do not operate regarding them. "Bribery," as has been well said, "like smuggling, infringes no personal rights, and therefore has to fear no prosecutor urged by a sense of injury and loss to discover and punish the wrong-doer." Any important service which legislation may render in the way of checking the evil whose magnitude so alarms us, it must do in the way of prevention. Is any preventive measure so likely to be effective as one that takes away the power to bribe to any large extent?

And cannot legislation be framed here as in England which will do this?

Evidently the task of devising legislation for one of our States (for such matters do not seem to lie within the province of Congressional action) would be weighted with special difficulties. The greater number of elections taking place among us, and the control which the executive committee of each party has of the canvass made on behalf of its candidates, make it harder than in England to find out how money is spent for campaign uses. Perhaps it would not be so easy here to determine how much might be employed for legitimate purposes. But, at any rate, a law might be made which should bring to public knowledge the amount spent. Suppose that the State executive committee of each party were obliged, at least after every presidential election, to publish, under oath, an account of its receipts and expenditures for the campaign, and made liable to penalty if the statement should be proved false in any essential particular. Misleading statements would be presented in reliance on the difficulty of proving their falsity? Perhaps so; but would not a party

suffer seriously from being represented by men who would deliberately perjure themselves, and run the risk of exposure and its consequences? Many men not above an indirect connection with corruption would refuse a position requiring such scandalous and withal perilous immorality as this. Or campaign funds would go through other hands than through those of the State committee? But the committee could be obliged to tell of the employment of those funds, if it knew of them. No doubt secret means of bribery could be employed, but evidently much less could be accomplished by them than is now accomplished by the recognized party action. Legislation cannot prevent electoral bribery; this can only be secured by elevating the moral standards of the people. But legislation can prevent party organization from becoming the recognized instrument of electoral corruption. It can, for example, prevent the party committee of a "pivotal" State from receiving and using a great corruption fund on the eve of a presidential election, — and reaping a rich political harvest as the result of its evil doing. The moral sense of the nation will secure such legislation as soon as its probable value is clearly seen.

PROPOSED CHANGES PERTAINING TO CREED SUBSCRIPTION.

OVERTURES are coming up from Presbyteries to Assemblies, both in Scotland and America, asking that the assent of ministers to the Westminster Confession may in future be accompanied with qualifying clauses, or that certain sections of the Confession may be revised. The movement has obtained considerable headway in the Free Church of Scotland, and has made a start in the Presbyterian Church of this country. At a meeting of the Free Presbytery of Edinburgh, held about the first of February, Professor Blaikie moved that an overture should be transmitted to the Assembly, setting forth that, whereas the Confession of the Church ought to be in harmony with her present and living faith, it is desirable that the Assembly should take the whole subject into consideration, with a view to a modification of the terms of the formula. After some discussion the meeting adjourned one week, when, after further debate, a vote was taken, with the result that 35 voted for and 30 against transmitting the overture to the Assembly. The same subject was debated in the Glasgow Presbytery, and by a vote of 71 to 19 a request was sent up to the Assembly praying that the whole matter should be taken into consideration. There was also the same week a meeting of the Aberdeen Presbytery, at which it was voted unanimously to transmit a similar overture to the General Assembly. The action taken by these three important Presbyteries will, of course, bring the matter squarely before the Assembly at its approaching meeting.

The causes which lie back of this movement scarcely need to be stated. There are several statements of the Westminster Confession which are considered erroneous or misleading, more especially the statements con-

cerning the preterition of the non-elect and the moral inability of man. Also the absence of certain truths, except by incidental allusion, especially of the truth of God's love to all mankind, and his offer of salvation to all men, is so serious an omission that the Confession is felt to be a misleading representation of the gospel. So many clergymen and candidates for the ministry have conscientious scruples about accepting the Confession as a doctrinal standard, that it seems to have become a necessity to modify the conditions of subscription, if not to supply defects by additional clauses. The movement has, doubtless, been hastened by the practice which has obtained for ten years in the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, of accepting the Confession, with seven additional declarations, intended to correct and enlarge the doctrine of that standard. It was voted, in 1879, by the Synod of the United Church, in reference to subscribing the Confession, as follows: "This acknowledgment being made in view of the explanations contained in the declaratory act of the Synod there anent." The explanatory statements then adopted are given entire in the foot-note below.¹ It has not been intimated that

¹ "Whereas the formula in which the Subordinate Standards of this Church are accepted requires assent to them as an exhibition of the sense in which the Scriptures are understood; whereas these Standards, being of human composition, are necessarily imperfect, and the Church has already allowed exception to be taken to their teaching, or supposed teaching, on one important subject; and whereas there are other subjects in regard to which it has been found desirable to set forth more fully and clearly the view which the Synod takes of the teaching of Holy Scripture; therefore the Synod hereby declares as follows:—

"1. That in regard to the doctrine of redemption as taught in the Standards, and in consistency therewith, the love of God to all mankind, his gift of his Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and the free offer of salvation to men, without distinction, on the ground of Christ's perfect sacrifice, are matters which have been, and continue to be, regarded by this Church as vital in the system of gospel truth, and to which due prominence ought ever to be given.

"2. That the doctrine of the divine decrees, including the doctrine of election to eternal life, is held in connection and harmony with the truth that God is not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance; and that he has provided a salvation, sufficient for all, adapted to all, and offered to all in the gospel; and also with the responsibility of every man for his dealing with the free and unrestricted offer of eternal life.

"3. That the doctrine of man's total depravity and of his loss of 'all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation' is not held as implying such a condition of man's nature as would affect his responsibility under the law of God and the gospel of Christ; or that he does not experience the striving and restraining influences of the Spirit of God; or that he cannot perform actions in any sense good, although actions which do not spring from a renewed heart are not spiritually good or holy, — such as accompany salvation.

"4. That while none are saved except through the mediation of Christ, and by the grace of his Holy Spirit, who worketh when, where, and how it pleaseth him; while the duty of sending the gospel to the heathen who are sunk in ignorance, sin, and misery, is clear and imperative; and while the outward and ordinary means of salvation for those capable of being called by the Lord the ordinances of the gospel: in accepting the Standards it is not required be held that any who die in infancy are lost, or that God may not extend

the doctrinal purity of clergymen in the United Church has been affected unfavorably by reason of the widened basis of subscription as was feared and predicted by many. On the other hand, the conspicuous advantage has been secured of entire satisfaction with the terms of subscription, so that friction and restiveness at that point have disappeared. There are not wanting those in the discussions now going on in the Free Church who are full of apprehensions in view of the proposed relaxation of dogma. These objectors do not contend that the Confession is free from serious faults, but that if amendment begins there is no knowing where it will end, that the real desire of those pressing on the movement is to get rid of the Confession, and that many of them wish to get rid of the Bible, that it is the entering of the small end of a wedge which will break the Church into shivers and splinters. As such objections, however honestly held, are always made when any change is proposed, and as they have but little to do with the case in hand, which is a perfectly definite demand, it may be supposed that they have no great weight, while the doctrinal harmony which exists in the United Church since modifications were agreed on has become a complete reply to all such objections. One of the ministers in the Glasgow Presbytery emphasized the good results in the sister church, and considered it a providential indication for the Free Church.¹

grace to any who are without the pale of ordinary means, as it may seem good in his sight.

"5. That in regard to the doctrine of the civil magistrate, and his authority and duty in the sphere of religion as taught in the Standards, this Church holds that the Lord Jesus Christ is the only King and Head of the Church, and 'Head over all things to the Church which is his body'; disapproves of all compulsory or persecuting and intolerant principles in religion; and declares, as hitherto, that she does not require approval of anything in her Standards that teaches, or may be supposed to teach, such principles.

"6. That Christ has laid it as a permanent and universal obligation upon his Church at once to maintain her own ordinances, and to 'preach the gospel to every creature'; and has ordained that his people provide by their freewill offerings for the fulfillment of this obligation.

"7. That, in accordance with the practice hitherto observed in this Church, liberty of opinion is allowed on such points in the Standards, not entering into the substance of the faith, as the interpretation of the 'six days' in the Mosaic account of the creation; the Church guarding against the abuse of this liberty to the injury of its unity and peace." — From article on Presbyterian Churches in the *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopædia of Religious Knowledge*.

¹ "In the course of a temperate and otherwise admirable address, Mr. Stalker said he attached immense importance to what had been done by the United Presbyterian Church. He believed they acted with great wisdom, and it was a providential leading for this Church, showing how they might, without compromising their evangelical character, make legitimate concessions to the demands that were being made. The subject came up in the United Presbyterian Church in a somewhat irritating way. There were some rather noisy spirits who pushed the subject to the front, and the first thing the Supreme Court of that Church had to do was to censure those who had brought up the subject. In spite of this, men like Dr. Cairns, Dr. Ker, and Dr. Andrew Thompson took up the subject, and produced a document in the form of a Declaratory Act, which he looked upon as a most precious document. Of

An overture on the same subject was submitted at its last session to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of the United States, and referred to the Assembly of the present year. This overture has in view revision of the Confession, and reads as follows: "The Presbytery of Nassau hereby respectfully overtures the General Assembly that a committee be appointed to revise Chapter 3, of the Confession of Faith (with especial reference to Sections 3, 4, 6, and 7), on the ground that in its present form it goes beyond the Word of God, and is opposed to the convictions and repugnant to the feelings of very many of our most worthy and thoughtful members; and that said revision be sent down to the Presbyteries, and, if accepted by them, be substituted for Chapter 3, in the Confession of Faith." The chapter referred to is concerning God's eternal decrees, and the objectionable sections are given in the accompanying foot-note.¹ Subscription to the Confession is modified in the Presbyterian Church in this country by the affirmation that it is received as "containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scripture," but in Scotland there is not even as much latitude of interpretation suggested in the terms of subscription. It is noticeable in this connection that the founders of Andover Seminary eighty years ago shaped their creed so as to remove from the doctrine of God's decrees those statements concerning reprobation and preterition to which all the clergymen of the Presbyterian Church in this country still subscribe, and which the overture just referred to seeks to remove. At various points, indeed, the Andover Creed, while apparently enlarging the brief answers of the Shorter Catechism, really substitutes improved statements for some of the objectionable declarations of the longer Confession. Those *agreements* of

course, he did not propose to dictate to the Assembly as to how it should act; but it might be well to draw attention to what the United Presbyterian Church had done, in order to see how certain advantages might be secured. They were coming to understand far better than their fathers that they might hold some things for truth, and even for precious truth, but they did not think it necessary that every man should pin his faith to them."—From report in *The Christian World* of February 14, 1889.

¹ "Section 3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death.

"Section 4. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

"Section 6. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam are redeemed by Christ, are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power through faith unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

"Section 7. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice."

New England theology were eighty years in advance of the *overtures* of local Presbyteries in Scotland and America, and, it may yet prove, a century in advance of essential revisions of the Westminster Standards.

It should be added, that in the Presbyterian Church of England, which has had a rapid growth since the union in 1876, although the Westminster Confession was never subscribed, but only accepted as a statement of Scriptural truth, an entirely new Confession has been prepared and is now under consideration by all its congregations.

It would be idle to predict the success or failure of these movements, but quite easy to predict the course of discussion. In support of proposed changes will be the conscientious scruples of men who are thoroughly evangelical, but who object to various statements of the Confession; there will be the feeling of those who personally are undisturbed in their subscription, yet are convinced that a wrong impression is quite generally given; and there will be the feeling that the requirements of the present are more sacred than the doctrinal formulas of the past. In opposition to the proposed changes will be a strong and even affectionate attachment to the theological standard which, for two hundred and fifty years, has been inseparable from Presbyterianism; there will be the belief that there are but few relatively who are disturbed, and that their orthodoxy is rather doubtful; and there will be the feeling that such changes as might be agreed on now would give only temporary satisfaction, and that further changes would be called for. At present, the party in favor of change seems to have more strength in Great Britain than in America.

The significance of the movement lies in the disclosure it makes of what we recently emphasized, that the cleavage of doctrinal opinion is within the denominations rather than between them, that in one form or another each of the great religious bodies is working out the same problem as between conservatism and progress, and that all are developing in the same general direction.

The adoption of proposed changes would, in itself considered, have no special importance, for they are not at points where there is radical disagreement. It might, indeed, be difficult to find any one who is disposed to defend the objectionable statements on their own merits. Nothing is proposed but the removal of a few excrescences and contradictions which are generally recognized, and the addition of certain truths on which all are agreed, but which have been omitted from the Confession. So that, if all which has been proposed should be accomplished, the visible result would merely be a Confession brought more nearly into accordance with the belief of those who subscribe it. But as an indication of progress already made, and of the direction in which progress of religious thought may be expected, and as an indication that rigid standards of doctrine cannot insure identity of belief, nor save any denomination from the agitations inseparable from modern life, the movement is significant in a high degree.

CHURCH HOSPITALITY.

So far as we have noticed in the discussions about church hospitality, which the St. Thomas incident has called out, very little notice has been taken of the condition under which church pews are owned or rented. Every pew is held under the controlling condition that it is to be put to religious uses, which of course implies that no religious obligations, like hospitality, are to be denied in the holding of it. The moral and to some extent legal distinction of a church-building is, that no one can have such personal and arbitrary rights in it as in other property. We say the legal distinction, because there are obligations to the public which are acknowledged in the exception of church property from taxation. The State excepts such property from taxation, not because it is unproductive, but because it is assumed to be productive of the public welfare. In other words, the State grants privileges to a church because it is a church and not a religious club; and a Christian Church is supposed to exemplify in its worship and charity the twofold command of its Lord: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength, and thy neighbor as thyself."

We emphasize this principle because if the principle be accepted and acted upon, the method is of little account—pews may be owned or rented or free. And because it is equally true that if the principle be not accepted, the method is of no avail: it will make no difference whether the pews are owned or rented or free. The owner of a pew can, if he will, make a stranger entirely at home; and the regular occupant of a free seat can, if he will, make his neighbor extremely uncomfortable. Everything depends upon the sense which one has as to the nature of his right to the seat he may occupy or the pew he may own or hire. If the moral condition on which one holds a pew in a church is honestly acknowledged, there will be no serious question concerning church hospitality.

A great deal is said about religious tramps in justification of the habit of some pew-holders. The religious tramp is by no means so ubiquitous as he is often assumed to be. Church-going outside the regular supporters of the churches is not an epidemic. The great majority who crowd the more attractive churches of the city are strangers, or visitors from neighboring churches, with here and there those from among the unattached class, whom the church professes to desire above all others to reach. The person who indulges in religion, as in any excitement or luxury, is a very trying person for the devout church-goer to bear with, but we may not vent our impatience with him upon the much larger classes whom he does not represent.

We have referred to church hospitality as an honest debt which the pew-holder owes to the public by virtue of the nature of his holding. We also urge that it is one of the most delightful forms of Christian be-

nevolence. It is the sharing with others of that which is to one's self the source of the greatest spiritual inspiration and strength. So one may share with others the teachings of an inspiring preacher, or the impressions from an elevating form of worship. In no way can one hope to minister so directly to the spiritual good of him, whom Christ calls his neighbor, as through Church hospitality.

HISTORICAL CRITICISM.

IS THE "DESCENSUS" IN THE APOSTLES' CREED AN "INTERPOLATION" AND SUPERFLUOUS?

So early, at least, as the beginning of the seventeenth century the opinion began to be current among Protestant theologians that the words in the Apostles' Creed, "He descended into hell," were originally a synonym for the word "buried." In 1612 appeared the celebrated posthumous polyglot lexicon of Valentine Schindler, a Wittenberg Professor. Under the word *Sheol* he cites from the Nicene (Constantinopolitan) and the Athanasian Creeds, somewhat misquoting, indeed, both, and notices that for the article in the one, "suffered under Pontius Pilate, and was buried," we find in the other, "Who suffered for our salvation, descended into hell." These last words he understands to mean "descended into the grave," in *infernus* being equivalent to *in sepulcrum*; and adds: "Afterwards these clauses, 'He was buried,' and 'He descended into hell,' which signified one and the same thing, were joined together as though they were two and diverse."

Somewhat later Pierre du Moulin, in an acute and well-reasoned disputation delivered in the University of Sedan (1631), puts the same construction as Schindler upon the absence from the Athanasian Creed of the articles respecting the death and burial of Christ and the inclusion of the *descensus*. He gives, however, to this article in the Apostles' Creed a distinct meaning from that conveyed by the preceding words, since it is not reasonable to suppose in such a Creed tautology, nor what is dispensable as respects faith, and if we were to assume a repetition we should expect the added clause to be the clearer of the two. He rejects Calvin's interpretation, which referred the words to Christ's agony on the cross. The Symbol, he says, already contains the passion and crucifixion. The arrangement follows the order of time. The *descensus* cannot be understood of what happened before death.¹

¹ Molinæus's compact little treatise *De Descensu Christi ad infernos* may be found in the *Thesaurus Theologiæ Sedanensis*, Genève, 1661, pp. 580-599. When the treatise was first published we cannot now say, but it was prepared as early as 1631. Its author was very widely known. The editor of the *Thesaurus* says of him, "Tota Gallia, Germania, Magna Britannia, Helvetia, Batavia, tota Europa, totus denique Christianus orbis novit quantum fuerit. Eum nominare sufficiat." His early studies were pursued in part at Cambridge, which afterwards gave him a doctorate. He repeatedly visited England. He was a member of the Synod of Dort, a prebendary (?) of Canterbury, Professor at Leyden and Sedan, chaplain to Catherine the sister of Henry IV., and one of the ablest leaders and defenders of the French Reformed Church.

About the middle of the century one of its most erudite scholars, Gerard John Voss, quotes the opinion of Schindler already stated, and gives his own conclusion thus:—

"The Eastern [Churches] at first understood by the *descent of Christ to hell* what the Western denoted by the word *buried*, and whereas earlier those who used the one omitted the other, afterwards both began to be conjoined. Indeed, in the time of Rufinus, that is about the year four hundred, the Roman Church itself was content to remember the burial alone; and although it is true that the Church of Aquileia had both in its symbol, yet, if we are to judge from the opinion of Rufinus, it deemed them identical in signification."¹

Voss understands the words as used in the Creed to mean that for three days Christ was under the power of death.

Further on in the century appeared a work which was translated into English nearly a century and a half later, and which has been very generally esteemed, Witsius's "Sacred Dissertations on what is commonly called the Apostles' Creed."² The author says that

"it is worthy of notice that anciently those Creeds which had the article of Christ's descent into hell did not contain the article relating to the burial." "The church of Aquileia, however, had both in their creed, but if we may adopt the opinion of Rufinus they supposed that both had one and the same meaning."

Witsius refers to Du Moulin and Voss, and expresses his entire concurrence with the latter. In explaining the "*descensus*" he understands it literally of the body of Christ, and metaphorically of his soul—that is, the one was buried, and the other suffered on the cross "dreadful and incredible agonies."

No divine, we suppose, of the seventeenth century exerted a greater influence through his character and attainments than Archbishop Ussher. He was a man, as Selden said, "of singular judgment and miraculously learned," and one of the best evidences of this is his work, "An Answer to a Challenge made by a Jesuit in Ireland" (1625). The eighth chapter is mainly occupied with a discussion of the "*descensus*." Ussher suggests in the conclusion an interpretation of the article closely akin to that adopted by the Westminster Assembly, if not completely identical. For our present purpose it suffices to call attention to a single passage. After quoting from Rufinus the opinion repeatedly referred to by the authors whom we have already cited (most of whom are subsequent in date), and apparently understanding it in the same way, he adds:—

"Which some think to be the cause, why in all the ancient symbols that are known to have been written within the first six hundred years after Christ (that of Aquileia only excepted, which Rufinus followed) where the burial is expressed, there the descending into hell is omitted; as in that of Constantinople, for example, commonly called the Nicene Creed: and on the other side, when the descent into hell is mentioned, there the article of the burial is past over; as in that of Athanasius."³

¹ *Op. Tom. vi. p. 215* [*Harmoniae Evangelicae, c. xiii.*] Vossius was held in high repute in England, being twice invited to a chair at Cambridge. He was made a canon of Canterbury.

² The first edition is said to have appeared in 1681; an enlarged edition in 1689. The English translation bears the date 1823.

³ *Works, vol. iii. pp. 341, 342.* Recent investigation has shown that Ussher's assertion respecting the relation of the two clauses, the burial and the *descensus*, during the first six centuries requires important modification.

We come now to a work which became and has remained a standard one upon its theme, Bishop Pearson's "An Exposition of the Creed," which appeared as early as 1659, and received its final form in 1669. By a singular and inexplicable mistake Bishop Pearson, throughout his discussion of the article "He descended into hell," wherever he has occasion to refer to the creed of Aquileia, supposes that it lacked the word buried, although in the preceding chapter he had himself quoted it correctly. Reinforced by this misapprehension, he affirms even more positively than any of his predecessors, or any of the subsequent continental scholars to whom we have referred, that "the first intention of putting these words [he descended into hell] in the Creed was only to express the burial of our Saviour, or the descent of his body into the grave."¹ The learned Bishop was altogether too competent a patristic scholar and too intelligent an interpreter of the Creed to suppose that the clause where it appears added to the word "buried" could signify the same thing, and he is not satisfied with Ussher's exposition of its meaning, though no allusion is made to him by name. Without going further in this direction, we call attention here simply to the reinforcement which his great authority gave to the opinion that the original meaning of the "descensus" was the burial of Christ. Other writers had noted the Creed of Aquileia as inconsistent with this theory, and had fallen back on an interpretation of Rufinus's language which made this writer (a presbyter at Aquileia, and the first author who refers to the "descensus" as included in the Apostles' Creed) affirm that the words *descendit ad inferna* meant in the Aquileian Creed the same as did the word *sepultus* in the Roman. But now the Aquileian Creed itself appeared as a proof of the theory of identity in meaning which had become current, for like the Athanasian it was supposed to have omitted the "burial" and inserted the "descensus," thus making the rule complete that in all the ancient creeds when one was used the other was not.

After Bishop Pearson's work had come into general use Bishop Burnet published "An Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles" (1699). Commenting on Article III., "As Christ died for us and was buried, so also is it to be believed that he went down into hell," he remarks, —

"... the article in the Creed, of Christ's *descent into hell*, is mentioned by no writer before Ruffin, who in the beginning of the fifth century does indeed speak of it: but he tells us, that it was neither in the symbol of the Roman, nor of the Oriental churches; and that he found it in the symbol of his own church at Aquileia. But as there was no other article in that symbol that related to Christ's burial, so the words which he gives us, *descendit ad inferna*, 'he descended to the lower parts,' do very naturally signify *burial*, according to these words of St. Paul, 'he ascended; what is it, but that he also descended first to the lower parts of the earth.' And Ruffin himself understood these words in that sense."²

Here Pearson's error as to the omission of the word "buried" in the Aquileian Creed is reproduced without misgiving.

In 1702 Peter King, subsequently lord chancellor of England, pub-

The Spanish Symbol (Hahn, *Symbole*, 1877, p. 35; Swainson, *Nicene and Apostles' Creeds*, p. 163), the African (?) (Hahn, p. 42), the Sardinian (?) (Hahn, p. 43), Gallic (?) (*Ib.* p. 50), the Nicene in Thrace (*Ib.* p. 126), the Constantinopolitan (A. D. 360) (*Ib.* p. 129), all contain both the burial and the *descensus*.

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 426, Chevallier's ed.

² *Op. cit.* p. 69, Page's ed. 1841.

lished "The History of the Apostles' Creed; with critical observations on its several articles." He maintained that the *descensus* in the Creed refers only to the soul of Jesus, and that it was inserted, in part, in order to correct the error of those who denied that Jesus had a human rational soul, — a theory which has been refuted. Falling into the same mistake as Pearson and Burnet, he supposed that in the Aquileian Creed the *descendit ad inferna* followed immediately upon the crucifixion, the *sepultus* being omitted, and that in this Creed the *descensus* might include and signify the *burial*; "but afterwards, when the *Descent* was received into the Roman and Oriental Creeds, the *Burial* was there retained." In such a form of the Creed, he concludes, the *Descent* cannot be understood of the *burial*, for we cannot suppose "a tautology in so brief a compendium." The meaning of the clause, he holds, is that Jesus's "spotless and immaculate soul, by a true and local motion, went unto the invisible and blessed habitation of holy and pious souls, where it remained in peace and happiness with the separated spirits of the faithful, in a triumphant and believing expectation of the time of his resurrection, which was the third day after; when his soul was delivered from the power of hell, and his body from the corruption of the grave, according to that text of the Psalmist on which this article is founded, cited by St. Peter in Acts ii. 27, 'Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption.'" ¹

King's interpretation, with Archbishop Usher's, may have occasioned the alternative reading admitted into the American "Book of Common Prayer," "He went into the place of departed spirits."

We will not follow the history further into the eighteenth century, but simply call attention anew to the authoritative position which the alleged fact had now won that the Aquileian Creed, the earliest form of the Apostles' containing the *descent*, omitted the word for buried; and to the confident and general conclusion which had been reached that originally the clause "He descended into hell," was a synonym for "buried," or "dead and buried."

We pass on nearly two centuries, to a statement in a recent work which is already greeted — not, certainly, without reason — as "a work of profound learning," and as written by one who knows "what the judgment of the world has been upon the points which come up for consideration." ² In his "Dogmatic Theology" (1888), Dr. Shedd remarks: —

"The Apostles' Creed, in its original form, read as follows: 'Suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified, dead, and buried; the third day he rose again from the dead.' This is also the form in the two creeds of Nice (325) and Constantinople (381); a certain proof that these great œcumenical councils did not regard the *Descensus* as one of the articles of the catholic faith. The first appearance of the clause, 'He descended into Hades,' is in the latter half of the fourth century, in the creed of the church of Aquileia. Pearson, by citations, shows that the creeds, both ecclesiastical and individual, prior to this time, do not contain it. Burnet (Thirty-Nine Articles, Art. III.) asserts the same. Rufinus, the presbyter of Aquileia, says that the intention of the Aquileian alteration of the creed was not to add a new doctrine, but to explain an old one; and therefore the Aquileian creed omitted the clause 'was crucified, dead, and buried,' and substituted for it the new clause, 'descendit in inferna.'

¹ *Op. cit.* pp. 264, 265, 4th ed. 1719.

² *The Congregationalist*, January 3, 1889, p. 6, notice of Shedd's "Dogmatic Theology."

Rufinus also adds, that 'although the preceding Roman and Oriental editions of the creed had not the words "He descended into Hades," yet they had the sense of them in the words "He was crucified, dead, and buried."' Pearson: Creed, Article V. The early history of the clause, therefore, clearly shows that the 'Hades' to which Christ was said to have descended was simply the 'grave' in which he was buried.

"Subsequently the clause went into other creeds. The Athanasian (600) follows that of Aquileia, in inserting the 'descent' and omitting the 'burial.' . . . It is almost invariably found in the mediæval and modern forms of the Apostles' Creed, but *without the omission*, as at first, of the clause, 'was crucified, dead, and buried'; two doctrines thus being constructed, in place of a single one, as at first. If, then, the text of the Apostles' Creed shall be subjected, like that of the New Testament, to a revision in accordance with the text of the first four centuries, the *Descensus ad inferos* must be rejected as an interpolation. . . . The difference of opinion among the fathers of the first four centuries, together with the absence of Scriptural support for it, is the reason why the *Descensus ad inferos* was not earlier inserted into the Apostles' Creed. It required the development of the doctrine of purgatory, and of the mediæval eschatology generally, in order to get it formally into the doctrinal system of both the Eastern and Western churches."¹

The general argument of Dr. Shedd, and even certain special errors of fact, will not appear strange to one who has followed our preceding citations. We are persuaded, however, that he has given us — however naturally in view of the preceding history of thought, especially English and American — an accretion of error, and this of sufficient importance to require correction. We offer these criticisms with a vivid consciousness, in view of the facts already given, of the truth of the maxim, "to err is human."

1. If by the "original form" of the Apostles' Creed is meant its earliest, the clauses "suffered under Pontius Pilate; was crucified, dead and buried;" do not belong to it. The oldest known form reads, "crucified under Pontius Pilate and buried." Dr. Shedd's quotation is from the latest and most expanded text.

2. Nor are the clauses he cites to be found either in the Nicene Creed or in the Constantinopolitan, if there ever was such a creed.

3. The import and purpose of the statement respecting "the first appearance" of the *descensus* are not clear. Does it refer to the particular clause cited, its exact verbal form, or to the fact which it expresses? To use, or to available evidence of use? We will refer to these points farther on.

4. We come now to a multiplication of errors, some of them of long standing.

Rufinus is said to have stated that the Creed was altered at Aquileia by the insertion of the clause "*descendit in inferna*"; that this was done for the purpose of explaining the clause "was crucified, dead and buried"; that this latter clause was consequently "omitted" and the other, which was "new," was "substituted for it"; that Rufinus adds, that preceding creeds, which did not contain the Aquileian clause respecting the *descensus*, affirmed the same thing in the words "He was crucified, dead and buried," as appears by a quotation of Rufinus's words, or of his words as translated by Pearson; and that all this is a proof that the clause "He descended into Hades" originally meant simply He was "buried."

Upon this we remark: Rufinus nowhere says that the insertion of the clause "*descendit ad inferna*" (not "*in inferna*") was to explain an old

¹ *Dogmatic Theology*, II. pp. 604, 605, 607.

doctrine; nor that it was made by the Aquileian Church; nor that the Aquileian Creed "omitted" the clause "was crucified, dead and buried"; nor that any creed contained such a clause; nor that he had ever heard it; nor that the words "descendit in" (or "ad") "inferna" were "substituted for it," or for anything; nor that this clause was "new." Nor are the words put in quotation marks by Dr. Shedd a translation of Rufinus's, nor an exact reproduction of Pearson's; nor can we deem them correct, whosoever is their author; nor is there a sufficient foundation for the conclusion drawn, even if we accept the facts as stated. Finally, we think that all that gives any seeming color of truth to the inference drawn from "the early history of the clause," is itself a mistake as to a fact, — into which Dr. Shedd has been led by following too confidently Bishop Pearson and other seventeenth-century writers, — and a misunderstanding of Rufinus's testimony. Since this testimony is not only fundamental in the matter immediately before us, but also seems to us to be very widely and seriously misunderstood, we may be pardoned for dwelling upon it with some particularity.

Commenting on the first article of the Apostles' Creed according to the Aquileian text, he calls attention to the existence in different churches of additions to the words which had been preserved intact in the Roman form, "Credo in Deo Patre Omnipotente," and adds, that so far as can be understood these additions were made on account of some heretics, and for the purpose of excluding "new doctrine." Thus at Aquileia the ancients ("majores," forefathers, men of a past generation) seem to have added the words "invisibili et impassibili" for the purpose of shutting out the heresy of Sabellius, particularly Patripassianism. Evidently Rufinus regards the change as made to meet a heresy of a by-gone time. The tone of his statement, as well as its substance, indicates, if his explanation is correct, that the change occurred long before the middle of the fourth century, — perhaps far back in the preceding century. No other addition is noted until he comes to the words of the Creed, "Crucifixus sub Pontio Pilato et Sepultus, Descendit ad inferna." The last clause, he says, is not found in the Symbol of the Roman Church, nor in the churches of the East; "yet the force of the word seems to be the same, in that He is said to have been 'buried.'" ¹ Proceeding, farther on, to establish by Scripture the Aquileian article, he cites (with other texts) not only the words "And Thou hast led me into the dust of death," but St. Peter's, "Because Christ being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the spirit which dwells in Him, descended to preach to those spirits who were shut up in prison, who were unbelieving in the days of Noah": and adds, that these words "show what was the work which He [Christ] wrought in the lower world."²

This is all that Rufinus says on the point before us. He suggests no explanation of the reason why the Aquileian Creed contained the *descensus*, nor even intimates that the addition was original with that church. He records the fact that it was an addition to the Roman Creed, and not found in the Eastern texts, but of its origin, history, date, he tells

¹ "Sciendum sane est quod in Ecclesiæ Romanæ symbolo non habetur additum, DESCENDIT AD INFERNA, sed neque in Orientis Ecclesiis habetur hic sermo: vis tamen verbi eadem videtur esse in eo quod 'sepultus' dicitur."

² "Unde et Petrus dicit, Quia Christus, mortificatus carne, vivificatus autem spiritu qui in ipso habitat, eis qui in carcere conclusi erant descendit spiritibus predicare, qui increduli fuere in diebus Noe: in quo etiam quid operis egerit in inferno, declaratur."

us nothing. He does, however, virtually claim that it adds no "new doctrine" to the creeds of Rome and the East, for these contain what it expresses in their word "buried."

How are we to understand this last declaration? Dr. Shedd, with other scholars, supposes it to affirm that Rufinus understood the clause "*descendit ad inferna*" to mean simply that Christ was "buried," that is, was laid in a "grave." But this interpretation is beset with improbabilities. Rufinus goes on to prove the Biblical truth of the words "*descendit ad inferna*" by the passage in 1 Peter iii. 18-20. There would be no relevancy in this citation if his conception of the *descensus* was merely Christ's descent into a grave. Moreover, the clause "*descendit ad inferna*" is not a substitute in the Aquileian Creed for "*sepultus*," but an addition to it, the Creed reading, as quoted and commented on by Rufinus, "*crucifixus sub Pontio Pilato et sepultus, descendit ad inferna*." If he had understood the last clause to mean merely buried or interred, he would thereby have regarded it as a pure tautology. The key to his meaning seems to us to lie in his suggestion, in considering another article to which additions had been made, that these were for the purpose of excluding new doctrine. This particular fact, indeed, he does not claim to be true when he discusses the "*descensus*" as it stood in his Creed, but his earlier language shows the state of his mind, his opinion that the new doctrine is heretical. He wishes, therefore, to say that the Aquileian article concerning the "*descensus*" does not affirm something wholly new or foreign to the Creed as held at Rome and in the East, but, on the contrary, its meaning is implied in the common statement that Jesus was buried; not as though the "*descensus*" could be reduced in meaning to the mere conception of the interment of Jesus's body, but that the fact of his burial was intimately connected in thought with his death, which itself had relation also to his spirit and its departure to the realm of the dead. The current interpretation, adopted by Dr. Shedd, supposes Rufinus to say, "We mean at Aquileia by the *descensus* what other churches mean by the *sepultus*, understood as mere burial." What he intends to say seems to us to be, "Other churches include under the *sepultus* what we express by the *descensus* added to the *sepultus*." It is of an addition to the "*sepultus*," let it be remembered, not of a substitute for it, that he is speaking. If we suppose him to mean that what was explicit in his Creed was already implicit in other forms, we relieve the very serious difficulties which attend the common interpretation. His Creed, on this supposition, contains no tautology, yet adds no new doctrine. It is almost a decisive objection to the common interpretation, apart from the difficulties already noticed, that the ordinary Christian belief in Rufinus's day, and from the earliest times, was that Christ went at death to Hades, the world of the dead. It is in the highest degree improbable on this account that he could have intended to put upon the article in his baptismal creed which affirms the *descensus* the meagre interpretation implied in the supposition that he explained it as signifying merely the entombment of Jesus's body. On the other hand, as we have said, the conception of the burial of our Lord, as taught in the Creed, could easily be understood, and actually was understood at the time, to cover the fact of Christ's descent to Hades.¹

¹ The late Professor von Zezschwitz (*System der Katechetik*, Bd. II. i. p. 116) refers in illustration and proof of this point to the Catechetical Lectures of S. Cyril of Jerusalem, iv. 11. Other passages are equally striking, as xiii. 17,

This explanation, if we are not mistaken, sheds light upon what, so far as our reading goes, has usually been a great puzzle to writers on the Creed who have followed the modern tradition, namely, how the clause "He descended into Hades" ever came into it. A common supposition, already noticed, ably maintained by Lord Chancellor King, has been, that it found favor on account of its antagonism to Apollinarianism; or, the theory that the divine Word in Christ took the place of the human spirit or reason. But Rufinus makes no such suggestion, though, judging from his allusion to Patripassianism, he would have done so if the hypothesis were true. If, moreover, the addition had arisen from any anti-heretical or ulterior purpose, he would have been quite sure thus to have explained it, unless we are to suppose that the addition occurred in an immemorial antiquity. It is altogether more probable, on this hypothesis, and certainly if the change was comparatively recent, that it was in its origin merely a more distinct statement of what was always understood to be involved in the words we translate "buried," namely, that Jesus, at death, went into Hades, the common realm of the dead, and that this is one of the elementary or cardinal facts or events in the history of his redeeming work. Its statement in the Creed was simply a transference to it of what had been always in the faith of the Church, — an expansion, in this respect, like all other additions which had been made to the first baptismal confession, "I believe in Jesus Christ, the Son of God." In the earliest known form, after enlargement began, we see mentioned only the crucifixion and the burial. The one was further explicated by the word "suffered"; the other by the *descensus*; the latter forming at once the contrast and the beginning of the triumph signalized by the resurrection and completed in the judgment; the whole being the foundation of the hope which enlarged the third article to the form, "the Holy Spirit, the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting."

5. We recur now to the question of the antiquity of the clause, "He descended into Hades." The statement that it first appears "in the latter half of the fourth century, in the creed of the church of Aquileia," can only mean, at least in the first instance, that Rufinus's testimony shows that it was there at that date. He gives no hint as to how long it had been there, nor why it was introduced. On this last point we can only infer from his words that he regarded it as only a more complete statement of what was confessed elsewhere without its use. It would seem to be natural for him, if the change were at all recent, to have said so, and to have given some account of its introduction. But on the other hand, his silence may arise from the perfect naturalness of the change — it never encountered any opposition, it needed no explanation. His silence, therefore, gives no sure indication as to the time of the change. It is, however, of material importance in another way. It shows that the question of the time of the introduction of the clause does not have the significance Dr. Shedd seems to attach to it. The real question is, not when it first appeared in the Creed, but whether it belongs there, whether it is there of right, whether it came in naturally and spon-

xiv. 2, 9, 10. Cyril teaches clearly and quite fully the ancient doctrine of the *descensus*, connecting it with the burial, as well as with the resurrection. It is easy to see in his treatment how the thought of descent into the tomb ran on inevitably to that of the descent into Hades, — how the one expanded into the other and implied it. His Lectures were delivered about A. D. 347.

taneously as an expression of the ancient faith in its appropriation of Apostolic teaching. On this question Rufinus's statements, so far as they give any indications, point in the same direction with that given us by many other facts and testimonies. He finds it plainly taught in the Scriptures. He betrays no consciousness that any church, or church-teacher, or heretic even, ever questioned its being a part of the Christian faith. In this he is in entire accord with all that we know of the ancient faith, which embraces this article wherever we come in contact with it, in Edessa, in Syria, in Asia Minor, in Gaul, at Alexandria, at Carthage, as well as in Italy. Indeed it is impossible to explain the Apostle Peter's application to Christ (Acts ii. 31) of the Septuagint version of Psalm xvi. 10, except upon the supposition that the "descensus" was to him an indisputable fact, and his discourse shows it to have been a part of that common Apostolic teaching which historical science now accepts as the basis and primary impulse of the entire development in the church of Christian doctrine.

6. In the light of its well-known history Dr. Shedd's suggestion that the *descensus* is an "interpolation" requires little comment. Probably everything in the Creed is an addition except the simple confession of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. If we take, however, the oldest known form, then the words "Maker of heaven and earth," "conceived," "suffered," "dead," "God," "Almighty," "I believe," "catholic," "The communion of saints," "body," "And the life everlasting," are equally interpolated with the words "He descended into Hades." In truth, the word "interpolation" has no proper application to a growth like that of the Creed, — no more so than to a branch of a symmetrical tree.

7. Dr. Shedd finds the cause of the acceptance by the church of the "descensus" in "the doctrine of purgatory" and "the mediæval eschatology generally."

The acceptance of "the doctrine of purgatory" is usually dated in the time of Gregory the Great, who became Pope more than two centuries after Rufinus's baptism at Aquileia. Dr. Shedd's theory runs counter to very plain facts. The Eastern Churches all inherited the ancient faith in the "descensus," but none of them accepted the Western doctrine of purgatory,¹ although in other respects they held opinions which helped to bring in the Roman doctrine. In modern times, the Reformers entered a stringent protest against purgatory, but held fast to the "descensus." The Thirty-Nine Articles characterize the one as "a fond thing, vainly invented and grounded upon no warranty of Scripture, but rather repugnant to the Word of God," and yet they affirm of the other, "As Christ died for us and was buried, so also is it to be believed that He went down to Hell." Evidently the two doctrines have no necessary connection so far as history can testify. If any could be traced, the relation of cause and effect would need to be precisely reversed from that stated

¹ The statement in *The Creeds of Christendom*, i. 66 (1887), that the *Confessio Dosithei* and Philaret's *Larger Catechism* teach essentially the Roman doctrine of Purgatory, seems to us too strong. Gass, *Symbolik der griechischen Kirche*, says, guardedly but accurately, "Nevertheless it remains true that the Greek Church does not know of a Purgatory in the strict sense." So Hofmann, *Symbolik*, p. 188. Such approaches, moreover, to the Western doctrine as may be traced belong to the modern period, and cannot be connected with faith in the *descensus* as their cause. Dr. Schaff says that the Nestorians "repudiate" the doctrine of purgatory, and that the Monophysite sects (Armenians, Copts, etc.) "know nothing of" it. — (*Creeds of Christendom*, i. 80, 81.)

by Dr. Shedd, for the "descensus" had long been believed before the doctrine of purgatory arose, and the most that can be claimed is that in the later centuries of the ancient era and beginning of the mediæval there was a predisposition in men's minds to dwell on everything connected with the intermediate state. Something, it is true, as Güder has noticed, was common to the two conceptions, namely, the thought of "deliverance out of a transitory intermediate state,"¹ but their contrasts and even repugnances are more striking. Whatever dogmatic interpretation had been put upon the "descensus" it bore no analogy to, and was brought into no connection with, the growing theory of penal satisfactions which was already controlling Western theology. The main root of the doctrine of Purgatory was in a legal conception of the way of salvation; the *descensus* was one of the original facts in a revelation of salvation by faith in a Redeemer. Hence when Güder remarks that no church-teacher within his knowledge ever attempted to prove the doctrine of purgatory by an appeal to the *descendit* in the Creed, and adds, that both doctrines were definitely held apart, with perfect consciousness of their not belonging together; and that the new doctrine of purgatory, instead of giving prominence to the older one of the "descensus," had precisely the opposite effect and obscured it and pressed it into the background, — we cannot but deem such facts as natural as they are suggestive.

But it is not our purpose at the end of a criticism perhaps already too extended to enter upon the dogmatic significance of the *descensus*. We have accomplished our purpose if we have shown that it stands in the oldest symbol of the Christian faith neither as an interpolation nor as a vain repetition. It stands there as one of the primary facts of Christianity — an event in the life and work of the world's Redeemer. The facts available for eschatology are not so numerous that one can be spared. Every accredited fact is a foundation-stone not only for faith but for thought. Theology has still a work to do in giving the "descensus" its rightful place and value. And the key to the right use of the fact is suggested, we believe, by the position of the clause in the Creed — it is an arch from the burial to the resurrection; it connects with the passion, but is the beginning of the triumph. And so it comes about that a clause which seems at first to have been an expansion of the series completed with the word "buried," should afterwards have gained, as it were, an independent position, or even have passed over to the series beginning with "the third day he rose again from the dead" — as when, in the old legend which distributed the different parts of the creed to the twelve Apostles as their authors, Philip is said to have contributed the words "Suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried"; and Thomas to have added, "He descended into hell, the third day he rose again from the dead." The lowest depth of humiliation was the beginning of victory.²

Egbert C. Smyth.

¹ *Die Lehre von der Erscheinung Jesu Christi unter den Todten*, p. 179.

² Cf. Güder, *op. cit.* The successive methods of punctuating the clause "He descended into Hell," in the Book of Common Prayer, are not without interest in the history of Christian thought. In the Black-Letter Prayer Book of 1636, and in the same revised in 1661, the clause is preceded by a comma and followed by a period, thus associating it with the passion and death of our Lord. So it appears in an Oxford edition before us, dated 1871. A copy of

SOCIAL ECONOMICS.

I.

THE OUTLINE OF AN ELECTIVE COURSE OF STUDY.

FOR the full outline, and for general authorities, to be used under Section I, see the January number, pp. 85, 86.

SECTION I. THE SOCIAL EVOLUTION OF LABOR.

Topic 4. *The Factory System.*

REFERENCES. — History of the Factory System. (Chaps. 8, 9, and 10.) Taylor.

Labor in Europe and America. Young.

Progress of the Nation (England). (Sec. ii, chap. 2, sec. iv, chap. 14.) Porter.

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History of Prices. Newhall.

History of Taxation in England. (Vol. 2.) Dowell.

Work and Wages. Rogers.

The Industrial Revolution. Toynbee.

History of English People. (Book ix, chap. 3.) Green.

Encyclopædia Britannica. Articles on Inventors, Machinery, Cotton, etc.

The Reign of Law. (Chap. vii.) The Duke of Argyll.

The Evolution of the Relation between Capital and Labor. Adam Shortt (ANDOVER REVIEW, February, 1889).

NOTES.

The change effected in the condition of labor by the great inventions which gave rise to the factory system far surpassed all preceding changes. The era of machinery is the formative period in the history of Industrialism.

Machinery brought about the following changes: —

1. The consolidation of labor. It necessitated the change from the cottage system to the factory system.

2. The equalization of labor. Individual skill and strength became of less value. Women and children could do the work of men. Inven-

the American Book, undated, but sanctioned by Bishop Hobart of New York in 1817, separates the *descensus* both from the passion and the resurrection, preceding and following the clause by a semicolon. The authorized and revised edition of 1886, published by E. & J. B. Young & Co., New York, precedes the clause by a semicolon and follows it by a comma, associating it with the resurrection, "Suffered under Pontius Pilate, Was crucified, dead, and buried; He descended into hell, The third day He rose again from the dead;" etc. The corresponding clause in the Athanasian Creed is punctuated thus in the Black-letter editions: "Who suffered for our salvation: descended into hell, rose again from the dead." The American Episcopal Church has repealed the rubric permitting the omission of the *descensus* in the use of the Apostles' Creed. Dr. Schaff, *Creeds of Christendom*, ii. 45, points the *descensus* as a co-ordinate clause with those relating to the passion and the resurrection.

tions in machinery produced the same effect in equalizing laborers that inventions in weapons offensive and defensive produced in equalizing soldiers.

3. The re-distribution of population, with the attendant effects upon health, manners, and morals.

4. The growth of capitalism. The existing relations of the different classes of small producers were broken up, and society was sharply divided between capitalists and wage-earners.

5. The opening of new markets, the development of new industries, and the general enrichment of the nation, all of which reacted upon the laborer for the enlargement of his life.

1. *Manufactures of value, as notably those in silks and woolens, preceded the factory system. The factory system was the outgrowth of inventions which facilitated manufacturing in cotton.*

2. *The factory system was the result of a remarkable succession of inventions, no one of which would have produced the system.*

The Fly-shuttle of John Kay, the Spinning-Jenny of James Hargreaves, the Water-Frame of Arkwright, the "Crompton" Mule, form a series of inventions unparalleled in the multiplication and extension of power.

"It is an order of facts observable in the progress of mankind, that long ages of comparative silence and inaction are broken up, and brought to an end, by shorter periods of almost preternatural activity. And that activity is generally spent in paths of investigation, which, though independent, are converging. Different minds, pursuing different lines of thought, find themselves meeting upon common ground. Such, in respect to literature, was the period of the Revival of Learning; such, in respect to religion, was the period of the Reformation; such, in respect to the abstract sciences, was the period of Tycho Brahe, of Galileo, of Kepler. Hardly less memorable than these, certainly not less powerful, as affecting the condition of society, were those few years in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, which were marked by such an extraordinary burst of Mechanical Invention. Hargreaves, and Arkwright, and Watt, and Crompton, and Cartwright, were all contemporaries. They were all working at the same time, and in the same direction. Out of their inventions there arose for the first time what is now known as the Factory system; and out of the Factory system arose a condition of things as affecting human labour which was entirely new in the history of the world. The change thus effected is a signal illustration of the relation in which Natural Law stands to Positive Institution in the realm of Mind." — *The Duke of Argyll, "The Reign of Law,"* chap. 7.

3. *The productive power of the factory system is best seen in the increase of the wealth of England, which enabled the nation to bear the enormous strain of taxation consequent upon the wars with Napoleon.*

The debt of England at the beginning of the War of American Independence was a little over \$630,000,000; at its close, a little over \$1,215,000,000. Within ten years from the close of the American war England had committed herself to the coalition against Napoleon, and had entered upon that series of campaigns which was not to reach a final conclusion till the Peace of Paris in 1815; the net result of which to the economical life of the nation was a debt now increased to the astounding sum of over \$4,300,000,000, with an annual charge of over \$160,000,000.

(The debt of the United States at its highest point — 1866 — was

\$2,773,000,000, while the population of the United States at that time was nearly fourfold that of Great Britain in 1815.)

See Dowell's "History of Taxation in England," vol. 2, page 238.

4. *The political significance of the system of industrialism appeared in the new men whom the system made influential in deciding the policy of the government.* The manufacturer and the merchant became in the early part of the nineteenth century a political power.

See Green's "History of the English People," Book ix, chap. 3.

5. *The immediate moral and social effect of the factory system upon the laborer was twofold.*

First, it created a fixed class in society. It organized the laboring class into a social community. The effect of this was seen in a certain depression on the part of those who had been able to look forward to a change of social condition, or to a more independent life, and to the gradual development of a feeling of animosity toward those who now became capitalists.

"The most striking results of the industrial revolution have been : *first*, the concentration of industry in the hands of successful capitalists ; *second*, the creation of the modern proletariat. The last word is not here used as a term of reproach. It is a sufficiently accurate name for a class of workers who have practically nothing to depend on but wage-labour that is often precarious and inadequate. Be it also remembered that the period of worst degradation and impoverishment for English labour coincided with the most marvellous development of riches that the world had seen up to that date, that is to say, with the period from 1780 to 1850, from the time steam came into effective play till the middle of the present century. Against this sad destiny the individual worker could do little to protect himself. He was at the mercy of forces over which he had only the most limited control. He had before him the alternative either to rise to be a capitalist, using other men's labour, or to be a labourer, used by a capitalist. The former alternative could fall only to a very few. The mass sank into a condition of economic dependency. For we must emphasise the fact that the isolated worker of the olden time, with his small means of production, had to disappear in proportion as the revolution extended. It was a struggle between the isolated workman owning his own small capital, and the large industry. The victory was to the latter, to the large system of production with machinery moved by steam, with large numbers of workmen organised and directed by capitalists competing for their own profit. The independent workman, utilising his own capital, had on the whole to disappear." — *Thomas Kirkup*, "An Inquiry into Socialism," chap. 2.

Second. The greater reliance upon machinery had a tendency to reduce the mental qualification of the workman, though this tendency was in part neutralized by the new opportunities which the system gave for mutual intercourse among workmen. The grouping into towns and cities gave an intellectual activity which had not obtained under the cottage system.

"The starting point of Modern Industry is, as we have shown, the revolution in the instruments of labour, and this revolution attains its most highly developed form in the organised system of machinery in a factory. Before we inquire how human material is incorporated with this objective organism, let us consider some general effects of this revolution on the labourer himself.

"A. *Appropriation of supplementary Labour-power by Capital. The Employment of Women and Children.*

"In so far as machinery dispenses with muscular power, it becomes a means of employing labourers of slight muscular strength, and those whose bodily development is incomplete, but whose limbs are all the more supple. The

labour of women and children was, therefore, the first thing sought for by capitalists who used machinery. That mighty substitute for labour and labourers was forthwith changed into a means for increasing the number of wage-labourers by enrolling, under the direct sway of capital, every member of the workman's family without distinction of age or sex. Compulsory work for the capitalist usurped the place, not only of the children's play, but also of free labour at home within moderate limits for the support of the family. . . .

"B. *Prolongation of the working-day.*

"If machinery be the most powerful means for increasing the productiveness of labour, *i. e.* for shortening the working time required in the production of a commodity, it becomes in the hands of capital the most powerful means, in those industries first invaded by it, for lengthening the working day beyond all bounds set by human nature. It creates, on the one hand, new conditions by which capital is enabled to give free scope to this its constant tendency, and on the other hand, new motives with which to whet capital's appetite for the labour of others. In the form of machinery, the implements of labour became automatic, things moving and working independent of the workman. They are thenceforth an industrial *perpetuum mobile*, that would go on producing forever, did it not meet with certain natural obstructions in the weak bodies and the strong wills of its human attendants. The automaton, as capital, and because it is capital, is endowed, in the person of the capitalist, with intelligence and will; it is therefore animated by the longing to reduce to a minimum the resistance offered by that repellent yet elastic natural barrier, man. This resistance is moreover lessened by the apparent lightness of machine work, and by the more pliant and docile character of the women and children employed on it. . . .

"C. *Intensification of Labour.*

"It is self-evident, that in proportion as the use of machinery spreads, and the experience of a special class of workmen habituated to machinery accumulates, the rapidity and intensity of labour increase as a natural consequence. Thus in England, during half a century, lengthening of the working day went hand in hand with increasing intensity of factory labour. . . . This condensation of a greater mass of labour into a given period thenceforward counts for what it really is, a greater quantity of labour. In addition to a measure of its extension, *i. e.* duration, labour now acquires a measure of its intensity or of the degree of its condensation or density. The denser hour of the ten hours' working-day contains more labour, *i. e.* expended labour-power, than the more porous hour of the twelve hours' working-day. The product therefore of one of the former hours has as much or more value than has the product of $1\frac{1}{2}$ of the latter hours. Apart from the increased yield of relative surplus-value through the heightened productiveness of labour, the same mass of value is now produced for the capitalist say by $3\frac{1}{2}$ hours of surplus labour, and $6\frac{1}{2}$ hours of necessary labour, as was previously produced by four hours of surplus labour and eight hours of necessary labour." — *Karl Marx*, "Capital," vol. ii. part iv., chap. 15.

6. *For the effect upon wages*, see Rogers's "Work and Wages."

7. *The greater evils in the early working of the factory system* will be treated under the topic of "English Labor Legislation."

William Jewett Tucker.

ANDOVER.

II.

SOCIOLOGICAL NOTES.

THE present state of the movement for reform in legislation upon Marriage and Divorce is worthy of special notice at this time for two reasons. The subject in itself is important and growing, and the elaborate special report of the Commissioner of Labor which was made to Con-

gress, February 20, and which will be in print a few weeks or possibly some months hence, will undoubtedly turn public attention to the whole subject. It is not proposed here to give a full and exact statement of all that has been done, but only enough to show the movement and its controlling principles and aims, with some indication of the problem to be solved and the direction thought is taking upon it.

The first legislative action in this movement was in 1878, in Connecticut and Vermont, a year or more after the present discussion of the Divorce question began. In that year Connecticut repealed that statutory ground for divorce in her list of causes which has been notorious as the "Omnibus clause." This was so called because the general discretion it gave to the courts enabled parties to get a divorce who could not succeed under any of the other several clauses. That year Vermont prohibited the remarriage for two years of the party against whom the divorce was decreed, and guarded more carefully against the coming of parties into the State for divorce. Massachusetts afterwards made all divorces *nisi* or conditional for six months, and put restrictions on remarriage. Maine in 1883 repealed the law which gave great freedom to the personal opinion of the judges, and put in its place the several well-defined causes of Massachusetts with some restrictions upon remarriage. Later, Vermont introduced further protective measures. One of them required all libels to be filed at the term of court preceding that in which they are tried, thus insuring a delay of at least six months. The other provides for the appearance of the State's Attorney to defend the interests of the State, like the effective English method of Queen's Proctor. Michigan in 1887 introduced nearly all these improvements into her statutes, excepting that she made the time of filing the petition before trial four months instead of six as in Vermont. Two or three States have already adopted the recommendation of the American Bar Association which seeks to establish a uniform statute on this important point. In these instances, with scarcely an exception, a decrease in divorces followed the enactment of the new law. This decrease was slight in Massachusetts, and more in the nature of a temporary check, but everywhere there seems to be a tendency to recover somewhat under the pressure of the underlying social movement. But rarely is there a return to the old high rates. Indeed, the States in the entire country where divorces were not more numerous in 1886 than they were in 1867 — the years included in the official report — are just those, and only those, where these legislative changes have been made.

Pennsylvania and Michigan have pretty thoroughly reconstructed their marriage laws by introducing a system of license, record, etc., similar to that of the best New England States.

Further attempts at better legislation on Divorce have been made in New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Ohio, the District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, and Illinois. None of these are yet successful, though some are still pending with a hopeful outlook. The tide has turned, for no lax measure has been adopted for several years, so far as I know. Mr. Stimpson, in his *American Statute Law*, has called attention to this conservative turn in Marriage and Divorce legislation.

The subject of National legislation has been frequently discussed, and in the last three years some measures have been introduced into Congress providing for constitutional amendment in behalf of uniformity. At first, divorce alone was in mind. Then marriage, divorce, and polygamy

were brought in together. So much to give an idea of the nature and direction of the steps that have been actually taken.

The controlling principles and methods should never be seen. This movement has been largely, though by no means wholly, represented by the National Divorce Reform League and its immediate friends, and its views have had much to do with the course taken in legislation. But it has no formulated creed regarding legal reform. It is avowedly catholic in spirit, and studiously avoids recommending in any dogmatic way definite measures as those which should be adopted by any or all particular States. Recognizing that the evils are profoundly social as well as legal in their origin, it has always urged great care in whatever steps legislation may take.

The general trend of legislation, wherever accomplished, can be seen in the account just given of it. The statutory grounds for divorce have, so far, been untouched by actual legislation, with a single exception. This exception is the repeal of the "Omnibus" clauses in two States and one Territory. Everywhere else the plan has been to remove abuses in administration and temptations to divorce for other evils than relief from existing bonds, while leaving the causes as before, with the exception above noted. This has been done, not because the causes have not been thought absolutely too many and often improper from every consideration of morals and public policy, but as a matter of practical wisdom in the earlier stages of reform. Several attempts have been made by various parties to go farther and reduce the number of legal causes for divorce, and some absolutely prohibitory measures have been brought before legislatures, often supported by most respectable parties. But in every instance of this kind complete failure has followed. Whatever has succeeded has been the result of pretty close adherence to the aim to strike at the more obvious abuses in practical work rather than the formal causes of the statutes, and that, with great care, to pass such measures only as will stand the test of time. So far, I believe, no repeal has been effected in spite of some serious attempts by interested parties. Attention has been called especially to the marriage laws, with excellent results, in Pennsylvania and Michigan.

Since the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments of the National Constitution there has been a great popular tendency to make additional changes in the organic law of the land. Reforms in the gristle have been eager to achieve constitutional amendment. One of the favorite subjects for this kind of effort has naturally been that of Marriage and Divorce. Perhaps on no other subject, on the whole, could so large a number of persons be found to agree the last half dozen years as upon the desirability of a constitutional provision relating to Marriage, Divorce, and Polygamy. Many of the friends of Divorce reform have been eager to accomplish this. Indeed, the acknowledged evils of our conflicting laws have been so many and so serious that it has been difficult to get much attention for other things or for the broader relations of this specific subject of amendment. The leading thought in all this discussion has been based on the direct assertion or tacit assumption that a very large percentage of divorces in the entire country are granted to persons who have purposely gone from one State to another to get them, and on the opinion that the uncertainties and abuses as to the legal conjugal condition are a deplorable evil. The latter I believed to be well founded. The former I personally greatly doubted. Some most repu-

table parties have believed that this objectionable class of emigrants for the sake of divorce constituted the majority of divorce cases in the country. One journal of high standing repeated the assertion, until I privately went into the reasons for doubting it with the editor, that in nine cases out of ten this was true! It has never, to my knowledge, repeated the statement since that conversation.

But there has been one thing that Congress can do under its present powers. It can take up the Marriage and Divorce laws of the Territories, and especially of the District of Columbia, whose administration has greatly disturbed some of the judges and citizens of the District. Congress has not hesitated to reform the Marriage law of Utah. But there was a time when the Divorce business of Utah, and that mainly for certain parties, was simply frightful. There were 914 divorces in Utah in 1877, whose records were actually discovered by the expert who collected the statistics, probably more than one half as many as there were marriages in that same year. It should be said that this, or anything like it, was true for only two years. The Mormon leaders, it is said, themselves instigated the repeal of the peculiar law allowing this business to go on. But the Territories are now known to be invariably among the worst parts of the country as respects their high divorce rates.

Some of these matters were brought before the President and Attorney-General, though two or three years after the systematic attempt to get Congress to provide for the report we have just had made was begun. Both saw the importance of the subject and felt the need of the investigation, which, with the especially efficient support of Mr. Garland, was brought about; but which was originally introduced more than five years ago by Senator Edmunds, who followed up the measure in the Senate until the House acceded to it. This resulted in the publication of the large volume, which can be obtained soon in the ordinary way by application to members of Congress or to the Commissioner of Labor, and which will put us in possession of much of the material we need on all phases of the legislative problem. It gives statistics showing that the increase of divorces almost everywhere in twenty years has been twice as great as the increase of population, that it is rapidly gaining in the South, and that the Territories, as already stated, are among the worst parts of the country. It will give us a full and authoritative statement of the various laws both of Marriage and Divorce in this country, and a fair view of those in Europe.

One feature of very great interest is the attempt to show where the parties obtaining divorces were married, whether in the State where divorced or in some other State or country. With our moving population, and the failure of the original sources of information in some States to show the place of marriage, these figures will necessarily be incomplete and more or less uncertain in their evidence. But probably a good deal can be learned from them. Any one who will study carefully the tables of the advance sheets Mr. Wright has already given to the press and see how widely the 328,716 divorces of twenty years are distributed North and South, East and West, in city and back country districts, cannot help thinking that the theory of migration can account for only the smaller part of the vast total. And if such States as Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and California, which have been regarded and known to be the most frequent resorts of parties seeking divorce, shall after all, in spite of the large legitimate immigra-

tion, be seen to grant the larger part of their divorcees to people who were married within the State, this part of the problem that relates to migration for divorce, grave as it is, is a very small part of the whole, and must take a subordinate place in the larger one of divorce and marriage as a whole. Until the statistics appear, we cannot wisely make predictions. But certainly there has been grave danger, very grave had there been the least probability of actual amendment, that premature national legislation would have done harm. It would have removed frauds while at the same time it might have swollen the great stream of divorcees, restricting its volume here and there, but not as a whole.

There are other and most important elements coming into the problems of legislation. At first the call for amendment was confined to the subject of Divorce. But polygamy in the Territories has long confronted us. If Utah became a state she might go back to polygamy. A general constitutional provision for the whole country then seemed necessary. But further experience showed also that in Utah polygamy needed to be reached through a radical change in the territorial law of marriage. Accordingly, Congress has probably given Utah, alone of all the Territories, an adequate marriage law and one that is much better than those of most of the States. Meanwhile, and even before this, the more careful students of these subjects saw that the marriage laws of the several States and Territories were in a tangled condition of looseness and conflict as well as those relating to divorce. In some way like this, most who have written of late years on constitutional amendment have usually been led to couple marriage and divorce together, including the specific topic of polygamy under the former term.

A very great service has been rendered by Mr. Frank Gaylord Cook in a series of articles, a year ago, in the "Atlantic Monthly," on the Celebration of Marriage in the United States and Europe, as seen in the light of the historical and comparative method. He has shown how that, while Europe has been steadily moving towards a scientific and uniform system, our own drift has been in an important respect the other way. And soon the appendix to the government report will give us an opportunity to make a fuller comparison between the marriage and divorce laws of Europe and our own. My own reflection upon the various material and elements of our own problems led years ago to the probable conclusion that these various elements, including also such other matters as those of inheritance, chastity, and children, were after all but fragments of one whole covered by the single word *Family*. Certainly as the movements have gone on in the last few years, there has been a convergence of thought in this direction. It seems impossible to study all the elements presented in Mr. Wright's investigation without at least raising the question whether one of the deeper lessons of it is not just this one of the unity of various social and legal problems in the great one of Family. It has seemed to me that our legislation has generally been too much the expression of our fragmentary thinking on these subjects, and that the organic nature of the subjects is likely to be recognized soon.

This makes the national problem one of very much greater significance than it is as commonly understood. The conflict of marriage and divorce laws is no small affair. But it must be seen in its proper place and proportions. When thus viewed, it indicates a very different treatment than is popularly demanded on the implication that it covers the larger

part of our trouble. Nothing has been said here so far about the way to final settlement of the great legal problem involved. This may or may not be by constitutional amendment. It may or may not be by general convergence of legislation towards uniformity in the States, either acting independently in a series of experiments or by concerted action, while Congress shall lead or follow in its own provision for the Territories or District of Columbia. There is not time and space to treat this subject in this article, and besides the purpose now is to show the direction of events, thought, and public law, and not to give any opinion as to the final form the solution of it may take. It will be well for us now to get in fair sight of the stream before we indulge in the present popular furor for throwing constitutional bridges across mighty rivers. We must remember that the investigation of the government is the first survey we have had by competent forces of a region into which only solitary pioneers have entered here and there.

The appendix to the government report, particularly when studied in the light of such jurists as Dr. Henscius of Berlin, Dr. Mentha of Zurich, and Fraye and Gode of Paris, and others, will be helpful in approaching our own legislative problems. In Germany and Switzerland especially, the problems of marriage and divorce law and our own problem of various and conflicting laws have been taken up and partly solved. Switzerland has a uniform divorce law, which is still under discussion, or has been within a year or two. Germany has had for a dozen years an imperial marriage law of singularly scientific structure. There is now some discussion of uniformity in divorce law, for the several states and even small cities of Germany are often under very different systems. Such are the nature of the comparatively simple and not difficult regulations, both for entering into and passing out of the relation established by marriage, that bigamies or other illegal relations in the guise of lawful marriage would seem almost impossible. It seems to be as easy in Germany, and some other European countries, to trace the records of a marriage from its beginning to its dissolution, either in death or divorce, as it is in this country to trace the legal status of real property in the States which most carefully guard their records of deeds. We find that now the marriage and divorce laws of Germany are treated in official or private works on *Familienrecht*, or Family Law, growing out of the recent tendency among writers to make Law the Science of Relations instead of the Science of Rights. My own thought, if I may again refer to it, has long led to the conclusion that our practical way in this country of taking up the various legal subjects in this general field one by one with the unconscious yet strong social pressure of the underlying common life would sooner or later bring us to see certain things and the real problem. Marriage and Divorce laws are vastly more than legal provisions of a mere *modus vivendi*, that is, the adjustment of certain individual relations growing out of sex, which can be satisfactorily treated as affairs solely of individual and public concern. There are three instead of two elements in the problem. They are parts of a scientific whole, the Law of the Family. These laws regulate the initiation of individuals into the Family, or rather the initiation of the Family itself into being, and provide for its natural or abnormal dissolution, and are thus organically connected with other parts of this class of law in the common whole.

In this way, we come inductively from a scientific point of view and

practically, and therefore wisely in a political sense, to this great problem. Men of all parties in Congress and in the executive branches of our general government have united in securing this investigation. The way is now fairly open for that study which the subject demands, with a clear field before us in national legislation, if that should be found necessary, or for action by States should this be found to be the better way. There is no reason, happily, to think the present administration will be any less hospitable to the subject in its present stage than the last has been to the investigation and the territorial problem, though that could only wait for the approaches to the latter to be fairly opened by the investigation we now have accomplished.

AUBURNDALE, MASS.

Samuel W. Dike.

NOTES FROM ENGLAND.

DURING the months of December and January every district of England and Wales was put into a greater or less state of excitement by the election of councilors for the new County Councils. These elections were the first direct outcome of the Local Government Act passed last year by our Imperial Parliament. The change thus ushered in is not a great one on the surface, but it may possibly prove to have ulterior consequences of very great moment. Hitherto the local government of the rural districts has been managed by committees of the magistrates, mostly wealthy country gentlemen, of course unpaid, and appointed by the government, mostly from considerations of their social status and property qualifications. Henceforward most of the local matters, notably care of the roads, carrying out the sanitary laws, arranging the assessment upon which the local rates will be levied, care of lunatic asylums, besides many other matters, are to be intrusted to the new County Councils, which are popularly chosen bodies, elected triennially. Throughout England and Wales, therefore, these councils have been elected for the first time, and there has consequently been something of the excitement of a general election, except in a certain number of large towns, which, being already incorporated, have been constituted separate counties under this act, and in which the town council becomes the county council, and will perform those further duties which, as a county council, it has imposed upon it under these acts. The result of these elections, therefore, has been to constitute popular bodies in the counties of England and Wales, which will manage many local affairs, which, though of great importance to the people, have previously been under no popular control.

The most important of the County Councils thus constituted is undoubtedly the London County Council: for the capital of the British Empire is by this Act of Parliament constituted a county, and has had, for the first time, given to it direct popular control of its own municipal affairs. The local affairs of the metropolis have been previously managed by the City Council (in the small part of London comprised by the city proper), by the local Vestries (for the minor affairs in the different localities), and by the Metropolitan Board of Works (for the larger works, for example, sewers and public parks). The Metropolitan Board of Works, composed

of representatives from the various vestries, has done some good work, but it has never been a popular body in any sense, and when last year revelations of extensive jobbery by officials of that body were made, its unpopularity seemed justified, and it was doomed; so, in its place, the new London County Council is to carry out the municipal work of the metropolis.

The election of councilors in London has resulted in the most remarkable success of the Liberal party: of course in many cases the elections did not turn on party lines, but in the majority of cases they did, and it has been a surprise that London, which is considered the stronghold of Conservative principles, should have returned a large majority of Liberal County Councilors. Whether this is to be taken as a sign of reviving Liberalism in the capital, or is due to the dislike of the now dying Metropolitan Board of Works, a strongly Conservative body, or to what causes it is attributable, it is hard to say, but the fact remains that the London County Council is a body in which Radical Reformers have a large working majority.

The duties of the County Council are primarily those duties about which political differences have not much to say. But in time these new councils will have their powers largely extended, and their political differences will be much more important. The licensing of places for the sale of intoxicating liquors, for instance, which the bill in its original form made a duty of the County Council, but which was eventually left in the hands of the magistrates, must, sooner or later, be subject to their control, and the political interest will then be much more excited, and the publican and temperance candidates will be prominent. So, also, with the problem, serious in all our large towns, most serious in London, the provision of adequate dwellings for the working classes, — with this the County Councils at present can only cope by enforcing the existing sanitary laws. Many feel, however, that something much more vigorous than the present law is needed to do away with the "slums" and cellar dwellings, the garrets and dens of "outcast London." Accordingly a bill will be introduced into Parliament immediately, giving the London County Council power to buy up land in London at a valuation price, *without otherwise compensating the present owners for disturbance*, and to erect thereon dwellings for the working classes. If this bill passes into law, there is little doubt that the London County Council will act on its powers, and will inaugurate a new era of social reform.

This proposal to erect dwellings for the poorer classes by compulsorily buying out the rich owners and levying a tax over all ground values in London, to bear the expense, is a proposal which would have greatly shocked our old economists of the *laissez-faire* school, and which smacks terribly of Socialism. This, indeed, cannot be denied that the proposals of the Liberal party become more and more socialistic as years roll on; at the same time, the party of avowed Socialists is making great strides, and signs are not wanting that ere long the Socialists will be strong enough to make themselves an important factor in all popular elections. The London School Board has two very prominent Socialist members, one of whom, Mrs. Annie Besant, a Secularist lecturer, and a well-known philanthropist, was head of the poll in the great East-End Division; the Socialist candidate at the late Bristol School Board election was triumphantly returned, and at the Newcastle-on-Tyne School Board election three Socialist candidates were returned, the whole Board being only

fifteen in number. In the London County Council election no success was more notable than that of John Burns the Socialist, who, just a year ago, was suffering imprisonment for endeavoring to deliver a speech in Trafalgar Square, and now heads the poll in the Battersea division. Ten years ago the notion that an avowed Socialist could ever succeed at any popular election would have been absurd: now there is nothing strange in it: what ten years hence will see, it is hard to tell. This consideration is, in any case, reassuring, that the Socialism which is now making such rapid strides is perfectly open and avowed; it is not, as often on the Continent of Europe, driven underground by laws which limit the freedom of the press and of public utterance; besides, it is, as a rule, entirely constitutional in its means and aims, and strives for no sudden or violent subversion of the existing social order. These are the encouraging points about our most advanced politicians; and these considerations allow the hope that our future political and social development, which cannot but be a matter of many struggles and much difficulty, will still be an orderly and regular march of progress.

In the ecclesiastical world, also, the air is full of interest and expectation. The Bishop of Lincoln has been summoned before the Archbishop of Canterbury's Court to answer the charges preferred against him of ritualistic practices which are contrary to the discipline of the Anglican Church. The Bishop of Lincoln is the most eminent and avowed exponent of the extreme High Church party on the episcopal bench. The Low Church section of the Church of England, whose whole instincts are Calvinistic, and whose watchword is "Protestantism," have endeavored to bring matters to an issue by citing for illegal practices the episcopal champion of that other party in the State Church, whose whole instincts are Catholic, and whose public services are scarcely distinguishable from those of the Roman Catholic Church. The ritualistic practices^a charged against the Bishop of Lincoln have been already condemned by our highest ecclesiastical court, and include the use of altar lights, of the mixed chalice, and of the eastward position, causing the "Agnus Dei" to be sung immediately after the prayer of consecration, and ceremonially cleansing the paten and chalice.

That the Bishop has done what is charged against him is not denied. He and his party seem to take now the same ground which the ritualistic clergy have always taken, that is, denying the authority of the ecclesiastical courts, they claim that the Church must be independent of the State in all things spiritual. The trial before the Archbishop's Court, which opened on the 12th of February, now stands adjourned till the 12th of March; it may be all over by the time these lines are in print, or we may be for months plunged into a sea of legal and ecclesiastical squabble: some even think that the matter can hardly end without severing the weak bond which binds in one communion the two sections of the Church of England.

Under the circumstances any one who is not a partisan in the quarrel can hardly fail to be moved by two opposite feelings. On the one hand, it is hard not to feel indignant at a matter of ritual and vestments, "a question of old clothes," as Dean Stanley once put it, being allowed to divert the Church from its work of uniting all men in Christian brotherhood, of converting the sinner, and of healing the sick: one cannot fail to feel with those who ask, "Are they who find good in these symbols

and this ritual to be harassed, perhaps deposed from their office, and even prevented from joining in the work of the Christian ministry, just because they do not do everything to the liking of another party?" On the other hand, it is hard to see why men who take all the advantage of the social status and monetary emoluments of the Established Church should be allowed to have them while they repeatedly and willfully break the law which the Established Church most indubitably lays down: one cannot help feeling the force of those who say, "Clergymen have been repeatedly punished for doing these things: and shall a bishop, who should be a model of law, order, and right-doing to his clergy, be allowed to transgress the law under which his clergy are punished, just because his station is higher and his transgression the more serious?"

When the court was formally opened on the 12th of February, the Bishop of Lincoln handed in a protest against the jurisdiction of the Archbishop's Court, in which he urged that it would have been more in accord with the custom of the primitive church to have summoned him before a court of his Metropolitan and the other bishops of his province, but in which he takes no notice whatsoever of recent decisions in ecclesiastical cases, and implicitly ignores altogether the authority of the courts which tried them. This protest is thought by many to add greatly to the gravity of the position. But whether this trial will really be productive of any new relation or result in the history of the Church of England remains to be seen. For the present there is only expectation and surmise.

Amid such manifestations of the doctrinal and other differences which divide the forces of Christianity, there are not wanting signs of hope. One especially interesting sign of the times is the success which has attended Dr. Joseph Parker's midday talks to workmen. Dr. Parker, whose large church is in the midst of one of the busiest warehouse and workmen's quarters of London, has been inviting workmen to come, bring and eat their midday dinner, and smoke a midday pipe in the lecture-room of his church. These meetings have taken place on successive Mondays, Dr. Parker first giving a short address and then inviting questions and expressions of opinion from the men, and then answering their objections and restating his own views. The questions taken up at these informal conferences have been: "Mistakes of the Preachers," "Mistakes of the People," "The Unemployed and Emigration," "Why do not Workingmen go to Church?" etc. The plan seems to have been already productive of a better understanding between the preacher and the people. Certainly all honest efforts in this direction are to be heartily welcome.

Some of our most popular preachers are now making it a practice to address workmen regularly one Sunday evening a month, often taking a topic of social importance. One London minister who is doing admirable work now among the working classes follows this course up by a free-and-easy conference on the following Monday evening, in his school-room, when he is ready to hear those speak to whom he has been preaching the previous evening. Some such method seems necessary if the leaders of religion are to make their influence felt in the political and social spheres.

Among works of recent literature I will only mention two, both of which

belong to a now increasing class of historical works dealing with local history. In "Church Principles and Bible Truths," W. Urwick gives a decided negative to the debated question, "Was John Bunyan a Baptist?" and also gives an interesting account of Nonconformity in the city of St. Albans.

Most laborious and most valuable is Mr. W. J. C. Moens's "The Walloons and their Church at Norwich, 1565-1832." This work comes out under the auspices of the Huguenot Society of London, and, for the most part, its two quarto volumes are composed of documents and genealogies of special antiquarian interest to the Huguenot families of England. In the space of 110 pages, however, the history of the Walloon Church at Norwich is sketched, and much light is thrown on the history of religion in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The story of how the Flemish and French refugees were favored by Queen Elizabeth, persecuted by Archbishop Laud, accorded privileges again by Cromwell, and how their church subsequently decayed and vanished, — not, however, without leaving a mark on the religious life of our country, — this is a story not to be neglected by the student of religion in England.

Joseph King, Jr.

HAMPSTEAD, LONDON.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES.

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO RELIGION. By ROBERT POTTER, M. A., etc. etc. Macmillan & Co. 1888.

Two methods for the investigation of the evidences for the Christian position are open to thoughtful men to-day, each of which commends itself to a type or tendency of the human mind. Roughly speaking, we may call one of them the historical, the other the scientific, method. On the one hand, accepting the verdict of the rationalistic schools of criticism in France and Germany as to the authenticity of the four great Pauline epistles, and the testimony of men of all shades of historical opinion with regard to the existence of certain universally recognized Christian phenomena at the beginning of the second century, it is possible to arrive at what is to most minds a convincing belief in the New Testament revelation as preserved to us in the Gospels. There is, however, a second method which is possibly more in favor among thoughtful men to-day — breathing as we do at every waking moment so much of empiricism in every form of thought — which I have spoken of as the scientific method. And by this second method, as well as by the first, we examine what things are universally accepted as the facts and the phenomena of a certain period, — in this case, of our own day, — and working backward from the data so secured we arrive at a generalization and a postulate of causation.

Among recent attempts at clearing the ground in this direction, there has been perhaps no more thorough and searching — and at the same time cautious and unassuming — piece of work than is embodied in a little monograph from the pen of the Lecturer on Christian Evidences in

Trinity College, Melbourne. Thoroughly familiar with the methods and the results of modern scientific and philosophical research, Canon Potter brings them to bear upon the questions, What aid do they give to the reverent student of Christianity as a factor in the development of the race? Can we regard the teachings and the practice of Christianity as falling into line with the principles which the scientific method sets before us, or do they form an exception to its rules?

It is manifest that if the examination yields unqualified testimony to the position of Christian faith, its value at the present moment is unquestionable. That it does so yield is the contention of Canon Potter's little volume, and will be the contention of this review.

Profoundly speculative as was the mind of Kant, it is possible that one of his greatest services to human thought lay in his pointing out some of the antinomies that exist between what he termed the practical and the speculative reason — between pure thought on the one hand, and the facts of existence and of consciousness on the other. It is here too that in all probability the Christian apologist will consider himself most indebted to the great German thinker; for it was in adjusting the moral nature of man to its environment and to the facts of its own consciousness that Kant arrived at what to him seemed the justification as well as the necessity for a belief in God. To him the thing given is the imperative of conscience, and from this he infers the existence of a moral and holy God as a postulate of the practical reason. Harmonizing as Kant's theory does with the facts that meet us practically in the life of Israel and in the history of Revelation, and with a Christian as opposed to a purely theistic conception of the universe, we may be pardoned for calling Kant's the specifically Christian method of arriving at the grounds of a philosophic faith.

But it must be borne in mind that, strong as Kant's position is, and incapable of evasion by minds keenly alive to "the exceeding sinfulness of sin," it does not preclude the employment of an entirely different method to arrive at the same conclusion by minds that approach the problem from a very different side.

Laying aside, as irrelevant to our present purpose, the fact that the general consciousness of mankind with regard to the sinfulness of sin is apparently just now much less acute than at some prior periods in the history of the race, we find that a different method is insisted on: a method which results in confirming in us a belief in a high theistic conception of the universe, as opposed to one specifically Christian.

The phenomenal popularity of a recent novel dealing with some of the religious problems of the time has made familiar to the general public the name of a man who, judging both from his published works and from the testimony of his friends, seems to have been the possessor of a singularly keen and far-reaching mind, as well as of an equally devout and aspiring personal character — the too early dead professor of moral philosophy in the University of Oxford, the late Mr. T. H. Green. A strong theist when he entered upon his duties at Oxford, Mr. Green set himself to formulate some groundwork for his belief which should be independent of the fluctuating discoveries and conclusions of empirical scientific research. Some portion of his system we find elaborated in the little volume of two "Lay Sermons," delivered by him before the heads of his college in accordance with the custom of the holder of the chair to address them on the Saturday preceding the administration of

the Communion: a custom which had descended from the times when all the University professorial chairs were held by clergymen, and which, as he was the first lay occupant of the moral professorship, he was at liberty to ignore or to conform to as he chose. Professor Green decided to deliver the sermon or address; and the result is seen in the sermons on "The Witness of God" and "Faith," which were published after his death. A further acquaintance with Professor Green's method must be sought in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* and his philosophical and other works. It has seemed worth while to call attention to the man, however, in this connection, in order to acquaint ourselves with a justification for faith which appeared to such a mind sufficient to satisfy the most exacting philosophic test, and successfully to withstand assault.

Given, says Mr. Green, the consciousness of the individual, we infer from this the consciousness of God. The argument is at this stage an exceedingly old one, and has been familiar to Christian and theistic apologists from very early times. Professor Green, however, pursues the argument further, and essentially changes its bearing, when he tells us that history shows us a progressive effort of the individual consciousness to realize its unity with the consciousness of God; and that out of this effort and this consciousness emerges the idea of morality and moral responsibility.

With Kant the first fact is the moral idea in mankind; with Mr. Green the first fact is the consciousness of God. Thus far with regard to "the justification for faith" in the moral government of the universe at the hands of an unseen God.

It will be manifest to the critical mind that, so far, we are advanced but little in our search after "the justification for faith," using the words in a definitively Christian sense. It is, however, with certain conclusions deducible from these positions that we have now to do: with the categorical moral imperative in the soul of man (or in other words with the supremacy of conscience), and of man's consciousness of God and of the link connecting him with God. If these two things exist, — and it is contended both abstractedly and upon the facts that they do exist, — what light upon the matter may be thrown by the history of Christianity as a revelation and as the regulator of human conduct?

Canon Potter answers this question by an examination of the facts. It is objected that, if we maintain that man possesses in conscience an infallible test of truth, we shall find ourselves at once in a dilemma. Certain things have frequently been done in the name of Christ, and in accordance with what were considered the demands of conscience, which the conscience of a later age repudiates. Which conscience is to be considered as infallible — the earlier, or the later? — since it is impossible that both can be. Again: men's consciences differ materially among themselves to-day upon many minor matters: where, then, does the undivided supremacy of conscience hold her seat?

Acknowledging both these difficulties, — and allowing further that the individual conscience sometimes deceives by its very eagerness to exclude selfish considerations, as well as in deference to them, — Canon Potter contends that of one thing there can be no doubt; and that is of the gradual but most perceptible tendency of the conscience of the race, so far as it has accepted the Christian faith, to assimilate itself to the spirit of its Founder, and to improve the social and ethical condition of mankind. While there has been a fluctuation, like that of the flux and reflux

of the tide, — and while certain individuals' consciences, like certain atoms of water, seem not to join in the advance, — there has yet been an advance to which history bears emphatic witness. Christianity has justified the position it assumes by the fruits of its activity: it has been true of the race, as of the individual, that he that willeth to do the will knoweth of the doctrine. However easy it may be to point out and estimate the reflux, and to find here and there an isolated atom which has not joined in the advance but has apparently retrograded, the view along the line shows us that there has been progress of the most pronounced description. The sea is flowing now over what was an hour ago dry land, and there is no room left to doubt the direction to which it tends. So much as this is conceded by nearly all competent investigators. Mr. Lecky, in his examination of "*The History of European Morals*," bears ungrudging and unsolicited testimony to the regenerative power of Christianity upon society wherever its influence has been placed in the ascendant.

Here, then, precisely as "he who loves God knows God," so does the race that obeys God find God. In the practical result to the world which puts itself under the discipline of the Cross do we find the justification for its submission to such obedience. With whatever minor retardations the progress of the Christian movement may be marked, the general wave is rolling emphatically upward, and its goal is a position and a peace which it is impossible that we can gauge. Upon this the mind of the Christian, when it is most tempted to despondency, may allow itself most unreservedly to rest.

There remains, however, the further investigation: Is the universe, or is it not, a unity? and if it be, is the principle of its unity favorable to righteousness? In other words, Do righteousness and happiness go hand in hand? Is the world of nature, in this crucial particular, at one with the world of grace?

To this question it is not possible to return an answer that shall be anything but approximately satisfactory; nor is it without hesitation that one attempts to formulate a theory upon a problem that has pressed so heavily upon individual minds in all ages of the world, and been answered in contrary ways by some of the most gifted and most reverent of mankind. Taking a wide survey, it is however possible to say that, while in the individual the conflict may continue to be the keenest that flesh and blood can know, in the wider arena of the race there seems to be a breaking light. There is manifestly a growing tendency to postulate the greater happiness of the Christian over the non-Christian nations, and to believe that the natural world is so adjusted to the world of spirit that the obedience of any large body of humanity to the laws of their spiritual being results in a larger amount even of temporal happiness than could otherwise be theirs. Individuals still have to offer up their inclinations and their happinesses not infrequently to the law of righteousness and to the welfare of their fellows: but the result of such sacrifice is measurable in the increased happiness and righteousness of the humanity in which they share, and of the generations now unborn that shall come after them upon the earth. To the individual the Christian teacher must continue to answer: "Pain with progress — yes! the right before all things and at all costs, and no estimate of its happiness or the reverse to be put before its rolling wheels." But to the nation, to the world at large, the study of history allows us to return a less rigorous, a more con-

soling answer, wherein lie also the hope and the solace of the struggling individual soul: that "moving upward, working out the beast," *does* inure to the greater happiness of the body corporate; and that the world which embraces the religion of the Cross may in the end expect to be both happier and more at peace, as well as holier and less ignoble, with the progress of succeeding suns.

William Higgs.

McDONOUGH, NEW YORK.

THE CHRISTIAN MIRACLES AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF SCIENCE. By Rev. W. D. THOMSON, M. A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. New York: Scribner & Welford. Boston: N. J. Bartlett & Co.

This is one of the well-known Series of Handbooks for Bible Classes and Private Students, issued by T. & T. Clark. The first sentences of the introduction are as follows:—

"The Christian miracles constitute a class of supernatural phenomena. In this treatise the attempt is made to reconcile the possibility of their occurrence with the conclusions of science. They are not examined one by one, nor as arranged in various groups. They are considered rather as a whole, as all alike involving the action of supernatural power within the course of nature: and the attempt made is to show the compatibility of such action with the order of nature as explained by science. The Incarnation, however, is the foundation-miracle of Christianity; and the possibility of this miracle involves that of all the rest. Hence it is singled out after general conclusions have been reached; and its possibility as a Biological occurrence is vindicated."

This is the general outline and the purpose of the book. The subject is discussed with remarkable clearness and completeness for a handbook.

The student's time is very precious, and he hails with delight such a writer as this who can put his thorough and comprehensive knowledge into so small a space. This book brings the discussion of the natural and supernatural down to date. After showing the naturalness of the supernatural, the author describes a miracle from the Biblical point of view, and then gives his own definition of miracles, namely, "The Christian miracles are effects from extraordinary, as distinguished from ordinary exercises of the personal and Divine efficiency immanent in nature."

It remains to show that these "effects" are possible within the natural world as we know it; and this is, in our opinion, accomplished.

One does not need an extensive knowledge of physics to follow this argument, yet the fundamental facts and principles of natural science are all here before the reader, and evidently present no obstacle to "extraordinary exercises" of the "Divine efficiency immanent in nature." Natural force is carefully distinguished from natural law, and we would recommend the chapter on natural law to those who may have been begoggled by the discussion of this subject in the book called "Natural Law in the Spiritual World."

In his treatment of the Incarnation as necessary and verified, which occupies the last two chapters of the book, the writer seems to lose the freedom and comprehensiveness so manifest before and is cramped by a mechanical and minute theology.

The book as a whole meets some important questions fairly and squarely and will repay careful study.

William Slade.

WEST NEWBURY, MASS.

THE AMERICAN BOOK OF CHURCH SERVICES, with Selections for Responsive Reading, and Full Orders of Service for the Celebration of Matrimony, for Funerals and other Occasional Ministrations. Also an ample List of Selections of Sacred Music, with References for the Guidance of Pastors and Choristers. Arranged by EDWARD HUNGERFORD. 16mo. Boston : Houghton, Mifflin & Co. 1889. \$1.25.

The attention of ministers and members of all denominations of non-liturgical churches has, during the past two or three years, been so thoroughly aroused to the meagreness of the forms of service to which we have been accustomed, and so many tentative efforts have been made in every quarter toward their enrichment, that the above-named little book by Rev. Edward Hungerford, just come, in the daintiest of type, form, and binding, from Houghton, Mifflin & Co., will receive a most hearty welcome, as by far the best contribution to the literature of public worship and the most adequate provision for the needs of pastors and choristers in their conduct of public services, that has appeared. The writer of this paper had the fortune to be associated as choir-director with Mr. Hungerford two years, during the preparation of this book, in the course of which time there was abundant opportunity at once to prove the practicability and impressiveness of the various services outlined in it, and to submit every suggestion contained in them to the test of careful and repeated practical use, so that perfect and symmetrical adjustment of part to part might be secured, and that their real value to the average congregation might be ascertained. The result was that both the shorter and the fuller order of regular Sabbath services, and also (and especially) those for the Communion service, proved wonderfully inspiring and quickening, and, in connection with the consecutiveness and cumulativeness of thought and sentiment that it is a principal aim of those services to secure in divine worship, stimulating the people to hearty participation in them and conducing most manifestly to their vitality and power. The rich treasures of ancient and hallowed forms of prayer have never before been so fully and discreetly opened up to us, in so small compass, as here. Their precious fragrance of devout and trustful piety, less common in this restless age than in the early church, will be a rich comfort to many, and will constitute for them a chief value of the book. The Responsive readings contained in the manual will be found to be genuine antiphons, not merely verses, to be responsively repeated. The collection of these is very large, including many other passages of Scripture than the Psalms, and covering a wide range of subjects appropriately grouped together. It is not seemly for the writer to dwell especially upon the suggestions of music embodied in the book, but it will not seem out of place to say that great care has been taken to provide a sufficient number of choir pieces, for the various offices, that are at once worthy and simple. The commonplace, or childish, has nowhere been recommended because it is easy, but the copious repertoires of genuine sacred music opened up during thirty years of experience as choir-director have been carefully searched, for Anthems, Responses, etc., that are at once dignifiedly musical and within the reach (as to technical difficulty) of the most unskilled of choirs. It will be seen also that a large number of selections for more experienced choirs is included, not forgetting the needs of male-voice choirs now coming into well-deserved prominence in our churches.

B. C. Blodgett.

NORTHAMPTON, MASS.

YALE LECTURES ON PREACHING, AND OTHER WRITINGS. By NATHANIEL J. BURTON, D. D., Pastor of the Park Church, Hartford, Conn. Edited by RICHARD E. BURTON. Pp. 639. New York: Chas. L. Webster & Co. London: Chatto & Windus. 1888.

A book which should have a wide circulation among the young men in the ministry is "Yale Lectures on Preaching, and other Writings," by Nathaniel J. Burton, D. D., for many years pastor of the Park Church in Hartford. This neatly bound volume, edited by his son, contains twenty of Dr. Burton's homiletical lectures; eight miscellaneous addresses; nine sermons and extracts from his foreign letters, published in the Hartford "Evening Post" in 1868 and 1869.

The addresses delivered at Dr. Burton's funeral by President Dwight, Rev. J. H. Twichell, D. D., and Dr. Parker, are also included.

The varied character of these productions gives us a bird's-eye view of the broad and fertile genius of Dr. Burton, and enables us to appreciate his striking personality. But space permits only a glance, and that brief, at one portion, his homiletical lectures.

These, delivered at Yale Theological Seminary, twelve in the Lyman Beecher course of 1884, and eight as special lectures the two following years, might be termed a homiletical autobiography; for they do not consist of a systematic elaboration of homiletical principles, but rather present certain truths through the medium of his own personality and experience.

We catch the general spirit and purpose of the whole in the opening sentence of the lecture on "Order in Sermon Topics," where he says: "Gentlemen, we learn by the mistakes we make; that, for one way; but when a man has spent half a century or so in making mistakes, and getting wise in that expensive manner, he turns to those who are young with a feeling that they ought to learn by his mistakes, and not be at the miserable expense and waste of time of working out a great list of mistakes of their own."

Only a man with a great loving heart, a royal nature, and a Christ-like spirit of humility, could so permeate his utterances with his own individuality without offense. But Dr. Burton could, and did, because he was such a man. And because he thus wrote, the laws laid down, instead of being cold and formal, glow with the fervent heat of human life and action. One cannot read his words without loving and admiring the man and having regard to his counsel.

We can read lectures, hear sermons, and listen to good advice, *ad infinitum*, even acknowledging all claims made, without being one whit influenced by them; but when this servant of God in urging us to take aim, to aim at men in our sermons, takes us into his confidence and says, "It has been the sin of my life that I have not always taken aim. I have been a lover of subjects. If I had loved men more and loved subjects only as God's instruments of good for men, it would have been better, and I should have more to show for all my labors under the sun;" speaking thus he seems to come very close to us, and our hearts warm toward him and we heed his words. We become disciples sitting at the feet of a traveler, as he warns us of the rough roads, the steep hills and the sterile fields, and tells us where to find the green pastures, the still waters, and the paths of righteousness, whereby we may lead our flocks in safety through this desert to the celestial fold.

His thoughts are beautiful in expression, because of his rare mental

gifts: they are valuable because of his experience: they are powerful because they come straight from his heart.

Dr. Burton was controlled by subjective rather than by objective influences, and in a certain way was no respecter of persons. I imagine he cared little for the world's verdict on his acts and utterances—he spake as he was moved within his soul.

Such a spirit pervades his lectures. While scholarly they are unstudied, with no trace of artificiality about them; and his expressions come tumbling, roaring, flashing like a mountain brook. Scores of his sentences would be the despair of a class in grammar, and he calls into action words which find no place in Webster; but which none the less under his command add to the force without marring the symmetry of his expressions.

Also, because of this spontaneous spirit and method of treatment, the lectures are not comprehensive—would never do as a text-book. Looking at all subjects, in the main, from one standpoint, and that not a common one, they might be termed a treatise on the relation of the imagination and its expression in art to ministerial life and duties.

The titles of some of his lectures illustrate this: the third is *Originality in the Preacher*; the fourth, *Imagination in Ministers*; the fifth, *Imagination in Sermons*; the eighth, *Ceremonial Occasions*; the ninth, *The Right Conduct of Public Worship*; and the twelfth and thirteenth, *The Service of Art in Religion*.

This prominence given to the imagination at first thought seems unwise and perhaps dangerous; but by imagination Dr. Burton does not mean fancy. With him the imaginative stands in contrast not to the actual and substantial, but in contrast to the trite and commonplace. Imagination vivifies, makes truths, facts, men, scenes live before the preacher and live before the people.

After reading his lecture on *Imagination in Sermons*, I understood why some of my discourses, prepared with painstaking care, had stirred neither speaker nor hearers. Devoid of imagination they were only skeletons in armor, instead of living truths holding the shield of faith and the sword of the Spirit.

Dr. Burton shows the value and legitimate functions of this gift of God, which is sometimes feared and more often neglected, but which might cause many a homiletical desert to blossom as the rose.

His first sentence in *Imagination in Ministers* has a suspicious appearance, and puts us on our guard, for it reads: "I am here to-day to make a plea for imagination in ministers, considered as theologians." But on reading it imagination proves not to be an *Arabian Nights'* monster bird upon whose back the youthful preacher is to mount and be borne aloft into misty cloud lands, or carried into unknown distant regions beyond the confines of divinely revealed truth. It is rather one of God's mountain peaks, from whose summit the dweller in the narrow dark valley beneath, thinking that all of God's light has been poured into that valley and that all of God's creation is within its walls—one of God's mountain peaks from whose summit such a one may behold God's sun flooding with light the world's vast dome, and perceive in their true proportion and relation the fertile meadows and rocky hills, the dark valleys, the mountain heights, the limitless ocean, and the far-reaching, boundless horizon of God's infinite eternal truth.

Such is imagination in Dr. Burton's eyes, one of the most delightful,

powerful, holy gifts of God to man. We spend most of our lives like moles digging in the earth, but we should know God better and dig better, if at times in eagle flight and with eagle vision we should mount upward toward the sun.

These lectures are stimulating and suggestive, containing many short pointed sentences, which act like spurs and set the mind off on a gallop. In one place he says: "If we all had nothing in us but our actualities we should be small affairs: our potentialities are the greatest things about us." In another connection his words are: "The question is sometimes raised, how plainly a preacher had better show the skeleton in his sermon. I should say, as a rule, about as plainly as he shows his own skeleton." In his lecture on "Short Sermons" is this definition, "A short sermon is a sermon that seems short;" and he closes his lecture on "Making Sermons" thus: "A sermon gets to be a sermon and saves itself from being a lecture by being made and delivered in the Holy Ghost."

Though these lectures were written for theological students, they seem peculiarly adapted to those who are trying to catch their breath after coming up from the first plunge into the whirlpool of ministerial life. To a young minister, surprised, perplexed, confused, overwhelmed by the actions of the unsanctified throng, of the elect, of his own wayward nature and of the Conscript Fathers, to him these lectures will prove a real blessing, a veritable godsend. For he gives into our bosom wholesome advice, hearty cheer and inspiring encouragement, good measure, pressed down, and shaken together and running over. One of the best examples of this is his manly, cheerful exhortation, entitled "High Heartedness in the Ministry," — a very sweet morsel indeed for a repast on a blue Monday morning.

But Dr. Burton does not limit himself to encouragement in his words "to embryo ministers." He can warn and reprove; and does with no sparing hand. He begins his lecture on "The Assimilation of Sermon Material" thus: "Gentlemen, most of you feel your limitations, I dare say. If you do not, I feel them for you. So do your professors." And evidently he feels them quite strongly and makes his hearers, and readers too, feel them if they never did before. He takes it thoroughly for granted that we shall make a by no means inconsiderable number of mistakes during our early ministry, and talks with a rather trying persistency from that standpoint.

These lectures must have been of great value to those for whom they were written; but others, who read, will find their imaginations aroused, their minds stimulated, and their hearts warmed, and will take up with stronger grasp and more earnest purpose their daily tasks.

Edwin Hallock Byington.

SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

BABYLONISCH-ASSYRISCHE GESCHICHTE VON C. P. TIELE. 2 Teil. Von der Thronbesteigung Sinacheribs bis zur Eroberung Babels durch Cyrus. 8vo, pp. 285-647. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. 1888.

The author feels that a people, whose influence has been so great upon the history of nations and of civilization, deserves to be better known than the Assyrians and Babylonians have been hitherto. Every page of his lucid and learned volume is a proof to his readers that he is in the right.

Section III. is a continuation. It covers the second Assyrian period in which events group around Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Asurbanipal, not as lay figures but living actors in the drama that ended in the Fall of Nineveh.

The next section delineates with a master-hand the second Babylonian or New-Chaldean period. Here Nebuchadnezzar stands out boldly as his famous cameo. No less distinct is the capture of Babylon by Cyrus, perhaps the climax of the whole brilliant narrative. This capture the Jewish prophets did not expect precisely as it happened. "When now the man whom they had hailed as the servant and instrument of Jehovah, and even as Jehovah's favorite, came forward as peacemaker rather than judge, not casting down the foreign gods, but honoring them like his own, not turning the hated city into a desert but raising it to a royal residence, they must have experienced a disenchantment which, even with the striking off of their fetters, would not wholly disappear."

One may accept or reject Professor Tiele's views on the higher criticism. It is impossible not to admire the research, the moderation, the independence, the accuracy, the suggestiveness, the charm with which he has woven his story out of sacred and heathen fabrics. Neither Hommel nor Brunengo are to be named beside him. The foot-notes show more than acquaintance with the names of Oppert, Schrader, Sayce, Delitzsch, Haupt, Strassmeier, Pognon, Pinches, and Budge. They show knowledge of the original documents, and convictions gathered from the baffling cuneiform texts. Taken as a whole, the book is likely to prove a classic in its field.

We regard Section V., on *Die Babylonisch-Assyrische Cultur*, as the best extant solution of a knotty problem. If it be not adequate, it is only because the sources are not adequate. The author's treatment of Babylonian industry and commerce has all the vivacity and none of the superficialness of a newspaper. Of the banking house of the Egibi and the invention of exchange by the merchants of the Euphrates he speaks with due reserve. An ingenious conjecture he does not take for an established fact. It is probable that India and Chaldæa had commercial relations by sea rather than by land. These seem witnessed by words, by the teakwood, by the Indian hound, and even by the borrowing on the Indus of the Babylonian weight. The god Ea was the god of the ocean. Hence he was the patron of fishermen and sailors, to whom Sennacherib flung a golden fish on the eve of the departure of his war-fleet. Indeed, Ea and Dagan are one and the same deity. The library of Nineveh was a marvellous collection of clay tablets, substantiating the claim of Asurbanipal to be a patron of letters. That this library was free to the public is, however, unproven and improbable. The Old-Chaldean writing may have been borrowed from a non-Semitic pre-Sumerian race. Certainly it did not originate with Egyptians or Chinese, nor their script from it. The utmost which can be said is that the three writings had a common origin, though each was developed apart from the others into its own form.

It is usual to regard the Assyrian kings as despots par excellence. No doubt this was true in practice. It was false in theory. They were limited, as Professor Tiele points out in an interesting chapter, by laws and charters to which they refer often, and on the basis of the faithful observance of which they look for the favor of their gods. The royal violator of the law of the land braved the wrath of Heaven, and pestilence and famine

on earth. The Assyrian monarch was not deified like the Egyptian, although the sign of deity was placed before his name. Nowhere in his empire is a trace of temples erected to regal worship or rituals established for regal honor. The oldest government was theocratic. The ruler's title was Isakku, then Sangu or Saknu, finally Sarru or Malku, — which, singly or combined, have a sacerdotal sound. The title "Sar Sarrani," "King of Kings," has a no less feudal ring. Our space forbids us to name the great officials and sumptuous etiquette of the Assyrian court, centering in a palace lion-guarded and alabaster-sculptured on its enormous artificial mound. Professor Tiele's picture is a model of literary art combined with philological and political acuteness.

Our author's observations on the art and religion of Babylonia are extremely penetrating and valuable. The Temple E-Sagila was a many-shrined Acropolis. He thinks that Herodotus was speaking of this ancient sanctuary, under the name Jupiter Belus, but could never have been personally a visitor to the Babylon where Marduk was adored. He thinks also that the religion of Assyria, spite of the simplicity of its ritual and the elevation of its psalms, never embodied itself in one supreme deity, Ilu, or did more than graze the boundaries of monotheism.

We note a misspelling at the foot of page 310, and a misprint in the fifteenth line of page 520.

John Phelps Taylor.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Akademische Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, Freiburg i. B. Sammlung Theologischer Lehrbücher. Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte. Von Dr. Adolf Harnack, ord. Professor der Kirchengeschichte in Marburg. Erster Band, Die Entstehung des Kirchlichen Dogmas. Zweite vermehrte und verbesserte Auflage. Pp. xxiv, 752. 1888. 14 M.; — Das Neue Testament um das Jahr 200. Theodor Zahn's Geschichte des neutestamentlichen Kanons (erster Band, erste Hälfte), geprüft von D. Adolf Harnack, Professor der Kirchengeschichte an der Universität Berlin. Pp. 112. 1889. 2 M.

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